A review of the Energy Productivity Center's Least-Cost Energy Strategy study by Berndt, Ernst R. et al.
A Review of the Energy Productivity Center's
"Least-Cost Energy Strategy" Study
by
David 0. Wood
Michael Manove
Ernst R. Berndt
June 30, 1981
(Revised November 30, 1981)
MIT Energy Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL 81-043
A Review of the Energy Productivity Center's
"Least-Cost Energy Strategy" Study
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Energy Laboratory
Energy Model Analysis Program
by
David 0. Wood
Michael Manove
Ernst R. Berndt
Contributors
Alan Cox
Ronald Krumm
Edward Mensah
Eric Shumabukuro
George Tolley
Prepared for:
Electric Power Research Institute
3412 Hillview Avenue
Palo Alto, California 94304
EPRI Project Manager:
Richard Richels
Energy Analysis and Environment Division
NOTICE
This report was prepared by the organization(s) named below as an account
of work sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. (EPRI).
Neither EPRI, members of EPRI, the organization(s) named below, nor any
person acting on their behalf: (a) makes any warranty or representation,
express or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of the information contained in this report, or that the use
of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this
report may not infringe privately owned rights; or (b) assumes any
liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the
use of, any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this
report.
Prepared by
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
-i-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Contributions from several individuals must be mentioned. At an
early stage of this review Steve Carhart of the Mellon Institute's Energy
Productivity Center (EPC) provided a comprehensive'briefing on the
objectives and organization of EPC's "Least-Cost Energy Strategy" Study,
and transmitted to us the materials which comprise the documentation for
this review. Later he commented on the first draft of this report.
The organizations responsible for the models used in EPC's study
also provided valuable assistance in completing the model description
questionaires included in Appendix A. In particular we acknowledge the
assistance of Samir Salama and Harold Kalkstein of Energy and
Environmental Analysis, Inc.; Michael Lawrence of Jack Faucett
Associates; and Peter T. Kleeman of the Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Roger Bohn of the MIT Sloan School also "consulted" with us regarding the
ISTUM model, a modeling effort in which he participated at an earlier
stage as an employee of Energy and Environmental analysis, Inc.
We wish to acknowledge helpful comments from Rene Males of EPRI,
Paul Joskow of MIT, David Strom of the Office of Technology Assessment,
Alan Meier of the University of California at Berkeley, and Roger Bohn.
Finally we acknowledge the support provided by EPRI in organizing
and conducting this review. We have benefited from several conversations
with Larry Williams of the EPRI Demand Analysis group. As in previous
EMAP studies, Richard Richels has contributed significantly to both the
organization and content of the study.
-ii-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Mellon Institute's Energy Productivity Center (EPC) has recently
completed a study asking the question, "How would the nation have
provided energy services in 1978 if its capital stock had een
reconfigured to be optimal for actual 1978 energy prices?" Interest
in this question is motivated by the unanticipated increases in oil
prices since 1973. If policy makers are to learn from history it is
important to know what would have happened if the increases in energy
prices had been foreseen and if the nation had taken full advantage of
that knowledge to minimize costs.
EPC concludes that if the 1978 capital stock had been transformed in
conformance with a least-cost principal for providing energy services,
then, given actual 1978 energy prices and energy service demands, per
capita energy service costs would have been reduced by 17%. Market
shares of the various energy types would also have been affected
substantially. For example, while the gas share of total energy service
demand would have increased slightly from actual 1978 levels, the share
of purchased electricity would have fallen from 30% to 17% of total
energy service demand, and improvements in energy efficiency would have
increased from 10% to 32%.
EPC's findings have received considerable attention, both from the
press and from policy makers. EPC interprets its results as indicating
"... the direction in which we coul move to begin realizing some of the
benefits of a least-cost strategy."
The purpose of this report is to assess and evaluate the EPC
methodology, data base, and results. Here we briefly summarize our
principal findings.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. The Energy Productivity Center's retrospective, "Least-Cost Energy
Strategy" (LCES) study is provocative regarding the potential role
of efficiency technologies in competition with energy supply
technologies. Their decision to conduct a "what if' analysis for a
recent year provides an historical context for interpreting and
reviewing the results.
1.1 As a result of its predication on known prices and
technologies, the question posed by EPC avoids analysis of the
difficult problems of uncertainty, shocks, and other
"surprises," and instead focuses on the issue of optimal
adjustment to higher energy prices.
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1.2 The retrospective vantage of the LCES study helps us learn from
history and has implications for optimal adjustment to future
energy-price increases.
2. The LCES study is subtitled: "Minimizing Consumer Costs Through
Competition." But the effects of competition are not explored in
the body of the study. All of EPC's analysis is devoted to
constructing a hypothetical optimal strategy and comparing that
strategy to what actually occurred. EPC suggests, without
substantiation, that competiton would cause an optimal strategy to
materialize. It should be kept in mind that many economists,
planners and regulators would argue that an optimal strategy can be
implemented only with planning and regulation.
3. The methodology chosen by EPC to construct an optimal energy
strategy is based on the least-cost energy-strategy (LCES)
objective. This methodology has several advantages over other
conventional policy objectives.
3.1 Because of its general nature the least-cost objective function
can simultaneously take account of many different kinds of
issues. Matters such as resource limitations, environmental
factors and national security can all be evaluated and compared
within the framework of the least-cost method. This way of
formulating policy is far more appealing than a method that
takes account of only one significant issue (such as energy
independence).
3.2 Because costs must be quantified before they can be minimized,
the least-cost method invites the analyst to use hard data when
it is available. Vague judgments are thus discouraged.
4. Least-cost methodology is limited for several reasons, and it yields
results which tend to overstate -- perhaps substantially -- the
economic desirability of energy-efficiency improvements. Hence LCES
implications for policy in this area may be misleading.
4.1 There are many potential market responses to new energy price
conditions:
i. Consumers may substitute less energy-intensive consumer
goods for more energy-intensive consumer goods.
ii. Producers may substitute less energy-intensive inputs for
more energy-intensive inputs in the production of a broad
spectrum of commodities.
iii. Producers may substitute more energy-efficient processes
for less energy-efficient processes in the production of
energy services.
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iv. Secondary price changes may occur for many fuels and other
energy rich commodities.
The least-cost methodology as applied by EPC takes account of
only one of these market responses, namely, iii. above.
4.2 Least-cost methodology does not treat the level of benefits as
a subject of consumer choice. Costs are permitted to vary as a
function of the energy-service technologies selected, but the
output of goods, and thus consumer benefits, are exogenously
fixed. That is why the least-cost method cannot allow
consumers to substitute less energy-intensive consumer goods
for more energy-intensive consumer goods (e.g. i., above).
4.3 In contrast, the methodology of maximizing net benefits
simultaneously chooses the appropriate bundle of outputs and
the least-cost strategy for attaining that bundle. Maximizing
net benefits and minimizing costs are equivalent only under
restrictive and unlikely conditions. This raises important
questions about the use of least-cost strategies for public and
private policy formation.
4.4 When net-benefits maximization replaces cost-minimization as
the policy objective, the indicated optimal improvement in the
energy efficiency of capital goods is reduced. The interaction
between the demand for services, capacity utilization and the
optimal energy-efficiency of capital is an essential
consideration in adjusting to higher energy prices. Ignoring
this interaction biases LCES results toward excess efficiency.
Some preliminary analysis suggests this bias may be substantial.
4.5 LCES strategies are deficient in that they recognize only the
costs of energy-service inputs in the production of non-energy
goods. They do not analyze the cost of other inputs to
non-energy goods production, e.g. labor, capital, environmental
conditions, non-energy materials, and primary resources. As a
result, the LCES method cannot be used to analyze the
substitution of less energy-intensive inputs for more
energy-intensive inputs in general productive processes (e.g.
ii., above). This omission further biases LCES results towards
excess efficiency.
5. In constructing the LCES model, EPC described technologies for the
production of energy services in great detail.
5.1 This detail is potentially useful in drawing conclusions about
the future role of specific technologies in the production of
energy services. EPC has advanced the state of the art of
modelling energy-services production by integrating detailed
information concerning a wide variety of energy services.
5.2 However, because of lack of attention to some of the broader
issues discussed above, many of the detailed LCES results may
be artifacts of methodology. Therefore, we believe it would
have been more fruitful to distribute modelling resources more
evenly among the issues listed under 4.1, to trade off detail
for broader scope and a more appealing objective than least
cost.
6. The EPC retrospective question can be stated succinctly: "How would
the nation have provided energy services in 1978 if its capital
stock had been reconfigured to be optimal for actual 1978 energy
prices." .We believe that the focus of this question is too
restricted.
6.1 In fact, only a part of the capital stock is permitted to
adjust. The least-cost strategy implicitly gives the gift of
perfect foresight to end-use consumers of energy services but
not to other decision makers, so that the least-cost strategy
is a partial optimization.
6.2 Using actual energy prices rather than estimates of market
prices greatly restricts the interpretation of the LCES study
results as optimal. Further, the use of such prices, which
include distortions due to regulation and market failures, is
inconsistent with the spirit of a paper purporting to
demonstrate the advantages of increased competition. We
suggest that EPC should have used imputed free-market prices
rather than "actual 1978 energy price."
7. We suggest an alternative retrospective question: "How would the
nation have provided energy services in 1978 if cost-minimizing
economic decision makers with perfect foresight had defined the
domestic economic environment, constrained only by the domestic
energy endowment and by world-market prices of energy resources
abroad?" The answer to this question would be substantially
different from the answer to the question posed by EPC, and, we
think, more interesting.
7.1 With universal perfect foresight, public policies in the 1960's
and 70's might well have mitigated the disruptive economic
consequences of energy price shocks. A more fully adjusted
macro-economy with greater economic growth and fewer recessions
might have resulted.
7.2 With universal perfect foresight, investment levels and
patterns of the energy-production, conversion, transportation
and distribution industries would have been very different from
their actual 1978 realization. For example, the electric power
industry--with its long-lived capital and investment leadtimes
--would have obtained a smaller and "optimally reconfigured"
1978 capital stock, resulting in lower electricity prices.
-V-
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7.3 Governmental policy that allowed the deregulation of all fuel
in the U.S. might have led to more rational fuel use and fewer
shortages, as well as different energy service demand and
prices in 1978
7.4 EPC argues that its optimization methodology is satisfactory
for indicating "..the direction in which we could move to begin
realizing some of the benefits of a least-cost strategy." But
even the direction of change indicated by a partial
optimization process may differ from the direction indicated by
a complete optimization. Many of the opportunities for
reducing the costs of energy services identified by LCES could
disappear when the range of possible adaptations are
increased.
8. LCES treats 1978 fuel prices as exogenous to the least-cost
strategy. As a result, the fuel prices EPC uses in its simulations
and computer runs, bias results towards increased use of natural
gas, increased cogeneration of electricity, and substantially
decreased use of purchased electricity.
8.1 Oil and natural gas prices are assumed to remain indefinitely
at their below-market regulated 1978 levels.
8.2 Electricity prices are set at levels higher than would prevail
if optimal reconfiguration of the utility capacity were
allowed. This affects EPC simulations by making cogeneration
more attractive to the industrial and buildings sectors than it
otherwise would be.
8.3 Indicated optimal industrial cogeneration of electricity is
dramatically higher than in any other study surveyed, and most
significantly much higher than in other applications of ISTUM,
the simulation model employed in the EPC study.
9. Several key results of the LCES study were imposed on the models,
rather than being generated endogenously within the models as the
outcome of an explicit optimization process. Hence prior judgment
rather than integrated analysis significantly affected LCES results.
9.1 In the industrial sector, the second largest source of energy-
efficiency improvement was the development and market
penetration of the variable speed motor. As the recent history
of the Reliance Company indicates, the time for the variable
speed motor has not yet arrived.
9.2 In the transportation sector, the second largest source of
improvement derives from the increased dieselization of the
motor vehicle fleet. But the figures regarding penetration of
diesel motored vehicles were imposed on the model exogenously.
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9.3 In the buildings sector, the fourth most important source of
efficiency improvement is cogeneration, a result introduced
into the study via a side calculation.
10. The models used by LCES in their analysis have been found elsewhere
to yield findings that are anomolous or inconsistent with LCES
results. This complicates interpretation of LCES, and renders them
less credible.
10.1 The Energy Modeling Forum studied aggregate energy demand-price
elasticities using fourteen different models. They found that
elasticities implicit in the ISTUM and BECOM models were by far
the most volatile and sensitive to energy component price
changes. For ISTUM, the demand ellipse had the wrong slope.
It has been suggested that the EMF.4 price experiments were
unintentionally biased against ISTUM; this conjecture needs to
be evaluated by the modelers.
10.2 EPC uses a modified version of both the ISTUM and the BECOM
models. The LCES reports contain no discussion of the
sensitivity of ISTUM results to EPC model modifications.
10.3 Comparison of output from EPC runs of the BECOM model with
base-case output presented in that model's documentation
suggest very different patterns of adjustment to higher energy
prices.
12. The use of ISTUM, BECOM and TECOM by LCES is poorly documented.
Appropriate documentation would delineate each change in the
base-case inputs of these models made for the LCES model runs
presented. The lack of reasonable documentation aggrevates the
problem of interpreting inconsistencies between LCES results and the
base-case output of ISTUM, BECOM and TECOM.
-viii-
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I. BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION
The M.I.T. Energy Model Analysis Program (EMAP) was organized in 1979
to conduct evaluations of important energy policy models and studies, and
scientific studies bearing on important policy issues. Recent and
current sponsors of the EMAP include the Electric Power Research
Institute, the Energy Information Administration, the Office of
Technology Assessment, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
In early March, 1981, EPRI invited the EMAP to conduct a review of
the forthcoming Mellon Institute's Least-Cost Energy Strategy Study,
tentatively titled "Eight Great Energy Myths." At the same time EPRI
invited the Mellon Institute's Energy Productivity Center (EPC) to
cooperate with M.I.T. in the review. After some discussion, EPC made
clear that the new study would not be published until August, 1981, and
that until then they would be unable to participate in any review
activities beyond providing existing documentation and describing in
general terms their current and proposed research study activities. In
spite of this "timing problem", EMAP accepted EPRI's invitation to
conduct an interim review to gain familiarity with the EPC's objectives
and approach, and to review the initial EPC study, published in December,
1979.
The present study represents, therefore, an interim review of
existing materials for EPC research and policy studies as of May 4, 1981,
and concentrates on the objectives and approach of the EPC studies and on
establishing a foundation for review of the current study.
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY CENTER'S
LEAST COST ENERGY STRATEGY STUDY AND PROGRAM
The Mellon Institute formed the Energy Productivity Center (EPC) in
1977 under the direction of Mr. Roger Sant. According to EPC's 1980
Annual Report, the Center's activities are organized into three areas
including data gathering and analysis, institutional experiments, and
public outreach.
Data gathering and analysis activities have been organized around
three major research studies of energy service demand and supply. The
first study--the subject of this review--was a retrospective study asking
the question, "How would the Nation have provided energy services in 1978
if its capital stock had been reconfigured to be optimal for actual 1978
energy prices?"3
The second study, recently published by EPC, is "Eight Great Energy
Myths", a prospective study (1980-2000) which employs the least-cost
criterion in estimating capital'and energy shares in providing the energy
service demand predicted in the Energy Information Administration's
ARC-1980, conditional upon EIA's estimates of equilibrium fuel prices.
The third EPC research study, a one-year effort beginning in the fall
of 1981, will link the sectoral analysis characterizing the first two
studies with a macroeconometric interindustry model, simultaneously
determining equilibrium energy service uses, supply, and prices.
According to EPC staff, the least-cost principles will continue to
underlie the analysis, although the basis for comparisons has not yet
been established.
-3-
2.1 Description of the EPC'S Least Cost Energy Strategy Study:
The starting point for the EPC studies is the idea that it is supply
and demand for energy services which should concern both public and
private decision makers, not primary energy itself and particularly not
oil import dependence. Thus,
The conventional import context in which the energy problem has been
examined concentrates on the numbers of barrels of oil that can be
produced or "saved" through new production or conservation. Within
this framework, the competing elements include various fuels - oil,
coal, natural gas, etc., - and various methods of "saving" energy -
lower speeds on the highways, colder homes in winter and warmer homes
in summer, etc. But production and conservation of a given number of
barrels of oil or other quantities of energy only partially addresses
the function of energy in our economy and our lives. A thriving
economy and a materially rewarding life are dependent not on the
given quantity of energy consumed but og the services or benefits
that are derived from that consumption.
Focusing on energy services has the immediate effect of explicitly
coupling energy-using technologies with specific primary and intermediate
energy forms. Providing a given level of energy service requires both
the explicit consideration of alternative technologies and their various
characteristics--including acquisition and operating costs, performance,
and energy efficiency--as well as a criterion for choice. The EPC
chooses a least-cost criterion, and that is the central theme of the EPC
studies.
In this first EPC study, roughly half of the final report is devoted
to a review of policy conflicts and failures of the 1970s, and to
development of the concept of using least-cost principles to determine
the shares of capital and energy in supplying energy services. The
least-cost criterion is proposed as the organizing principle for
identifying and evaluating both public and private energy policy
alternatives. The second part of the report, supported by a technical
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appendix, presents and interprets the results of a retrospective study
applying least-cost principles to answer the question, "How would the
nation have provided energy services in 1978 if its capital stock had
been reconfigured to be optimal for actual 1978 energy prices?" 5 The
highly publicized answer is that such a "reconfiguration" would reduce
per capita energy service cost by 17%, distributed by sector as shown in
Table 2-1.6
TABLE 2-1
Summary Results from EPC's
Least-Cost Energy Strategy Study
% Reduction in 2 Largest Contri- Service
Sector Service Cost buting Technologies Market Share
Buildings 23% Structural Improvement, 5.3%
Residential Bldgs.
Improved HVAC, Bldgs. 2.0
Transporta- 16% Auto Weight Reduction, 3.2
tion Power Train Improvement
Auto Diesil Engines .9
Industry 10% Gas Turbine Cogeneration 1.6
Variable Speed Motors 1.1
The total energy efficiency improvements equal 22% of energy service
supply, purchased at an investment cost of 364 billion dollars. The sum
of the two largest technology improvements in each sector is associated
with least-cost estimation accounts for 14.1% of the 22% efficiency
improvement.
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The EPC least-cost energy strategy provides dramatic estimates of the
potential for energy service cost reduction, and is interpreted by EPC as
indicating "... the direction in which we could move to begin realizing
some of the benefits of a least-cost strategy." 7 EPC employs the
least-cost principle in order to identify opportunities for public and
private policies to reduce energy service costs. One example of public
policy cited by the study is the deregulation of fuel prices and fuel use
in order to increase competitive forces in energy service markets. One
example of private policy cited by the study is investment in the
increased efficiency by private business organizations in the provision
of energy services.
The EPC believes their analysis and results are sufficiently
well-founded and credible to support rather wide-sweeping policy
conclusions. Thus,
Although the purpose of this analysis is to indicate the kind of
changes tht could have taken place and not to project with
statistical accuracy actual results that could have been attained,
the hypothetical case will indicate that, theoretically, a least-cost
strategy applied during the 10 or 12 years prior to 198 could have
reduced the cost of energy services by roughly 17 percent in 1978
with no curtailment of services. We will then cite some conclusions
based on this analysis which might help us realize the chief goal of
a least-cost strategy - adequate energy services at a minimum cost.
In addition, we will suggest that a least-cost strategy could also
resolve many concerns that have appeared to be in conflict during
most of the energy debate - concerns gver nuclear power, oil imports,
environmental integrity and so forth.o
Even setting aside "and so forth," a 17 percent reduction in energy
service costs and the resolution of key energy related issues of the
1970's is an exciting prospect. It is not difficult to appreciate the
sense of optimism which pervades the EPC study.
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Next we describe the analytical apparatus, data, and procedures used
by EPC in obtaining these results. EPC emphasizes that in this first
LCES study they made "...maximum use of analytical techniques already
developed." 9  In this spirit EPC employed three energy sector
technology models 10 including,
- Industrial Sector - Industrial Sector Technology Utilization
Model (ISTUM);
- Buildings Sector - Buildings Energy Conservation Optimization
Model (BECOM);
- Transportation Sector - Transportation Energy Conservation Model
(TECM).
Each of these models--ISTUM, BECOM, and TECM--is intended to support
technology choice analysis employing the criterion of cost minimization.
ISTUM and BECOM are both formulated as linear programming models, and
TECM as a simulation model. Each model takes the relevant set of energy
service demands, and a feasible set of energy service supply and
efficiency improvement technologies as givens. Technologies are
characterized by scale, costs (fixed and operating), and by
efficiencies. In addition, emerging technologies are characterized by
expected date of availibility. For emerging technologies, each of the
three models "models" the penetration process, either through market
share penetration functions, or by user constraints. The input
variables, characteristics, and output variables for each of the three
models is summarized in Table 2-2.11
The general assumptions regarding capital turnover in each sector and
measurement of capital service cost are summarized in Table 2-3.
.1 %
Macro-
Economic Physical Energy Market Technical Economic Fuel
Sector Output Service Service Shares Efficiency Efficiency Consumed
Buildings Residential, No. of residen- Space heat alr Market share Fuel used per Cost per unit Delivered fuel
non-residential tial units; Sq. conditioning, by 4 service unit of service of service sec- by 4 service
construction ft. of Commer. thermal, light- sectors & 9 sector & 9 tor & 9 bldg. sectors & 9
dollar value clal floor space Ing & ap- bldg. types .bldg. types types bldg. types
pliances by
bldg. type.
1 2 3 3 3 3 3
Industry Output by SIC. Tons of pro- 23 services by Market share Fuel used per Cost per unit Delivered fuel
dollar value duct 24 SIC's by 23 service unit of service of service by by 23 service
sectors and 24 by 23 service 23 service sec- seco-s & 24
SIC's sectors & 24 totrs & 24 SIC's '
SIC's SIC's
1 *2 4 4 4 4 4
Transport Disposable Ton miles or Work at the Market share Fuel used per Cost per unit Delivered fuel
Income, output passenger flywheel by by 2 service unit of service of service by 2 by 8 modes
by freight de- miles by mode mode sectors & 8 by 2 service service sectors
mand sector, modes sectors & 8 & 8 modes
dollar value modes
1 2 5 @5 _5 @5 5
Sources 1. Historic Data
2. Calculated from Historic Data
3. BECOM
4. ISTUM
5. .TEC
Footnotes * Not required by ISTUM
@ Calculated endogenously at a least cost basis for auto sector
only at present
Source: Carhart [1979]
Table 2-2
Analytic Framework for Energy Productivity Analysis
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Table 2-3
Assumptions Underlying LCES Study
The ar!-s!s deribed was performed using the Industrial Sector Technology Use M.odel (ISTUM), the
Buildings Enery Conservation Optimization Model (BECOM), and the Transportation Energy
Conservatlon Mb del (TEC). These models include all energy-using activities In the economy, and
assumed the fo:c.wi.ng condl1tons:
1. The transportation stock was permitted to completely turn over, buildings and industrial plants
could be renova!ed or modified but not replaced structurally, and improved efficiency
technologies In the industrial feedstock, construction and utilities sectors were excluded;
2. All decisicn-makers were assumed to minimize the discounted lifecycle cost of energy service
capital investments.
Cap!tal was charged at arn annual cost equal to the capital recovery factor times the Installed
cost.
CRF
1 - (1 + iL- n
Where I is .05 and n Is the lifetime of the equipment. With minor exceptions, equipment lifetime
used were:
Private vehicles: 10 years
Commercial vehicles: 15 years
Structural technologies: 20 years
Industrial equipment: 25 years
The total cost per unit of energy service Is thus
TC= CRF x Capita! cost!unit of service
+ Fuel costunit of service
+ O-M costunit of service
for each competing technology.
3. Capital was available in unlimited quantities at a real 5% cost to all:
4. The leve! of energy services In 1978 would remain constant, as would 1978 energy source
prices. A rarginal cost case was also analyzed but not included because it was even less
reflective of a dynamic situation.
" Efficlency-lr.provement technologies were compared to a 1973 base year. In this case we compared
energy use to an industrial output index in the industrial sector, total number of residences and
commercial sq-are footage in the buildings sector, and GNP in the tr nsportation sector. A
calculation of energy/GNP yields very similar results.
Source: Sant [1979].
.... - I n ill ilI I III ii
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3. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LEAST-COST-ENERGY STRATEGY
In this chapter, we shall analyze the general concept of "least cost
energy strategy" and the methodology associated with that concept. The
least-cost concept was applied by the Energy Productivity Center in its
retrospective study, "The Least-Cost Energy Strategy" (LCES). A review
of the LCES study itself and of the question it posed is presented in the
next chapter. In this chapter, however, we wish to step away from the
details of any particular study, and consider at an abstract level the
general issues involved in adopting the least-cost strategy. What are
the important elements included in EPC least-cost analysis? Are
important factors omitted? How does the concept of a least-cost strategy
relate to competition? Is a least-cost strategy a good strategy? Is it
"optimal" in some sense? Does a least-cost strategy correspond to our
intuitive notions of a reasonable way to proceed? These are some of the
areas explored below.
3.1 The Meaning of the Least-Cost Energy Strategy
EPC defines an "energy strategy" in terms of energy services and
energy-service technologies. When we think of energy in economic terms,
we usually think of physical commodities such as oil, coal, gasoline,
uranium and electricity. These commodities are fuels. They can be
converted into heat energy, electrical energy or mechanical forms of
energy by a variety of technologies such as boilers, engines, motors,
generators, wind-mills and nuclear reactors. Heat, electrical and
lli, u i1 dlliIEI-
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mechanical forms of energy can be converted to energy services, energy
delivered in a form which provides direct benefits to consumers or direct
inputs in the production of non-energy goods. Some examples of energy
services are space heating, transportation, electric service and steam
for industrial uses. Energy-service technologies are technologies that
are used in the transformation of fuels found in nature to energy
services.
In the EPC study, an energy strategy is a prescription for producing
a specified bundle of energy services by use of a specified set of
energy-service technologies. Energy services are viewed as the ultimate
output of an energy strategy, and energy-service technologies define the
methods used in creating those outputs. A "Least-Cost Energy Strategy"
for the production of a specified bundle of energy services is a strategy
for producing the given services that incurs less economic cost than any
other such strategy.
The EPC concept of a least-cost energy strategy, though not a new
idea, represents an important step forward from the usual treatment of
energy problems by laymen and policymakers. 12 EPC's approach begins
from an attractive premise. In this view, there are only two aspects of
energy that really matter to society: the benefits that energy yields and
the economic costs incurred in the provision of those benefits. Energy
services, rather than fuels, are viewed as the direct source of energy
benefits. A warm livingroom (space heat) yields a certain benefit
without regard to how that space-heating service was produced. The costs
of a particular bundle of energy services are a function of the
energy-service technologies adopted.
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This type of analysis is appealing for several reasons. First of
all, any least-cost strategy explicitly provides for some given level of
energy benefits. We are reminded that such benefits are an end goal of
energy production, while technological matters involving fuels, boilers,
insulation and the like are but a means to that end. Policies which
"tamper" with the means of energy-service production without regard to
effects on energy benefits are discouraged by the EPC analytical
framework.
Second, the evaluation of energy-service technologies in terms of
economic costs seem much more reasonable than many of the single-issue
approaches used in the past. When correctly defined, economic costs are
a measure of the value of opportunities foregone when a particular course
* of action is adopted. In principle, many opportunities can be evaluated
and compared on a common basis. Matters such as resource limitations,
environmental factors and national security, as well as labor and capital
requirements, can be considered simultaneously and traded off against one
another within the framework of the least-cost method. This way of
formulating policy is far more appealing than a method that takes into
account only one significant issue (such as energy independence).
Furthermore, because costs must be quantified before they can be totaled,
the least-cost method encourages the analyst to use hard data when it is
available, which tends to discourage vague judgements.
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3.2 Competition and the Least-Cost Energy Strategy
The EPC study, "The Least-Cost Energy Strategy," is subtitled
"Minimizing Consumer Costs Through Competition." Although EPC asserts
that competitive forces would be a valuable tool for the implementation
of least-cost energy strategies, the effects of competition are not
analyzed in the body of the study. All of EPC's analysis is devoted to
the construction of a hypothetical least-cost strategy and a comparison
with what actually occurred. While the concept of cost minimization will
play an important role in almost any economic system, it should be kept
in mind that many economists, planners and regulators would argue that an
optimal strategy can be implemented only with planning and regulation.
Such views should be given serious consideration.
The LCES study may lead some readers to believe that competition
would result in the adoption of the least-cost energy strategy. This is
not so. In some cases a competitive strategy would be more desirable
than a least-cost strategy; in other cases it would be less desirable.
In any event, there are many reasons to expect that an EPC least-cost
energy strategy and a competitive energy strategy would be substantially
different.
Assuming a competitive market, one could expect to see a variety of
economic responses to conditions of increased eilergy scarcity. These
responses would probably include the following changes:
i. Consumers would substitute less energy-intensive consumer
goods for more energy-intensive consumer goods.
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ii. Producers would substitute less energy-intensive inputs
for more energy-intensive inputs in the production of a
broad spectrum of commodities.
iii. Producers would substitute more energy-efficient processes
for less energy-efficient processes in the production of
energy services.
iv. Secondary price changes would occur for many fuels and
other energy rich commodities.
All of these market responses to increased energy scarcity would improve
consumer welfare. All of the responses would be incorporated in a
competitive-market energy strategy. But the least-cost energy strategy,
as defined by EPC, incorporates only response iii. This is because EPC
treats the demand for energy services, the configuration of production
technologies for non-energy commodities, and the prices of fuels as
exogenous parameters that must be specified in advance of least-cost
analysis. Thus, with respect to consumer welfare, there are several ways
that competitive-energy strategies would dominate least-cost energy
strategies.
However, there are some areas in which least-cost energy strategies
can be expected to perform better than any real-world competitive energy
strategy. This is because competitive markets don't always work very
well. EPC is well aware of this fact. The LCES study states:
We have concluded that implementation of a
least-cost strategy would utilize much of the traditional
free market system. This conclusion arises not out of
the belief that "free enterprise" can provide solutions
to all of our problems. Indeed, such immense problems as
world poverty and hunger and the burden of an escalating
arms race jll not yield to simple free market
economics.
Nevertheless, EPC asserts that the "most useful policy would be one
that encourages the maximum number of competing elements". 1 4
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Our conclusion about the value of market forces in
the operation of the least-cost strategy arise from the
evidence of our analysis that, in regard to most of our
energy problems, a freely competitive environment would
work, primarily because of the numerous, diverse and
actually or potentially competitive technologies that can
be brought into play in the energy economy.10
Their argument seems to be this: From a technological point of view, the
least-cost strategy is highly varied and diffused. Competitive market
forces work well in a varied and diffused technological environment.
Therefore policies to promote competition should be adopted.
We are sympathetic to the general thrust of the EPC argument.
However, many caveats should be attached to any general statement about
the economic efficiency of traditional free-market mechanisms. The
economic literature is rich with discussions of various forms of "market
failure" and the causal conditions. These conditions are categorized
under headings such as externalities, economies of scale and imperfect
information. While many of the present institutions and regulations may
not be serving the interests of society, many of the reasons regulation
and planning were instituted are still valid. In principle, least-cost
analysis can take into account these issues as well as concerns about the
quality of the environment, present and future national security and the
effect of particular energy strategies on the OPEC cartel. Free-market
institutions, left to their own devices, are not able to do so.
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3.3 EPC Least-Cost vs. Maximum-Net-Benefits
In the previous section, we noted that as a response to increased
* "energy scarcity (and higher energy prices) consumers will substitute less
energy-intensive consumer goods for more energy-intensive consumer
goods. Consumers behave this way because the less energy-intensive goods
become less expensive. In this situation, reducing the direct and
indirect consumption of energy-services increases consumer welfare.
However, EPC least-cost analysis does not treat the consumption of
energy services as a variable. When only costs are evaluated, the level
of output must be specified in advance. In the LCES study, EPC assumes
that the consumer will maintain his level of direct and indirect
energy-service consumption. This behavior is clearly suboptimal.
We propose a criterion for evaluating energy strategies that
incorporates explicit consideration of both the benefits and the costs
associated with different levels of energy-service consumption. The
strategy that maximizes net-benefits, the excess of benefits over costs,
would be selected. The maximum-net-benefits strategy would create a
higher level of consumer welfare than would the least-cost strategy.
Proponents of least-cost analysis might argue that it is not their
intention to select a level of energy-service consumption. Consumers can
make the selection unaided. Rather, it is their intention to discover
how energy services ought to be produced. For this purpose, the
specification of any reasonable bundle of energy services is sufficient.
We believe this argument is incorrect. The selection of a level of
energy-service consumption and the method of producing those energy
services form one simultaneous problem that cannot be partitioned in any
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simple way. For example, consider a consumer who is shopping for an
automobile. The consumer is free to choose the automobile's fuel
efficiency, but he is also free to decide how big the car will be and how
much he will drive it. The values that a rational consumer assigns to
each of these variables are interrelated and all will depend on the price
of gasoline. Normally, it would not be rational for a consumer to
consider the amount of his driving and the size of his car as fixed and
to consider the price of gasoline only when choosing the appropriate
level of fuel efficiency. Yet the design of a least-cost study
postulates exactly that: the quantity of energy services to be produced
and the productive capacity of the equipment are both specified
exogenously; only the efficiency of energy-service production can be
varied as a function of energy prices.
The technological configuration of an EPC least-cost strategy can
markedly deviate from that of a net-benefits-maximizing strategy. In
order to obtain a quantitative measure of the nature and degree of this
deviation, Manove employs several elementary analytical models of the
production of energy services. 1 6 The general setting for all of his
models is the same; An energy service (e.g., space-heating, cooling,
industrial steam, or transportation) is to be produced by some sort of
equipment (furnace, boiler, air conditioner, automobile) that uses some
form of energy input or fuel. Each strategy of energy-service production
is described by three variables: the level of energy-service output, the
productive capacity of the equipment and the energy-efficiency of the
equipment. These three variables imply values for two other important
variables: the capacity utilization rate and total use of energy inputs
or fuel. The models differ from one another in their designation of
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which variables will be fixed in advance, and which may be set by the
consumer or policy-maker.
The selection of the least-cost energy strategy is represented in
one of the models, and the selection of maximum-net-benefits strategies
is represented in three other models. The strategy selected by the
representation of the least-cost model is compared to the strategies
selected as optimal by the three net-benefits-maximizing models. In this
way, conclusions can be drawn about the type and degree of distortion
inherent in the least-cost model output because of its restrictive
assumptions.
The results are striking. When the elasticity of equipment cost
with respect to the level of energy efficiency is assumed to be unitary
and the elasticity of consumer demand for energy services is
conservatively assumed to be -.5, Manove's representation of the EPC
least-cost strategy calls for an energy efficiency increase of 40 percent
in response to a doubling in fuel price. But the maximum-net-benefits
strategy, with capacity held constant, calls for an energy efficiency
increase of only 29 percent. If the elasticity of demand for energy
services is assumed to be unitary, then the least-cost efficiency
increase is 40 percent, but there is no efficiency increase with the
maximum-net-benefits objective.
Similar results are obtained for the maximum-net-benefits strategy
when both demand and capacity are allowed to vary. The least-cost
strategy tends to be a good approximation of the maximum-net-benefits
strategy only when the capacity-utilization rates of service-producing
equipment are fixed. But while fixed capacity-utilization rates may be a
realistic description of certain sectors of the economy, one can safely
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assume that capacity-utilization rates for the economy as a whole will
change in response to substantial changes in energy prices.
We must conclude, therefore, that a least-cost energy strategy may
strongly overstate desired increases in energy efficiency. This occurs
for two different reasons. First, there are many situations in which the
capacity of equipment must remain relatively fixed, despite changes in
the price of fuel. If, in such cases, the demand for energy services is
price sensitive, then increased fuel prices will cause capacity-
utilization rates to fall. Lower utilization rates reduce potential gain
from increased efficiency without reducing the cost of obtaining that
efficiency. Therefore, a smaller efficiency increase is desirable.
Second, there are many circumstances in which the level of
productive capacity and the quantity of energy services demanded varies
independently. In such cases, consumers or producers will tend to
substitute additional capacity (and flexibility) for the energy service
itself. This also lowers utilization rates and optimal efficiency.
It is a general principle of economics that the existence of
substitutes in production and consumption tends to reduce the impact of
external economic shocks. The methodology of least-cost analysis allows
increased efficiency in the production of energy services to substitute
for energy-inputs or fuels, as energy prices rise. However, that
methodology excludes the possibility of substituting increased
flexibility in the production of energy services for some portion of
those services. Least-cost methodology also excludes the possibility of
substituting the consumption of non-energy services for the consumption
of energy services. Because of these characteristics, least-cost
methodology will tend to overstate both the importance of increases in
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energy efficiency and the overall impact of high energy prices on the
economy as a whole. Thus, the general perspective created by least-cost
analysis may be seriously biased.
Even when we overlook this distortion in the least-cost analysis, we
are left with a very difficult question: To what level of energy
services should the least cost criterion be applied? For their analysis,
EPC chose the level of energy services actually produced and consumed in
1978. But this bundle may be part of a transitional phase of consumption
behavior that is inconsistent with least-cost or competitive energy
strategies.
For all of these reasons we believe that a least-cost cost criterion
will result in strategies that are inferior to those selected with a
maximum net benefits criterion. We propose that EPC modify its
least-cost concept. The consumption of energy services should be allowed
to vary, and benefits as well as costs should be evaluated.
Some readers may be thinking, "easier said than done." But we
believe this proposal is realistic and practical. This matter will be
explored further in Section 3.6.
3.4 Least Cost of Energy Service vs. Least Cost of All Commodities
The EPC least-cost concept is concerned only with the cost of
producing energy services. The non-energy input costs in general
industrial production are not evaluated. It is simply assumed that the
energy-service component of production inputs will remain fixed. In
fact, as mentioned in Section 3.2, in response to increased energy
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prices, producers will tend to substitute non-energy inputs for energy
inputs. This type of substitution will reduce production costs and
thereby increase consumer welfare.
As an example, consider the plight of a national brewery facing
sharply increased fuel costs for its transportation fleet. The brewery
will respond in two ways. First, the configuration of the trucks owned
by the brewery may be altered by the purchase of more fuel-efficient
vehicles. This type of change will be captured by EPC least-cost
analysis, because costs of producing transportation services are
evaluated and analyzed.
The brewery may make a second potentially important adjustment. The
brewery may gradually decentralize production by building a large number
of relatively small brewing facilities, each one close to an important
consumer market. On one hand, this decentralization will raise the unit
capital and labor costs of beer production, because economies of scale
will be lost. But on the other hand, the decentralized brewery will
require fewer transportation services because of the market's proximity.
The cost of transporting beer inputs is relatively m nor, because water,
the main ingredient of beer, can be purchased locally. Total costs will
be reduced because when energy prices are sufficiently high, the reduced
transportation costs will more than compensate for the increased energy
costs. As the price of energy services increases, the least-cost
configuration of the brewery will be more and more decentralized. In
other words, capital and labor will be increasingly substituted for
transportation services.
The EPC least-cost strategy does not include this type of
substitution; the use of energy-services as inputs must be determined in
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advance, without regard to the prices of those services -- an output of
EPC least-cost analysis. This means that the EPC least-cost strategy,
while minimizing the cost of energy services for a particular level of
energy-service production, does not minimize the cost of all production.
We propose that the EPC least-cost concept be revised. The quantity
of energy services used as inputs should be permitted to vary, and all
production costs, not just the costs of producing energy services, should
be evaluated. The generalized least-cost strategy that could then be
obtained would minimize the total cost of all production. In the next
section, we comment on this proposal's practicality.
3.5 Issues in Model Design
Suppose that one accepts for the moment the EPC objective of
choosing and specifying a least-cost energy-service strategy. Many
decisions must be made to formulate a least-cost policy model, and most
involve answers to the following questions.
o Which resource expenditures are counted as costs? At what
prices are expended resources evaluated?
o What variables are endogenous to the cost-minimization process?
o What constraints are used in conjunction with the least-cost
objective function?
In Appendix D, these questions and their possible answers are
discussed in some detail. Here we note that the answers define the
concept of optimality by which energy strategies are judged. Optimality
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can be defined in many different ways. It is appropriate in this context
to narrow the domain of optimality by restricting attention to that which
is economically optimal in a competitive market environment. This
excludes from consideration, therefore, all energy-demand paths
associated with national energy policy which are politically expedient
but economically inefficient, or optimal from a solely engineering or
thermodynamic vantage but is economically too costly. But even within
the more limited domain of economic optimality, one can choose from a
range of possible objectives.
We have already discussed several of these in previous sections.
Here is a partial list:
(i) maximizing the net benefits of a country's entire resources in
a given year, perhaps 1978;
(ii) maximizing the net benefits of a country's entire resources
over a period of time, such as 1965-1978;
(iii) maximizing the net benefits of only the nation's energy
consumption and production, either at a single point in time
or over time;
(iv) minimizing the nation's social costs of all production at a
given point in time, say, 1978, subject to certain overall
level constraints;
(v) minimizing the nation's social costs of production over a
certain period of time, say 1965-78, subject to certain
overall output paths during this period, and subject also to
certain end-of-period constraints (e.g., the nation's capital
stock in the terminal year 1978 must not all expire on
December 31, 1978);
(vi) minimizing the nation's social cost, either at a single point
in time or over time, of producing and consuming a given
amount of energy services.
While the above list is less than exhaustive, it suggests clearly
that the notion of economic optimality is consistent with varying
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objectives, and the corresponding optimal strategies can be very
different from one another.
Which of these various possible notions of economic optimality is
used by EPC, and what does this choice imply? To briefly review, EPC
chose the objective of cost minimization of only energy services at a
given point in time (1978), and does not specify any constraints as to
what type of capital stock and what quantity of energy resources must
still remain on January 1, 1979. Hence the EPC notion of "economic
optimality" is one that minimizes energy costs rather than maximizes net
benefits, and optimizes at a given point in time rather than over time.
In addition to making choices regarding the particular definition of
economic optimality to be adopted, and the mix of markets and regulatory
constraints in which firms will function, decisions must also be made
regarding the types of models to be used in the simulation experiments.
One possibility is to construct general equilibrium models for various
sectors of the U.S. economy, using either statistical- econometric,
engineering, or judgmental methods. Regardless of which method is
chosen, it is important to ensure that the integrated model faithfully
reproduces the actual set of events occurring over the 1965-78 time
period.
The EPC chose a very different approach. The LCES model is focused
on the technologies for producing (and conserving) energy services. The
primary function of the model is to select energy-service technologies in
order to minimize the costs of providing a specified set of energy
services at given prices. Energy-service technologies within the model
are represented in disaggregate form. Engineering data incorporated in
BECOM, ISTUM and TECOM is used to describe those technologies.
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Thus, as we have noted, the LCES framework is well suited for
detailed analysis of the production of energy services. Data, as well as
analytical judgement is brought to bear on the problem. This is an
advantage that we have already discussed. Just as the LCES model
considers combined economic costs of energy services rather than a single
goal (such as energy independence), the least-cost strategy is likely to
be more appropriate than one-issue alternatives.
Nevertheless, we believe that the focus of The least-cost concept is
inappropriately narrow. Highly detailed data is useless if results are
substantially (and unpredictably) distorted by the focus of a model.
Therefore, we would urge that the focus of LCES be broadened and that, if
necessary, some of the high level of detail in LC(ES be sacrificed to that
end.
Some readers may feel, of course, that the level of detail in LCES
is one its crucial distinguishing features. We io not agree, believing
that the real strength of the LCES concept lies in its concept of an
economically based national energy strategy. We need to know only the
general characteristics of that energy strategy. If EPC is correct, then
traditional free-market institutions will "define the details." At any
rate, once the general nature of the optimal strategy is determined,
general parameters from that strategy can be iterated with the sectoral
results from ISTUM, BECOM and TECOM; the detailed output from these
models would then undoubtedly be more reliable than the output in the
current LCES study.
It has been suggested that such a scheme is impractical and beyond
the current state of the modeling art. Although this review does not
compare the EPC model/study with others, it is important to note that
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technology choice models have been integrated with general equilibrium
economic models, and employed in studies similar to EPC's. One of the
most prominent examples is the Hoffman-Jorgenson effort to integrate the
Brookhaven Energy Optimization System (BESOM) with the Hudson-Jorgenson
Dynamic General Equilibrium Model (DGEM); this integrated model was then
employed in a series of studies for DOE and its predecessor agencies, and
in various Energy Modeling Forum studies. Another example is the Wharton
Annual Energy Model developed at the University of Pennsylvania under
EPRI sponsorship. This model integrates the Wharton Economic Model with
technology models via the summary of the process models in the use of
"pseudo data" techniques developed and employed for this purpose of
Professor James Griffin. While it is beyond the scope of this review to
compare those efforts with that of EPC, it should be noted that these
integrated models, which incorporate many of the features we feel are
relevant to EPC's question, were available to EPC when they began their
study.
What are the variables and dimensions of a model relevant to the
question posed by EPC? Following is a broad outline of the basic
variables and dimensions of a model appropriate for a response to EPC's
question. Formulating an optimal energy strategy is a grand idea, and we
would give our model a very grand scope indeed. We would use aggregate
variables, and would drop non-essential details. The following types of
variables and parameters would appear in the model:
o Output of energy services (in 5-10 categories): 10 variables.
o Capital stocks for energy-service production (2-3 technology
types for each category of energy service): 30 variables.
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o Capacity utilization rates of the various stocks of
energy-service capital represented: 30 variables.
o Energy efficiency of the represented capital stocks: 30
variables.
o Innovation (efficiency increases) in the energy area: 30
variables.
o Consumer demand (benefits) functions for energy services and
non-energy commodities: 150 parameters.
o Consumer purchases of energy-services: 10 variables.
o Domestic supplies of energy inputs (described by 3-5 supply
curves): 25 parameters.
o Derived demand for energy inputs (a function of the variables
describing the energy-service industry): 5 variables.
o Prices of energy inputs, with some modelling of their
determination: 5 variables.
o Non-energy industrial production, by major sector (perhaps 3-5
sectors would do): 5 variables.
o Final and intermediate demand for the output of these
non-energy sectors (a very small input-output table might be
helpful here): 10 variables, 25 parameters.
o The derived demands of the non-energy industrial sectors for
various energy services: 50 variables.
o Several important macroeconomic variables: (GNP, C, I, G, r,
etc.): 8 variables.
For each of these categories, our estimated maximum number of
required variables is given. However, the model we propose would
necessarily be a dynamic one, perhaps with five five-year periods.
Therefore, the maximum number of variables given above would have to be
multiplied by five. This comes to a grand total of about 1100
variables. (Of course, many of these variables would be identically
zero.) This is by no means a small model, yet it is but a small fraction
of the size of a detailed model like ISTUM. And its scope is very
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broad. As noted, many of the ingredients required to build such a model
are already available in medium and large size macroeconomic forecasting
models.
Aside from its broad scope, an important advantage of the sort of
model we propose is that it provides an integrated framework for the
construction of an optimal strategy. One disadvantage of LCES is that it
is basically a collection of detailed models without an explicit
organizing framework. As a result much is lost.
3.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize the following points.
The LCES study is subtitled: "Minimizing Consumer Costs Through
Competition." But the study does not explore the effects of
competition. All of EPC's analysis is devoted to the construction of a
hypothetical optimal strategy and a comparison between the strategy and
what actually occurred. EPC simply assumes that competiton would cause
an optimal strategy to emerge. It should be kept in mind that many
economists, planners and regulators would argue that an optimal strategy
can be implemented only with planning and regulation.
Because of its general nature, the least-cost objective function can
simultaneously take into account many different kinds of issues. Matters
such as resource limitations, environmental factors and national security
can be evaluated and traded off against one another within the framework
of the least-cost method. This policy-making formula is far more
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appealing than one that takes into account only one significant issue
(such as energy independence).
Least-cost methodology is limited for several reasons, such as its
tendency to produce results that may substantially overstate the economic
desirability of energy-efficiency improvements. EPC least-cost
methodology can take into account only one (number iii.) of the following
predictable market responses to higher energy prices:
i. Consumers may substitute less energy-intensive consumer
goods for more energy-intensive consumer goods.
ii. Producers may substitute less energy-intensive inputs for
more energy-intensive inputs in the production of a broad
spectrum of commodities.
iii. Producers may substitute more energy-efficient processes
for less energy-efficient processes in the production of
energy services.
iv. Secondary price changes may occur for many fuels and other
energy rich commodities.
Least-cost methodology does not treat the level of benefits as a
subject of consumer choice. Costs are permitted to vary as a function of
the energy-service technologies selected, but the output of goods, and
thus consumer benefits, are exogenously fixed. In contrast, maximum-
net-benefits methodology would simultaneously choose the appropriate
bundle of outputs and the least-cost strategy for attaining that bundle.
However, the least-cost methodology does have the advantage of
avoiding all of the problems attendant to benefits computation. This is
an argument in its favor. But, in the context of selecting a national
energy strategy we do not find this argument convincing. As the
discussion in this chapter makes clear, the concept of cost has critical
subjective elements, as does the concept of benefits. The analyst's
-29-
decisions regarding expended resources evaluation can have a critical
impact on the cost figures obtained.
LCES strategies are deficient because they recognize only the costs
of energy-service inputs in the production of non-energy goods. They do
not analyze the cost of other inputs to non-energy goods production, e.g.
labor, capital, environmental conditions, non-energy materials, primary
resources, etc. As a result, the LCES method cannot be used to analyze
the substitution of less energy-intensive inputs for more
energy-intensive inputs in general productive processes (number ii.,
above). This omission further biases LCES results towards excess
efficiency.
In constructing the LCES model, EPC described technologies for the
production of energy services in great detail. This detail is
potentially useful insofar as it permits conclusions about the future
role of specific technologies in the production of energy services.
However, because of lack of attention to some of the broad issues
discussed above, many of the detailed LCES results may be spurious
artifacts of LCES methodology. Therefore, we believe it would have been
more fruitful to use modelling resources in a fashion such as we proposed
in Section 3.6.
The subjective elements in least-cost analysis impose a number of
obligations on the analyst: his approach must be consistent, his
decisions must be appropriate for the purpose of the analysis, but most
importantly, the analyst's subjective input and assumptions must be
meticulously documented. The lack of such documentation prevents other
parties from interpreting the results of the analysis in a meaningful way
and can cause those results to be confusing or misleading. On the whole,
we found LCES documentation to be unsatisfactory.
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4. REVIEW OF THE "LEAST-COST ENERGY STRATEGY" STUDY
We now turn to a detailed examination of the retrospective question
posed by EPC in the LCES study. In section 4.1, we evaluated the EPC
question and proposed several alternative questions. Now we set aside
these alternative questions, and concentrate upon EPC's approach and the
interpretation of their results; in particular we will be concerned with
the extent to which EPC's results are likely to coincide with those of
cost-minimizing decision-makers with perfect foresight.
The conceptual experiment proposed in the LCES study is, "How would
the nation have provided energy services in 1978 if its capital stock had
been reconfigured to be optimal for actual 1978 energy prices." This is
a question about "what could have been." Such questions are interesting
to curious people everywhere, and if we are to learn from history, they
are important as well. In defining "what could have been," we can
abstract from the influences of various constraints that complicate
interpretation of past events. The resulting projection can then be
compared with the actual data to identify opportunities for public and
private sector policies, including new market initiatives for
economically efficient supply of energy services.
Unfortunately, defining "what could have been" is not as simple as
it may at first seem. This is because such a question is invariably
associated with a hypothetical premise. The premise is usually set off
by the word "if." For example, we might ask: "How would the nation have
provided energy services in 1978 if our national leaders had promoted
policies to stimulate free-market competition in the energy field?" Or,
we might ask: "How would the nation have provided energy services in 1978
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if each of our citizens were intelligent, perspicacious, frugal and
public spirited?" In order to interpret the answer of a "what-could-
have-been" question, it is important to understand the question's
explicit and implicit premise. Therefore, we will examine the premise in
EPC's question, and compare it to plausible alternatives.
4.1 Alternative Questions
Here is the EPC question with the explicit part of the premise
underlined:
EPC: How would the nation have provided energy services in 1978 if
its capital stock had been reconfigured to be optimal for
actual 1978 energy prices?
We now proceed to define a series of alternative questions that are
obtained by modifying the premise of the original EPC question. In the
remaining sections of this chapter, we will examine each of the
alternative questions to see how its answer would differ from that of the
EPC question:
In the first alternative question, we ask about economic behavior in
an environment of free-market prices. We call this alternative the
market-price (MP) question:
MP: How would the nation have provided energy services in 1978 if
its capital stock had been reconfigured to be optimal for
imputed 197 free-market domestic energy prices?
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The market-price question differs from the EPC question by presupposing
imputed domestic free-market prices rather than actual prices. This
allows us to abstract from government price controls and other
domestically caused price distortions. (Presumably, we wouldn't want to
abstract from OPEC-caused price changes.) In addition, we believe that
use of regulated prices is inconsistent with the spirit of a study
purporting to demonstrate the advantages of increased competition.
Our second alternative question modifies the meaning of an optimally
configured capital stock. We call it the dynamic optimization (DO)
question:
DO: How would the nation have provided energy services in 1978 if
its capital stock had been reconfigured to be optimal for t1Ei
trajectory of imputed domestic free-market energy prices from
1960 to the year 2000?
The dynamic-optimization question refers to a trajectory of prices, while
EPC refers to prices for the single year, 1978. This places our own
hypothetical decision-maker in a more realistic situation than the EPC's
hypothetical decision-maker. The EPC notion of an optimally configured
capital stock seems predicated on a set of prices that never changes,
present, past and future. When EPC asks a question about "what could
have been" in terms of such a myopic hypothetical decision maker, the
answer will have very little connection with real-world possibilities.
We will argue below that the dynamic-optimization question is more
interesting and applicable to current problems than is the EPC question.
However, we are not satisfied with the dynamic-optimization question. We
believe that interest in the EPC study is largely stimulated by curiosity
about the answer to a question with a broader premise than any of those
given above: "What would have occurred if economic decision makers had
correctly foreseen the energy-price increases of the 1970's and had used
this information to minimize production costs?" We call this the
perfect-foresight-(PF) question. The perfect-foresight question can be
stated formally as follows:
PF: How would the nation have provided energy services in 1978 if
cost-minimizing economic decision makers with perfect foresTght
had been constrained only by the domestic energy endowment and
by world-market prices of energy resources, and had made their
decisions accordingly?
The premise of the perfect-foresight question includes a number of
elements:
i. Cost-minimizing economic decision makers (in the 1960's and
70's).
ii. Perfect foresight.
iii. A wide range of domestic economic variables subject to
adjustment. These include:
a. configuration of the entire domestic capital stock
b. domestic energy prices.
c. domestic economic policies.
d. direct and indirect demand for energy services by
end-use consumers.
iv. Only the domestic endowment of energy resources and world
prices of foreign resources are absolute constraints on the
economic decision makers.
In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, we will suggest how the answers to the EPC
question and the perfect-foresight question might be expected to differ.
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4.2 Price Concepts in the LCES Study
Chapter 3 and Appendix D make clear that the results of a least-cost
calculation depend critically upon the concept of price employed. EPC
asks us to consider a world with an optimally configured energy-using
capital stock. But their notion of optimality is based on actual energy
prices. These prices do not reflect economic scarcity or other
constraints beyond our control. We find it rather incongruous to
speculate about optimality in the capital stock without allowing prices
to adjust appropriately. Furthermore, EPC insistence on the use of
actual 1978 prices in their hypothetical world seems to violate the
spirit of the subtitle of their study: "Minimizing Consumer Costs Through
Competition." In a study which emphasizes the role of competitive
forces, we would expect that actual or estimated competitive market
prices would be employed.
We believe that the market-price question is both more interesting
and more relevant to the goals of the EPC study than the EPC question
is. Actual prices of natural gas, petroleum, and electricity reflect the
results of institutional factors such as taxes and regulation. As a
result, actual prices are a poor measure of true economic scarcity. In
our opinion, it is important to know what configuration of capital and
energy input would be associated with a more competitive market for
energy services. Serious questions regarding the treatment of natural
monopolies, the transmission of elej,ricity, environmental costs, and
taxes would all need to be specifically considered.
How would the substitution of "imputed market prices" for "actual
prices" in the EPC question affect EPC's results? The single price that
-35-
most shapes EPC results is probably the price of natural gas. The
regulated price of natural gas appears to contribute dramatically to the
increased use of natural gas in EPC's least-cost scenario, a full .8
Quads above the actual 1978 level of consumption. In addition, the use
of this price resulted in an increase in the market share for natural
gas. In the least-cost scenario, 35% of all BTU's derived from fuel
comes from natural gas, compared to 25% in the actual 1978 situation. We
believe that natural gas would play a much less important role if the
optimal configuration of capital were determined in a competitive
domestic energy-price environment.
In fact, the 1978 actual natural gas price is likely to be highly
atypical of future gas prices, for in that year the United States
committed itself to a specific phased decontrol plan for natural gas.
Thus, capital investments based upon natural gas prices remaining at 1978
relative levels will certainly not be least-cost investments for years
beyond 1978.
A more subtle point concerns the treatment of taxes in the LCES
study. The Technical Appendix of the study makes clear that
For purposes of calculating the Least-Cost energy strategy, a more
basic approach was appropriate. The costing conventions used
represent a normative approach based on a pure capital charge
independent of assumptions concerning government policies, such as
mandatory of certain fuels or taxes. Capital charges per unit time
are thus calculated as the present value of a dollar's investment
given the real long term discount rate and the service life of. the
investment. The real long term discount rate used in all technology
investment evaluations is i = .05, with the notation that this
estimate '...is consistent with the recommendations which will be
summarized in the forthcoming extensive treatment of this subject
edited by Professor R. C. Lind of Cornell University.' (Technical
Appendix, p. 3).
_ _~ _
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Setting aside for the moment the issue of the appropriate long-term
real discount rate, and the question whether the same rate is appropriate
for all sectors in the economy, consider the EPC view that private
economic cost is the appropriate concept in least-cost calculations. Two
questions must be raised. First, if private cost is the appropriate
concept, why are regulated prices used for energy inputs, represented by
1978 actual prices? This seems an inconsistent treatment, and at minimum
requires discussion and justification.
Second, if taxes are to be excluded, shouldn't they be excluded from
all input costs? Apparently exclusion of taxes is restricted only to
depreciation allowances and investment tax credits for capital goods
represented by the competing technologies in the models employed in the
EPC study. We find no evidence that taxes have been excluded from the
price of assets -- for example, corporate profits taxes passed through to
purchasers, etc. -- or excluded from the cost of energy forms combined
with this capital. Clearly, if taxes are to be excluded from capital
goods comparisons, then consistency requires their exclusion from energy
costs, even if a case could be made for using regulated energy prices.
Another point relating to prices used in the LCES study concerns the
distribution of the actual 1978 average prices to the regions required by
the models underlying the study. One question is: how were national
average prices distributed to regions, and does the distribution method
have any significant effect upon the results? More fundamentally, if
energy prices consistent with full anticipation of the events of the
1970s were used, the adjustment process would almost certainly have
resulted in regional shifts in demographics and economic activity,
towards both less energy-using regions of the country and less
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energy-using activities. Thus, the relationship between the regional'
pattern of energy prices and the national average would be very different
in a fully anticipated calculation compared to one which considered the
Least-Cost of producing a given level of energy demand.
We could analyze the implications of some of these questions with
more detailed investigation of the LCES study, especially by examining
the models and data bases underlying the study. However, our main
concern is to point out that there are fundamental inconsistencies in the
LCES study's treatment of different prices and costs, which at minimum
require much more motivation and rationalization than is provided in
their Technical Appendix.
Recognizing the difficulty of estimating market prices associated
with a fully adjusted economy, our preference would have been for some
"best estimates."
4.3 Configurations of the Capital Stock: Dynamic vs. Static Optimality
Because capital goods are relatively long-lived, the cost of
operating a given unit of capital can change significantly over the
lifetime of that unit. As a result, an optimizing decision maker will
not base the purchase of a unit of capital on current energy prices.
Instead, he will consider the trajectory of future energy prices. He
will search for a compromise between the units that would be optimal for
each energy-price level that can be foreseen over the lifetime of the
unit purchased. For example, a businessman may decide that a truck with
a high-powered engine is optimal when fuel prices are low, while a truck
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with a low-powered engine is optimal when fuel prices are high. If this
businessman decides that fuel prices will be low early in the lifetime of
the truck and high later in the lifetime of the truck, he would probably
choose a medium-powered engine as a compromise.
Furthermore, optimal purchase decisions at a given time depend not
only on currently available technologies, but on technologies that are
expected to become available in the future. Our businessman may put off
his purchase of a new truck if he expects a truck with substantially
increased fuel efficiency to become available the following year.
In a dynamic setting (one with market characteristics changing over
time), the optimal configuration of the capital stock at a given time
cannot be determined by reference to current energy prices and current
technologies alone. Past and future energy prices and technologies are
relevant as well. In particular, the optimal composition of capital
stock in 1978 depends on prevailing prices and available technologies
before, during and after 1978.
To see why this is true, consider the 1978 capital stock. The stock
will consist of (i) new capital goods put in place in that year; (ii)
capital goods from previous years whose characteristics have been
modified via additional retrofit investments in the current year; (iii)
unmodified capital goods from previous years. The characteristics of the
new and newly modified capital goods will depend on expected future
prices, on current and expected future technologies and on the
characterisitics of the stock of old capital goods. The characteristics
of the old capital goods, must also depend on prevailing energy prices
and available technologies during their lifetimes.
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To talk about "what could have been" in connection with 1978 energy
prices and technologies alone, is to talk about what could have been in
some imaginary land where price and technology never change. The EPC
question compares what actually happened in 1978 with what could have
happened in such an imaginary land. For this reason, we believe that the
answer to the dynamic optimization queston is more important than is the
answer to the EPC question.
4.4 Perfect Foresight and EPC Concept of Capital Reconfiguration
Let us consider the perfect-foresight question. Compared with its
premise (see section 4.1), the premise of the EPC question allows only a
very narrow scope for adjustment. Adjustments to the configuration of
the capital stock are the only adjustments permitted. Energy-service
demand and energy-input prices are held constant by the EPC premise.
Furthermore, although it is not explicitly stated in the study, EPC
concentrates on only one type of adjustment to the capital stock: changes
in shares of the various end-use technologies and fuels in the production
of energy services. Shares of non-end use technologies including those
used to produce, convert and transport energy for end-use purposes are
not permitted to adjust.
If we categorize the EPC question in terms of perfect foresight, we
are led to the conclusion that EPC gives the gift of perfect foresight to
some categories of decision makers while denying it to others. Perfect
foresight is a powerful fantasy, and once unleashed may introduce more
complications than it eliminates. In the case of the LCES study, the
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most serious complications arise because of restrictions on which groups
in the economy and society adjust with perfect foresight, and which
continue to make decisions based on a lack of knowledge and uncertainty
about both future events and the adjustments of those who are gifted with
perfect foresight. The premise of selective perfect foresight can
significantly bias results, because the extent of action appropriate for
those who have it tends to be exaggerated. For example, those who know
that the price of oil is about to increase will have a greater scope for
action, while the larger segment is ignorant.
Two groups that lack perfect foresight in the LCES study are the
public sector and the private energy production, conversion, transport
and distribution ind-ustries. How, we ask, would perfect foresight in
these sectors affect the planning data and decisions of those purchasing
end-use energy services?
First, let us consider public sector response to perfect knowledge
of energy-related events in the 1960's and 70's. Certainly we would
expect that public policies would have been implemented to mitigate the
economic and political consequences of the now fully anticipated OPEC
embargo and related events. Thus, the major energy policy problem of the
60's would have been the same as that for the period beginning in
October, 1973; namely, how to reduce the economic and social costs of an
OPEC "tax" on U.S. oil consumption.
Given the policy conflicts and problems of the post-embargo period
in dealing with this tax, it is somewhat fanciful to project with any
specificity just what policies might have been implemented. Perfect
foresight does not rule out possibilities for political conflict,
bungling, and confusion. For example, it took until 1978 to establish
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that deregulation of energy prices was an important instrument of
national policy in order to reduce the OPEC tax first imposed in October,
1973. Thus, what particular policies might have evolved, given perfect
foresight, is uncertain. For our present purposes, and with hindsight,
the main line of public policy response to perfect foresight of the
energy-related circumstances of the 1960's and 70's would probably have
been some deregulation of energy prices, perhaps with taxes on the
economic rents accruing to domestic producers, purchase of a strategic
petroleum reserve of reasonable size, increased public expenditures on
research, development, and demonstration (R,D&D) where competitive
markets did not produce the known desired result.
A stylized account of the consequences of such a policy would
include at least two kinds of results. First, the economy would have
optimally adjusted to the "shock" of 1973-74 since it would now have been
fully anticipated. The most important consequence of this adjustment
would be elimination of the costs of uncertainty, lack of knowledge, and
economic disruption associated with the energy conditions of the 1970's.
Thus, to the extent that the lower productivity and growth of the economy
in the 70's is traceable to enercy conditions, these losses would be
recovered. In general, given the opportunity to adjust appropriately to
our national energy fate, we would expect greater growth and prosperity.
It follows that one consequence of public policy adjustment would be
a higher rate of economic growth, with a concomitant increase in the
demand for energy services, and a reconfigured capital stock composed of
appropriate shares of new, retrofitted, and old capital.
A second result of public sector policies aimed at mitigating the
economic and social consequences of adverse energy conditions would be a
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gradual increase in energy prices prior to the precipitous event of the
OPEC embargo, either influenced or not by domestic energy taxes. Of
course, perfect foresight in the private sector would also cause such
price increases. If it had been known in the early 1960's that oil
prices would definitely increase in 1973, there would have been hoarding
of oil by potential suppliers in years prior to 1973. This hoarding
would have taken the form of reduced levels of production by producers,
conservation of supplies by those involved in refining and distribution,
and stock building by consumers and speculators. This would have reduced
the supply available on the market and, as a consequence, oil prices
would have begun increasing well before the 1973 OPEC tax came into
effect. Since deregulation of natural gas would likely have occurred as
well, its price would have been rising in a sympathetic relation with its
close substitute, oil, over this period.
A second consequence, then, of likely public policies, given perfect
foresight, would have been that consumers would face gradually
increasingly higher energy prices in the 1960's and early 70's so that
the OPEC tax on world oil consumption announced in October, 1973, would
have been fully anticipated in the price of U.S. energy products.
Let us continue, now, with the effects on the private sector of the
assumption of perfect foresight. The LCES study concentrates upon
adjustments by private consumers of energy services in choosing between
end-use technologies and energy forms. We now ask how the energy
industries would have reconfigured their own capital stock, if industry
decision makers had perfect foresight. Would an appropriately
reconfigured energy industry have changed the planning data used by
consumers of energy services in consumption decisions? How would perfect
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knowledge of the competition that the energy industry faced from the
"efficiency" industry have influenced energy industry decisions?
Consider the effects of perfect foresight on energy production,
transportation, conversion, and distribution activities. There are two
important types of adjustment here, including changes in levels and
patterns of investment on infrastructure for providing energy forms, in
addition to changes due to perfectly anticipated competition from
improvements in capital efficiency. In the first instance, the
deregulation of oil and gas prices would have stimulated investments in
exploration and development to a greater or lesser extent depending on
government policies with respect to allowable returns for this activity.
Deregulation of natural gas prices, and their rise in sympathy with oil
prices, would lead to increased use of this resource when excess demand
due to regulation eroded. This would mean new investments in
transmission-delivery systems and in hook-ups -- investments which should
be counted in a least-cost calculation of a fully anticipated
adjustment.
Second, we would expect pronounced effects on the level and pattern
of investments in the energy conversion industry, in particular, the
electric utility industry. Certainly the level of investments in the
60's and early 70's would generally have been reduced by the anticipation
of higher energy prices and reduced demands. Also, the pattern of
investments would have adjusted to reduce expansion in oil and gas
capacity, substituting coal and nuclear. It is likely that this
development would have accelerated the consideration of environmental
concerns about expanded coal use. Thus another problem of the 70's would
have been transferred back in time to the 60's. The net effect of these
-44-
adjustments would probably have been reflected by somewhat higher
electricity prices in the 1960's and early 70's and markedly lower prices
in the post-embargo period.
Another aspect of adjustment with perfect foresight would be the
response of intermediate energy-form suppliers to competition from energy
efficient capital. In the LCES study, the implications of these
adjustments for the energy prices used in least-cost calculations are
ignored. A prominent example is the role of cogenerated electricity in
the industry and buildings sectors. If the economics of the competition
between self-cogenerated and purchased electricity were, in reality, the
ones portrayed in the LCES study results, then a fully anticipating
electric utility industry would have had a much different pattern of
capacity investment. In particular, fully anticipating electric
utilities would have adjusted their capacities to reflect loads net of
cogenerated electricity either internally consumed or distributed via the
utilities grid. The exact adjustments would depend upon which segments
of the utilities' load curve cogeneration effectively supplies. The
details of such competition would depend upon the nature of the
industries cogenerating and the load characteristics for each utility.
Whatever the outcome of this competition, a perfectly anticipating
utility would have adjusted its capacity level and mix so as to acquiesce
gracefully when cogenerated electricity was economically superior.
Almost certainly, especially considering the results of the EPC study,
this behavior would have resulted in a much lower electricity price in
1978, even setting aside the consequences for electricity price of all
the other adjustments in a fully anticipating economy.
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When we consider the implications of perfect foresight in the public
and private sectors, other than just the end-use sectors, many more
opportunities for minimizing costs are available than have been
considered in the LCES study. Most important are the macroeconomic costs
of the OPEC tax and the costs associated with inefficient capital stock
in the energy supply industries. The LCES study, by focusing on such a
narrow range of adjustments, omits many of the actions that "could have"
been taken. Our brief review suggests that these actions may be quite
significant.
There is an important argument that should be made here in support
of the narrow focus of the LCES study. The types of adjustments admitted
by LCES can be easily and precisely quantified, while many of the
adjustments we have discussed here in connection with perfect foresight
are qualitive in nature and have uncertain quantitative implications. By
restricting itself to adjustments in the configuration of the capital
stock, the LCES study avoids a nasty morass of guesses and value
judgments.
We do not dispute this argument. But in spite of it, we believe
that a broader focus in the LCES study is warranted. This is our
reason: by omitting government policy and other variables from
consideration, the LCES study may significantly alter the outcome of
adjustments it does allow. The use of natural gas and cogenerated
electricity is a prominent example.
-46-
4.5 The Demand for Energy Service
As noted, the premise of the EPC question explicitly requires the
level of energy services consumed to equal the actual 1978 level. Given
this level of services, consumers choose that combination of technologies
and energy forms which minimize their service costs. This is equivalent
to saying, for example, that there is no elasticity of substitution in
manufacturing between the capital and energy aggregate versus labor and
other inputs; or that the demand for vehicle-miles traveled is completely
insensitive to price; or that demand for space conditioning (heating and
cooling) in residences is completely independent of the delivered service
price.
Clearly, we expect some price elasticity in energy service demand.
It would have been entirely consistent with the EPC strategy of
"employing existing methods of analysis and data" to have considered use
of such elasticities as a means of obtaining a first order approximation
to the adjustment from 1978 actual service demands that the change in
service price implied by Least-Cost calculations would indicate.
That such an adjustment might be significant can easily be
illustrated. The "first iteration" of the LCES procedure provides
estimates of the reduction in energy service costs associated with the
implementation of the LCES (Table 4-1, Column 1). As seen there,
industry, building and transportion costs of delivered energy services
are reduced by 10, 23, and 17% respectively.
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Table 4-1
Percentage Increase in Energy Service Demand for
Alternative Service Price Elasticities Conditional on LCES
Estimated Cost Reductions
LCES Service Alternative Energy Service Elasticities
Cost Reductions .Zb .bU ./b I.U
Industry 10% 2.7 5.4 8.2 11.1
Buildings 23 6.8 14.0 21.7 29.9
Transporation 17 4.8 9.8 15.0 20.5
Assume the range of own price elasticities for energy service demand
of .25 to 1.0. Then the percentage increase of energy service demand
associated with the estimated price reduction corresponding to each
elasticity is given in the body of Table 4-1. The most dramatic effect
is in the building sector, where an increase of as much as 30% in energy
service demand might occur at the high range of elasticities.
Such information could be employed in a second (and subsequent)
iteration(s) in which the revised energy-service demands were analyzed in
each of the three sectoral models, revised service price adjustments were
calculated, and the process iterated until it converged. Provided that
such an iterative process converged (and this would depend in part on
parameter values within the model), we do know that at the final
iteration; both energy demand and energy-service demand would be at least
as large as that at the first iteration. Therefore, ,eliminating
disequilibrium effects associated with the assumption of constant energy
service demand would result in higher energy-service demand, and lower
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energy-service costs, with equilibrium energy-service price somewhere
between the LCES estimate and the 1978 actual price.
Another consequence of the partial equilibrium nature of LCES
results is the implicit elimination of supply constraints. This problem
is pervasive in the study, but is most dramatically illustrated by
natural gas. Since the regulated price is lower than estimates of market
price, excess demand exists in natural gas markets. However, EPC
implicitly assumes that natural gas is supplied with infinite elasticity
at the regulated price. This naturally results in increased use of
natural gas up to that point on the gas demand curve associated with the
regulated price. The increase in gas consumption in the LCES study over
and above the actual 1978 consumption (constrained by supply) is .8
quads. Unless we find some method for producing more domestic gas and
deliver it at that price, the only source for this additional supply is
international purchases. But clearly such purchases are not available at
the 1978 regulated price.
If the decision to utilize a regulated price is justified, then a
necessary implication is that excess demand must be allocated to other
fuels. In the LCES study this might be accomplished by imposing a
restriction on the use of natural gas equal to the 1978 actual use. This
is equivalent to continuing the supply restriction which has constrained
natural gas use in the past.
The consequence of not imposing this restriction is clear when the
LCES results are examined. Underpriced, unconstrained natural gas now
takes over an increasing share of energy service markets. The LCES study
dramatically highlights this increased share of gas. This is a
-49-
consequence, in part, of their use of a regulated gas price,
unconstrained by any supply restriction.
A similar disequilibrium problem exists with the electric utility
sector. One of the most prominent, and highly publicized, study results
is the considerable role for cogeneration found in both the industrial
and building sectors. As shown in Appendix C, and summarized in section
5.2, the amount of cogeneration projected in the LCES study is much
larger than by any other study with which we are familiar, even studies
which employ the same models. If supportable, the EPC finding is an
extremely important and significant result. If EPC is correct, what
factors have other studies ignored?
One consequence of the very large contribution of cogenerated
electricity is that the demand for purchased electricity is considerably
reduced. As previously noted, LCES fails to consider the details of the
effects of the electric utility industry's adjustment to successful
competition from cogeneration. Therefore, an important area for
additional work by the EPC is the reconciliation of their cogeneration
results with those of other studies, and the provision of a more detailed
and credible interpretation of equilibrium between purchased and
cogenerated electricity.
One of the important differences between the premises of the EPC
question and the perfect-foresight question is that the latter permits
adjustment in the demand for energy services. In this section, we have
considered the possible effects of allow such adjustment and have tried
to show that these effects would be significant.
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5. OVERVIEW OF MODELS EMPLOYED IN THE LCES STUDY
We now turn to a very selective review of the models employed in the
LCES study. In Appendix A we present information obtained from each of
the three modeling groups (EEA, BNL, JFA) using the EPRI/MIT Model
Description Questionnaire. The questionnaire asks for information in 5
broad areas including;
General Information,
Administration data,
Model Characteristics, Description, and Documentation,
Model Development and Applications, and
Model Assessment.
Also included in Appendix A are the EPRI/MIT Energy Model Notebook
entries for each model, as well as some additional descriptive
information compiled from the model documentation, the LCES Study
Technical Appendix, and conversations with the modelers and the EPC staff.
A more systematic description of each of the models as employed in
the LCES study is provided in Appendix B, together with an overview of
some issues concerning the use of these models in the context of the EPC
study objectives.
In addition to the issues raised in Appendix B, we address four
points which suggest questions and directions for more detailed analysis
and review. These include,
some anomalous results from the Energy Modeling Forum
"Aggregate Demand Elasticity Study" (EMF.4) for the ISTUM and
BECOM models;
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some as yet unreconciled differences between the LCES study
results from the BECOM model, and a related base case analysis
conducted by the Brookhaven National Laboratory;
unreconciled differences in estimates of industrial
cogeneration potential between the LCES study and previous
applications of the ISTUM model;
a problem of accounting consistency in the ISTUM treatment of
capital stock component in the measure of industrial output
used by ISTUM (value added) versus the capital stock obtained
as the Least-Cost optimal estimate.
5.1 Review of Comparative Model Evaluation Results in EMF.4 for
ISTUM and BECOM
In this section we review some recent results in which the aggregate
demand elasticities implied by the ISTUM and BECOM models are calculated
and compared with other industrial and residential/commercial energy
sector models. These comparisons, while not specific evaluations of
ISTUM and BECOM, do provide some disquieting information regarding model
performance, and suggest that a more indepth investigation of these
models is warranted.
ISTUM: While it would clearly be desirable to perform a detailed
and systematic analysis of the ISTUM model -- a modified version of which
was employed by the Least Cost Strategy study -- both the limits of
available documentation and time permit us only to conduct a somewhat
brief "first round" comparison of ISTUM with other models of the
industrial sector. Such a comparison is possible because of recent work
published by the Energy Modeling Forum.17
A principal focus of the EMF4 (Energy Modeling Forum) Working Group
at Stanford University was the measurement and comparison, across sixteen
detailed models, of the aggregate price elasticity of demand for energy.
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Although the industrial sector model used by Least Cost Strategy was not
included among those examined by EMF4, the ISTUM model was evaluated and
compared with others.
Within the industrial sector, EMF4 considered five models:
Baughman-Joskow (BJ), the combined Brookhaven Energy System Optimization
Model/Hudson-Jorgenson (BESOM/HJ), the U.S. Department of Energy
Mid-Range Energy Forecasting System (MEFS), the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory Energy Policy Model (EPM), and the Energy and Environmental
Analysis, Inc. Industrial Sector Technology Use Model (ISTUM).
Statistical and econometric methods underlie the BN, BESOM/HJ and MEFS
models, engineering analysis forms the basis of the ISTUM model, while
EPM relies primarily on judgmental methods.
In terms of implicit aggregate price elasticity of demand for
energy, EMF4 undertook extensive simulations of the various models using
common assumptions on exogenous variables, and then measured price
responsiveness both at the primary and secondary energy level. Because
of additive mark-up policies, price elasticity estimates at the primary
level are always smaller than at the secondary level. Once price
simulations with respect to various fuels were undertaken, the various
energy quantities were aggregated using four indexing procedures:
Paasche, Laspeyres, BTU aggregation, and Tornquist. The Paasche and
Laspeyres indexes have a long history in national income accounting,
while the Tornquist has been shown to have very desirable theoretical
properties and has been used increasingly over the last decade. Although
BTU aggregation is very common in the energy analysis literature, EMF4
follow other analysts in arguing that BTU aggregation is undesirable,
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since implicitly it assumes that the various energy types are perfectly
substitutable with one another. Moreover, there is considerable
ambiguity in determininj how to measure the BTU content of electricity.
In their summary of results, EMF4 report aggregate elasticity estimates
for energy, using in most cases the Paasche index.
At the secondary demand level, based on the Paasche index, the
25-year demand elasticity (a reasonably close approximation to the long
run price elasticity) runs from a high estimate of 0.7 (EPM), mid-range
values of 0.5 (BESOM/HJ) and 0.4 (BJ), to a low value of 0.2 (ISTUM and
MEFS).18  Hence within the various industrial sector models, ISTUM lies
on the relatively low end of the scale for price elasticity estimates. A
rather strange feature of the ISTUM model, however, is its sensitivity to
the choice of index. While aggregate price elasticity estimates for the
other models show only limited sensitivity (for example, the Paasche and
BTU-weighted price elasticity estimates for BESOM/HJ across all sectors
are .42 and .46, respectively), the price elasticity estimate for ISTUM
drops from .24 to .01 when BTU rather than Paasche indexing is used.
More generally on the issue of instability, EMF4 note that
elasticity estimate results were occasionally quite sensitive to the
specific composition of the price changes. As noted by Sweeney, it is
not necessarily the case that the demand function for energy in aggregate
is single-valued; different combinations of fuel price changes, each
corresponding to an equal change in the aggregate energy price, can have
very different aggregate energy quantity impacts. 19  In such cases the
demand function for energy is an ellipse rather than a single valued
straight-line function. Sweeney notes, incidentally, that a sufficient
condition for the aggregate energy demand function to be single-valued is
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that the various types of energy are weakly homothetically separable from
all other inputs or commodities.
EMF4 report in their study that of the fourteen models evaluated
(five of which were in the industrial sector), elasticity estimates from
the ISTUM model were extremely unstable and sensitive to compositional
changes.20 Moreover, when the ISTUM price elasticity estimates were
averaged over all possible component price directions, the average
elasticity had the wrong sign, implying that the demand function not only
was a very wide ellipse (rather than a narrow ellipse converging to a
straight line), but that it was upward, rather than downward, sloping.
Precisely how one interprets these peculiar results from ISTUM is
not clear. However, several points should be made. First, among the
industrial sector models, the point estimate of the secondary aggregate
energy price elasticity is within the range of others, albeit at the low
end. Griffin and Wood have noted that engineering models such as ISTUM
have traditionally exhibited less price responsiveness than statistical
or econometric models such as Hudson-Jorgenson and MEFS.21 Hence that
ISTUM produces a low estimate is not that surprising.
Second, since the ISTUM model generates elasticity estimates very
sensitive to the particular indexing procedure employed (for example, BTU
versus Paasche), it follows that a great deal of inter-fuel substitution
must be implicit in the ISTUM model, far more than in other models. For
only if the fuel composition is changing substantially will weighted
aggregation methods produced such divergent results. This feature of
ISTUM merits further examination. Incidentally, as shown in the paper by
Alan Cox, included as Appendix C of this report, the Least Cost Strategy
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analysis of industrial cogeneration exhibits even greater sensitivity to
interfuel prices than the already volatile ISTUM model.
Finally, while it clearly is not necessary that demand functions for
aggregate energy be single-valued, the extreme width of the energy demand
function ellipse with the ISTUM model and its "incorrect" upward slope
suggests that ISTUM differs quite considerably from other industrial
sector models, be they engineering, econometric, or judgmental. Why
these differences occur merits additional attention.
BECOM: For the residential sector, EMF4 compared five models in
terms of aggregate energy demand elasticities: the Hirst model (H), the
OECD model of James Griffin (G), the U.S. Department of Energy Mid-range
Energy Forecasting System (MEFS), the model by Robert Pindyck (PIND), and
the Brookhaven Energy Conservation Optimization Model (BECOM). Several
additional models were considered by EMF4 for the combined
residential/commercial sector. It should be noted that the least cost
strategy (LCS) adopted a slightly modified version of the BECOM model.
In terms of the implicit long-run (25 year) secondary aggregate
energy demand elasticities, BECOM falls in the middle of the range of
estimates: 1.0 (PIND), 0.9 (G), 0.6 (BECOM), 0.5 (MEFS) and 0.4
(H).22  It is noteworthy, however, that the BECOM aggregate energy
elasticity estimate is by far the most sensitive to the choice of
indexing procedure used (e.g., Paasche, Laspeyres and BTU-weighted),
among the residential models considered. For example, while the Hirst
Paasche and BTU-weighted elasticity estimates were 0.44 and 0.47,
respectively, and the Pindyck estimates were 0.70 and 0.66, the BECOM
point estimate varied by a factor of two from 0.51 to 1.00 when BTU
rather than Paasche indexes were used.23 As noted earlier, such
-~---~- --- IIIYYYIII i
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sensitivity to choice of aggregation procedure is disturbing, and may
reflect extremely high inter-fuel substitution elasticities. This issue
merits further examination.
Interestingly, BECOM also shares with ISTUM an extreme sensitivity
of aggregate elasticity measure to the choice of component fuels. As
noted in the EMF4 report, of the fourteen models examined by EMF4, the
two most volatile in terms of average elasticity estimates are ISTUM and
BECOM.24 Coincidentally, variants of these two models are employed by
Least Cost Strategy. Additional analysis should be undertaken to examine
implications of the extreme elasticity volatility in BECOM and ISTUM
reported results.
5.2 Comparison of LCES Buildings and Brookhaven Base Case for
Northeast Residential and Commercial Buildings
The BECOM model documentation provides as illustration results from
a base case analysis for residential and commercial buildings in the
Northeast region, 1990.25 The base period is 1975, and the analysis is
conducted based on 1990 estimated prices, technologies, and service
demands. Thus this illustrative base case differs from the LCES study
case because full adjustment and retrofit has probably not taken place,
meaning that the extent of capital stock turnover in the two cases is not
comparable, different service demands are being considered (1978 versus
1990), and different energy prices are used (actual 1978 versus estimated
1990).
Nevertheless, by scaling the BNL 1990 base case to approximate 1978
building units in place, and by considering the pattern of techology
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units and energy demands, it is possible to measure approximately just
how important the other differences might be. 26 We would not expect
the two sets of results to be exactly comparable, but some consistency in
patterns between the two studies might reasonably be expected.
The results of this comparison are summarized in Tables 5-1,2 for
the residential buildings, and Tables 5-3,4 for commercial buildings.
Perhaps most striking is the fact that while the residential building
results differ significantly, the commercial building results seem
similar.
Residential Buildings:
The major differences in the residential sector are a shift from oil
furnaces and greater retrofitting in the Least-Cost case. The Least-Cost
case has 5.5 million fewer oil burning furnaces. In thermal heat all the
oil burners are scrapped and no new ones are introduced. Instead, the
Least-Cost study shows an increase in gas furnaces and electric heat
pumps. These changes result in the residential Least-Cost case using 1/3
less fuel than the base policy case.
The Least-Cost technological mix is quite different from the base
case. Electric heat pumps make a large penetration into the retrofit
market, amounting to 25T of the heating units. However, they make zero
penetration into the new home market. Instead almost all the new homes
are heated by gas burners. Why there would be more electric heat pumps
than new gas furnaces used in retrofitting and none in new housing is
perplexing, particularly given that the base policy case has electric
heat pumps in the new structures.
We have not been able to reconcile differences between the two sets
of residential results, but we believe two sets of factors are at work.
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First, while the energy prices used in the BNL Base case are not
documented, almost certainly, natural gas prices were higher, relative to
other energy prices, than in the LCES case. Hence the "reconfiguration"
to gas based technology seems likely to be due to this fact.
Second, the LCES study does not include as part of capital cost the
economic depreciation associated with early retirement of old capital.
Only incremental costs are evaluated.27 As the tables indicate, the
LCES study "turns over" a great deal of HVAC equipment.28  If this
equipment is retired prematurely, then the incremental capital cost
method is incorrect because it doesn't account for the economic value
lost in prematurely retiring capital. The most probable reasons for the
difference in the number of oil burners between the Least-Cost and base
policy case is that the Least-Cost study simply retired them faster than
the base-case did, without correcting capital costs.
This leads us into the question of perfect foresight in fuel
prices. If we know infinitely in advance what fuel prices would be, it
would pose no problem to choose the correct technologies under a given
decision criterion. If we reduce this period to 25 years, we still have
a enough time to make fairly optimal decisions. However, if we reduce
this period to 10-15 year-; as suggested by the Least-Cost study, it would
be difficult to make some of the changes suggested by the Least-Cost
study, for some capital lifetimes are longer than 10-15 years. Some of
the procedures used in the Least-Cost study suggest that foresight longer
than 10-15 years is needed.
However, even if we could have this long foresight, there is no
reason to believe that minimizing a specific year's costs would be an
optimal strategy. Why would anyone in 1963 act so that they would
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minimize their costs in 1978 rather than minimizing the costs over the
life of the equipment, or maximizing net benefits obtained from their
investment choice? Not only would 1978 fuel prices be considered, but
also all the fuel prices in all the other years of the equipment life
would be relevant.
This point is stressed here because of its relationship to the
housing results. The high price of oil relative to other fuels is
probably the driving force in the move away from oil burners. But in the
sixties oil was not as highly priced. Thus if one was going to buy a
heating unit in 1963, the fuel savings in 1978 of not having used oil may
not have offset the savings of burning low-cost oil in the sixties and
any other additional equipment costs. Thus, minimizing 1978 costs may
not have been an optimal decision criterion since costs changed over the
period before 1978 and continued to change after 1978.
The Least-Cost study also consistently invokes a higher retrofit and
new equipment conservation level than does the base policy case. In the
LCES case all old equipment is retrofitted, while in the base policy case
about 1/3 is not retrofitted to any level. The majority of new
technology is entered at the second level of conservation in the LCES
study while in the base policy case most is entered at the first level.
Commercial Building:
The commercial sector results appear to be similar for the two
cases. The notable exceptions are that in the Least-Cost case, there are
no oil or electric thermal units and very few electric space heaters.
One fact that should be noted is that there are no oil or electric
thermal units in the entire building sector of the Least-Cost study.
Almost all thermal demand is met by gas units with the small remainder
_ __I
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going to solar. As well, all the thermal units are new. This means that
the entire stock has been turned over, which does not seem unreasonable.
But to replace it entirely with gas and a few solar units is more
unlikely.
Electric thermal units that are used in the base policy case appear
to be replaced by gas units in the Least-Cost case. Again, retirement
procedures are likely to account for differences.
One interesting note in thermal and space heating of new commercial
structures is that solar collectors supply the majority of the demand in
the Least-Cost case. This holds true not only at the national level, but
also for the Northeast, which one would expect to be less favorable to
solar technologies. Solar is easily the dominant technology for
supplying space and thermal heating of new commercial buildings.
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Table 5-1
Northeast Residential (E6 Physical Units)
Space Heat
Gas L-C
BPC
Oil L-C
BPC
Elect L-C
BPC
Solar L-C
BPC
9.8381
7.1868
2.7510
8.3328
Thermal Appliance
.0211 17.5000
.6646 8.8048
5.1585
4.9110 6.6769
1.9149 5.9976
.1917
.2573 .2573
17.9000
17.25133.1593
.3078
.2573
Table 5-2
Northeast Residential Total Fuel Use (E15 Btu's)
Space Heat
Gas L-C
BPC
Oil L-C
BPC
Elect. L-C
BPC
Solar L-C
BPC
.6413
.5013
.8067
.2307
.6850
1.3653
.0597
.0589
.0025
.0019
AC
.0001
.0024
.0117
.0138
.0003
Thermal Appliance
.6506
.3921
.2858
.2963
.3442
.0009
.0837
.0030
.0013
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Table 5-3
Northeast Commercial (E6 Physical Units)
Space Heat
Gas L-C
BPC
Oil L-C
BPC
Elect. L-C
BPC
Solar L-C
BPC
3.0520
2.4244
2.6500
2.1308
.0490
1.1609
.3920
.4307
Thermal Appliance
5.7510
.6500 2.2333
2.9412
2.9519
2.1861
.2962
6.1430
.3020 5.6918
.3920
.4307
Table 5-4
Northeast Commercial (E15 Btu)
Space Heat
Gas L-C
BPC
Oil L-C
BPC
Elect. L-C
BPC
Solar L-C
BPC
.2337
.1422
.2884
.2316
.0048
.0231
.0040
.0055
AC
.0149
.0356
.0325
Thermal Appliance
.0222
.0120
.0193
.0003
.0007
.0011
.0010
.3383
.3204
-63-
5.3 The LCES and the Economics of Cogeneration.
Until now, we have accepted the EPC cogeneration results at face
value. However, it is important to note that the EPC results are
dramatically higher than those for other cogeneration studies. We have
not conducted a comprehensive survey of such studies, but have summarized
those with which we are familiar in Table 5-5. As is apparent, the
production of cogenerated electricity is dramatically higher for the EPC
study than for other studies included in the table.
Most importantly, the EPC study results for the industrial sector
differ significantly from those based on another application of ISTUM,
the same model employed by EPC. In Table 5-5 we compare the results
between the two studies, as well as the assumptions concerning technology
costs and fuel prices. ISTUM results for the year 2000 (with a much
higher steam service demand than actual 1978) are substantially lower
than the EPC results; the pattern of supply between the competing
cogeneration technologies is also much different. Most dramatically,
natural gas fired turbines are the sole source of supply for industrial
cogeneration in the EPC study, whereas in the ISTUM study their role is
much reduced.
The main differences between the two studies appear to be that EPC
uses a much lower price of natural gas, and uses much higher investment
costs for coal-fired boilers and steam generating equipment. In
addition, the EPC study uses an annual capital recovery factor that is
one half that of the ISTUM report.
With their set of assumptions, the EPC report's technology costs
show that gas turbines are a cheaper way to produce steam than coal
boilers; and that coal-fired topping cycles are more expensive than
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Table 5-5
Estimates of Cogeneration Penetration
Total U.S. cogenerated electricity as a percentage
of total electricity production, 1975 (Pickel, 1978) 4%
Massachusetts estimate of profitable cogeneration in
state as a percentage of 1977 electricity consumption.
Base Case. (Massachusetts, 1978) 19%
Resource Planning Assoc. l  5.5-16.4%
Dow (1975)1 18.2%
Thermp-Electron (1976)1 7.7%
ISTLUMI 5.9%
Least-Cost(a)2 59.6%
Least-Cost(b)3  37.7%
lAs percentages of 1985 demand projected by DRI. Adapted from Joyce
(1978) using 65 percent utilization rate.
2Industrial cogeneration as a percentage of 1978 industrial demand.
Estimated from gas consumption figures. Tables III.3.3 of LCES
technical appendix. Total gas use for electrolyte and machine drive
demand = 2.95 Quads. At 60% efficiency this gives 1.75 Quads of
electricity. Percentage cogeneration is then (1.75/(2.21 + 1.18) where
1.18 is industrial demand for purchased electricity.
3Total cogeneration as a percentage of total 1978 demand. Estimated as
in (a) plus oil consumption for diesel cogeneration in buildings times
40% efficiency. Oil use in diesel cogeneration in buildings (from Table
III.4.1) 2.29 Quads. At 40% efficiency, this gives .916 Quads of
electricity. Total electric purchases in LCES study is 4.4 Quads.
(1.75 + .916)/(1.75 + .916 + 4.4) = .377.
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purchased electricity. We have corrected the EPC technology costs and
find that coal is actually cheaper than gas turbines for providing steam
and that the mean cost of coal topping is cheaper than purchased
electricity.
These corrections notwithstanding, it is unlikely that the cost per
Btu calculations are an accurate reflection of the costs of
cogeneration. While the ISTUM methodology does utilize a distribution of
costs, some factors are not included in the estimation of the
distribution. Cogenerators face the problem of oscillating steam demand
which will increase the capital costs of cogeneration. In addition some
cogeneration options, particularly gas turbines, require the scrapping of
a great deal of capital which has both economic and financial
consequences.
The unreasonable cost assumptions, coupled with the inconsistent way
in which cogeneration technologies are handled in ISTUM, results in gas
turbines capturing a significant proportion of the steam market and,
automatically, the electricity market. The inconsistency is that gas
turbines receive a credit for their electricity production, reducing the
cost of providing steam, while coal boilers receive no such credit. The
incremental cost of adding cogeneration equipment to a coal boiler is
then used to compare this form of cogeneration with purchased electricity
in a competition for whatever is left of electricity demand after the gas
turbine contribution has been removed.
While the levels of cogeneration predicted in the EPC study are very
large, no attempt has been made to assess the impact of so massive a
reduction in demand on the elctric utility industry. Increased
production of electricity not under the control of a utility will alter
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the capital choices and operating costs of the utility. Significant
reductions in electricity production costs will reduce the value of
cogeneration, while increased capital requirements for cogeneration
back-up will also be assessed against cogeneration. However, the effect
of large amounts of cogeneration on the electric utility has not been
studied and the disequilibrium consequences are simply unknown.
5.4 Accounting for Capital in ISTUM
There is a question regarding the procedure by which energy service
demand is estimated in the ISTUM model. The ISTUM documentation makes
clear that energy service demands are calculated proportional to a value
added measure of output by industry sector. The proportion used is
calibrated using data for 1974, and projections are based on the DRI
industry model, although other projections of sector output (value added)
could be used.
Value added measures payments to primary factors of production
including capital, labor, and land. Thus a projection of value added
implicitly (hopefully explicitly) includes a projection of payments to
capital. But the ISTUM model itself purports to calculate optimal
capital in minimizing cost of providing energy services. Nothing in the
procedure ensures consistency between capital implicit in the projection
of value added, and capital explicitly estimated by ISTUM.
We note that this inconsistency does not affect the LCES study
results since actual 1978 service demands are employed. However, in
future EPC studies which are prospective in scope, some attention should
be given to the implications of this inconsistency.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Sant [1979], p. 27.
2. See Sant [1979], p. 38.
3. See Sant [1979], p. 27.
4. See Sant [1979], p. 4.
5. See Sant [1979], p. 27.
6. See the EPC Annual Report [1980] for discussion of the publicity.
7. See Sant [1979], p. 38.
8. See Sant [1979], p. 5.
9. See Carhart [1979], p. 1.
10. An EPRI Energy Model Notebook entry was prepared for each of these
models by the respective modeling group. See Appendix A.
11. An overview of each of the three models is presented in Appendix B.
12. The notion that it is energy services, not energy products, that
should be the focus of analysis has been suggested and pursued by,
among others, the modeling group at Brookhaven National Laboratory,
initially by Kenneth Hoffman, and more recently by the Technical
Director of the EPC study, Steve Carhart.
13. See Sant [1979], p. 5.
14. See Sant [1979], p. 43.
15. See Sant [1979], p. 5.
16. See Appendix D. Note that this problem is not specific to the EPC
study. See McFadden [1981].
17. See EMF4 Working Group, "Aggregate Elasticity of Energy Demand", The
Energy Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1981, pp. 37-75. Hereafter,
caTled EMF4.
18. EMF4, Table 6, p. 59.
19. J. L. Sweeney, "Price and Quantity Change Decomposition for
Aggregated Commodities", EMF Working Paper 4.7, Draft 2, January
1980.
20. EMF4, Table 7, p. 62.
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21. J. M. Griffin and D. 0. Wood, "Explaining Intermodel Differences in
the EMF Aggregate Energy Demand Elasticity Study," EMF Working Paper
4.11, Draft 1, August, 1980.
22. EMF4, Table 6, p. 59.
23. EMF4, Table 5, p. 57.
24. EMF4, Table 7, p. 62
25. In a telephone conversation, Steven Carhart gave his assurances that
the results were based upon reasonable inputs and were meaningful,
although not all the inputs were available for review.
26. Base policy case results were multiplied by .902 for residential and
by .706 for commercial. This factor equalizes the number of space
heating units in each case. Problems exist with some of the BECOM
base policy case results. These numbers are taken from Carhart,
Steven C.; Mulherkar, Shirish S.; and Sanborn, Yasuko. The
Brookhaven Buildings Energy Conservation Optimization ModeT,
BNL50828 Brookhaven National Laboratory, January 1978. Some of the
fuel use values do not add to the totals given in the summary
tables. The numbers listed in Table II correspond to the aggregated
fuel totals listed by type of technology.
It should be noted that tables 111.3.2 and 111.3.3, page 89 of the
Least-Cost Energy Strategy Technical Appendix do not correspond
because of off-line changes. These changes are referred to on page
102 of the Technical Appendix.
27. Capital costs are difficult to account for in the housing sector.
While page 118 of the Technical Appendix lists $147.6 billion as the
required capital investment, costs listed in tables III.6.1-.5 on
pages 117-118 add to only $103.7 billion.
28. The tables are taken from pages 96 and 111 of the Least-Cost Energy
Strategy Technical Appendix and from pages 35-37 and 47-49 of
Carhart, Steven C.; Mulherkar, Shirish S.; and Sanborn, Yasuko; The
Brookhaven Buildings Energy Conservation Model, BNL 50828,
Brookhaven National Laboratory, January 19/8. The upper number in a
row refers to the Least-Cost case and the number beneath it to the
comparable figure from the BECOM base-policy case. See also
footnote 23.
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Chapter 6
Response of the Energy Productivity Center
Steven C. Carhart
Introduction
Participation in the modeling review process proved.
to be an extremely valuable experience for us. Any time
another research group takes this degree of interest in
our work, we consider it a high compliment indeed. In
going into such a high degree of depth concerning our ap-
proach with the MIT group, we raised and fruitfully dis-
cussed many fundamental issues. Throughout the process
our EPRI project manager, Richard Richels, provided steady,
unobtrusive support which made possible a fruitful exchange
of views. For our part, we gained many useful perspectives
on alternative approaches to some of the issues we have
pursued, as well as some ideas for future work.
In our discussions with the review team, we endeavored
to impart our broader perspective on the study. We have
reviewed their final report and find it does not fully re-
flect the perspective we feel slould be taken for productive
use of our results. Our difference in perspective primarily
concerns the contribution which the least-cost approach has
made and can make to understanding energy markets.
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The Least-Cost Perspective
The modeling system developed at the Energy Produc-
tivity Center represents a fundamentally different con-
ceptual approach to energy issues than has traditionally
been taken in most other studies: The purpose of this
system is to assess the market shares and relative com-
petitiveness of different means of supplying energy
services - the heat, light, mobility, and other useful
functions provided by energy. It is not the purpose of
the system to forecast energy use or develop policies for
reducing oil imports. It is important to emphasize this,
because most energy modeling activity has been directed at
the latter two objectives.
Many of the comments of the review team reflect a
concern with energy use forecasts and oil import policies--
and suggestions about how to "improve" the least-cost
analysis that changes it into a forecast. We wish to emphasize
at the outset that while these are worthwhile issues to
address, they were not our purpose in this exercise. A major
contribution of the least-cost exercise was to highlight the
value of analyzing the energy system from.a totally different
perpective. We do not, therefore, consider these comments
to be responsive to the study.
The second point of emphasis in our study is the need-
given our purpose of assessing technologies - to
__
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work from a sufficiently rich engineering data base. To
do this, we used the three engineering-economic models
which represented the state of the art in this field when
the study was done in 1979 - the Industrial Sector Technology
Use Model (ISTUM), the Buildings Energy Conservation Optimi-
zation Model (BECOM) and the Transportation Energy Conserva-
tion Model (TEC). Use of these models allowed an in-depth
assessment of which technologies made the most sense as
means of reducing consumer costs.
Many of the review team comments criticized the choice
of models, and suggested different models or model improve-
ments they claim would be better suited to the task. Yet,
given our technology focus, we feel our choice of models
provided the best analytical approach available.
The review also states that our assessment of a 1978
optimal reconfiguration of the energy system was "motivated
by the unanticipated increase in oil prices since 1973." On
the contrary, our interest was motivated by a desire to under-
stand energy markets and the relative competitiveness of diffe-
rent fuels and technologies, not by any special concern about
oil prices or imports.
Detailed Commentary
This section responds point by point to the discus-
sion in the MIT Executive Summary. The section is arranged
so that the reader is first presented with a point made by
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MIT in the Executive Summary. Each point is followed by
our comments concerning the validity of the conclusions MIT
draws in their analysis of the Least-Cost modeling results.
The reader should note that the points presented by MIT repre-
sent a mixture of critique of our study and exposition
regarding issues MIT believes are relevant. The concluding
section discusses in detail the issue of cogeneration modeling,
which was a major focus of in-depth review by the MIT team. Our
comments focus on these points we feel are most controversial,
and ignore statements on which we concur or statements of fact.
Executive Summary:
1. The Energy Productivity Center's retrospective,
"Least-Cost Energy Strategy" (LCES) study is
provocative regarding the potential role of ef-
ficiency technologies in competition with energy
supply technologies. Their decision to conduct
a "what if" analysis for a recent year provides
an historical context for interpreting and re-
viewing the results.
1.1 As a result of its predication on known
prices and technologies, the question posed
by EPC avoids analysis of the difficult
problems of uncertainty, shocks, and other
"surprises," and instead focuses on the
issue of optimal adjustment to higher
energy prices.
1.2 The retrospective vantage of the LCES study
helps us learn from history and has impli-
cations for optimal adjustment to future
energy-price increases.
Response:
1. We appreciate MIT's comment regarding the value of
retrospective studies; however, we believe the
utility of the results lies more in the area of
understanding market trends in the near future.
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1.1 Our choice of prices and avoidance of "shock"
issues reflects our feeling that analysis
of long term equilibrium is a better guide
to business and government planning, apart
from the development of insurance policies
for special contingencies (such as the Strat-
egic Petroleum Reserve).
Executive Summary:
2. The LCES study is subtitled: "Minimizing Consumer
Costs Through Competition." But the effects of
competition are not explored in the body of the
study. All of EPC's analysis is devoted to con-
structing a hypothetical optimal strategy and
comparing that strategy to what actually occurred.
EPC suggests, without substantiation, that com-
petition would cause an optimal strategy to
materialize. It should be kept in mind that many
economists, planners and regulators would argue
that an optimal strategy can be implemented only
with planning and regulation.
Response:
2. We might distinguish here between technology com-
petition and competition between different business
organizations. The formal analysis demonstrates the
results of technology competition by choosing the
technologies which provide energy services at the
lowest cost. The corollary is that enhanced market
competition achieved through deregulation of prices,
elimination of barriers to market entry, and en-
forcement of anti-trust statutes will produce
more technology competition, and hence lower consumer
prices. We consider this corollary to be intui-
tively obvious. Attempts in centrally planned
economies to implement optimal schemes have
generally failed to achieve lower consumer prices
relative to economies with market competition.
Empirical verification of this axiom most likely
can be found in economic research comparing price
levels with market concentration.
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Executive Summary:
3. The methodology chosen by EPC to construct an
optimal energy strategy is based on the least-
cost energy-strategy (LCES) objective. This
methodology has several advantages over other
conventional policy objectives.
3.1 Because of its general nature, the least-
cost objective function can simultaneously
take account of many different kinds of
issues. Matters such as resource limitations,
environmental factors and national security
can all be evaluated and compared within
the framework of the least-cost method.
This way of formulating policy is far more
appealing than a method that takes account
of only one significant issue (such as
energy independence).
3.2 Because costs must be quantified before they
can be minimized, the least-cost method in-
vites the analyst to use hard data when it
is available. Vague judgments are thus
discouraged.
Response:
3.1 It is generally true that a cost minimization
function can facilitate simultaneous study
of issues, although for clarity we should
note that in the study we focused only on
cost minimization without explicitly treating
environmental or oil import concerns. The
favorable results in these areas were an
unintended result of the economic optimi-
zation.
3.2 The importance of quantifying technology costs
cannot be overemphasized.
__
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Executive Summary:
4. Least-cost methodology is limited for several
reasons, and it yields results which tend to
overstate -- perhaps substantially -- the economic
desirability of energy-efficiency improvements.
Hence LCES implications for policy in this area
may be misleading.
4.1 There are many potential market responses
to new energy-price conditions:
i. Consumers may substitute less energy-
intensive consumer goods for more
energy-intensive consumer goods.
ii. Producers may substitute less energy-
intensive inputs for more energy-
intensive inputs in the production of
a broad spectrum of commodities.
iii. Producers may substitute more energy-
efficient processes for less energy-
efficient processes in the production
of energy services.
iv. Secondary price changes may occur for
many fuels and other energy rich
commodities.
The least-cost methodology as applied by EPC
takes account of only one of these market
responses, namely, iii. above.
4.2 Least-cost methodology does not treat the
level of benefits as a subject of consumer
choice. Costs are permitted to vary as a
function of the energy-service technologies
selected, but the output of goods, and thus
consumer benefits, are exogenously fixed.
That is why the least-cost method cannot allow
consumers to substitute less energy-intensive
consumer goods for more energy-intensive
consumer goods (e.g. i., above).
4.3 In contrast, the methodology of maximizing
net benefits simultaneously chooses the appro-
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priate bundle of outputs and the least-
cost strategy for attaining that bundle.
Maximizing net benefits and minimizing costs
are equivalent only under restrictive and
unlikely conditions. This raises important
questions about the use of least-cost strate-
gies for public and private policy formation.
4.4 When net-benefits maximization replaces cost-
minimization as the policy objective, the
indicated optimal improvement in the energy
efficiency of capital goods is reduced. The
interaction between the demand for services,
capacity utilization and the optimal energy-
efficiency of capital is an essential consid-
eration in adjusting to higher energy prices.
Ignoring this interaction biases LCES results
toward excess efficiency. Some preliminary
analysis suggests this bias may be substantial.
4.5 LCES strategies are deficient in that they
recognize only the costs of energy-service
inputs in the production of non-energy goods.
They do not analyze the cost of other inputs
to non-energy goods production, e.g. labor,
capital, environmental conditions, non-energy
materials, and primary resources. As a result,
the LCES method cannot be used to analyze the
substitution of less energy-intensive inputs
for more energy-intensive inputs in general
productive processes (e.g. ii., above). This
omission further biases LCES results towards
excess efficiency.
Response:
4. Methodological limitations in the study nonetheless
reflect the state of the art at the time. We do
not agree that the methodology - taken with the
caveats originally provided in the study - overstates
the desirability of efficiency. Moreover, the prin-
cipal policy conclusion we reach - that enhanced
competition is the key to improving the operation of
the energy system - would only be enhanced by extension
of the methodology.
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4.1 - 4.2 Certainly Least Cost work does concen-
trate on one facet of consumer substitution
response. This choice was a conscious one
since the other facets of substitution are
far less relevant to our purpose in the
study, i.e. to identify market directions for
fuels and technologies As a point of general
model development, we certainly agree that
these issues should be treated. In defense
of our modeling methodology, it should be
pointed out that no other methodology exists
which treats these issues at the level of
detail we felt necessary in our study using
empirical data.
4.3 Net benefit maximization is certainly desirable
in theory but has not been implemented with
empirical data at a disaggregated level. For
our purpose - identifying directional trends
in energy markets - we do not feel that there
is any important difference between analyses
applying a cost minimization criterion and
analyses applying a net benefit maximization
criterion. The comment indicating that least-
cost strategies are not useful for public and
private policy formation is highly misleading
and out of context, especially since MIT does
not define the policy questions for which this
approach is considered inappropriate. The only
major policy recommendation we reach is that more
competition in energy markets will reduce consumer
costs without compromising social objectives. A
net benefits calculation would not affect this
conclusion.
4.4 Use of a net-benefits maximization function, if
such a function could be applied to empirical data,
might reduce the magnitude of energy-efficiency
achieved. However, this comment presupposes
that we are calculating a "recommended" level of
energy efficiency, which we were not doing. Our
emphasis was on testing the consequences of in-
creased market competition. The relevant lessons
to be drawn from the analysis are concerned with
market competition, not absolute efficiency levels,
as we have repeatedly emphasized.
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4.5 An analysis allowing for a broader scope of
substitution, including substitution of energy-
service production inputs with non-energy
service production inputs is certainly desir-
able. It is, however, beyond the scope of any
general energy use model presently available.
Ironically, if the range of possible substitu-
tion were broadened, we could only imagine a
broader range of substitutions for energy in
the production process, which implies that
the potential for increased efficiency is
understated by this methodological limitation.
Executive Summary:
5. In constructing the LCES model, EPC described tech-
nologies for the production of energy services in
great detail.
5.1 This detail is potentially useful in drawing
conclusions about the future role of specific
technologies in the production of energy
services. EPC has advanced the state of the
art of modelling energy-services production
by integrating detailed information concerning
a wide variety of energy services.
5.2 However, because of lack of attention to some
of the broader issues discussed above, many
of the detailed LCES results may be artifacts
of methodology. Therefore, we believe it
would have been more fruitful to distribute
modelling resources more evenly among the
issues listed under 4.1, to trade off detail
for broader scope and a more appealing objec-
tive than least cost.
Response:
5. - 5.1 Detailed technology characterization was
essential to our attempt to understand the economic
competitiveness of these technologies. A primary
goal of the modeling effort was to advance technology
characterization to a level not attained in other
modeling systems.
__
_ 
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5.2 Certainly our analysis was not concerned with
a broad scope of substitution; however, to
suggest we should have used our limited re-
sources to develop a broader substitution
spectrum is to comment on the value of the
question we addressed rather than on how well
we performed the task we chose for ourselves.
Our view was and is that identifying growth
markets for fuels and technologies is by far
more useful for practical business and govern-
ment planning than calculating the most accurate
fuel use forecast.
Executive Summary:
6. The EPC retrospective question can be stated suc-
cinctly: "How would the nation have provided energy
services in 1978 if its capital stock had been
reconfigured to be optimal for actual 1978 energy
prices." We believe that the focus of this question
is too restricted.
6.1 In fact, only a part of the capital stock is
permitted to adjust. The least-cost strategy
implicitly gives the gift of perfect foresight
to end-use consumers of energy services but
not to other decision makers, so that the
least-cost strategy is a partial optimization.
6.2 Using actual energy prices rather than estimates
of market prices greatly restricts the inter-
pretation of the LCES study results as optimal.
Further, the use of such prices, which include
distortions due to regulation and market
failures, is inconsistent with the spirit of
a paper purporting to demonstrate the advantages
of increased competition. We suggest that EPC
should have used imputed free-market prices
rather than "actual 1973 energy prices."
Response:
6. These points suggest further refinements of our
methodology which are in fact reflective of directions
we have taken since the 1979 study.
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-6.1 This is true of the best methodology we
could apply in 1979. We do not consider
these results directionally misleading con-
cerning market trends from 1978, however,
because the marginal costs of new energy
sources were higher than the actual prices
used. Thus, we understated the attractiveness
of marginal productivity investment versus
energy supply investment.
6.2 Since our purpose was to identify growth
marketsand assess the consequences of increased
competition- in energy markets rather than to
do a forecast, this point is quite distant
from the central focus of the study. We did,
in fact, do a sensitivity case using replace-
ment prices for fuels to reflect fuel price
increases as low cost supplies are depleted.
This case showed greatly increased efficiency
technology penetration (44% vs 32% in the
average cost case). These results were
covered briefly in section V of the Technical
Appendix, rather than presented prominently,
precisely to avoid the charge of overstating
the economic potential of efficiency technol-
ogies which MIT attributes to our controlled
price analysis.
Executive Summary:
7. We suggest an alternative retrospective question:
"How would the nation have provided energy services
in 1978 if cost-minimizing economic decision makers
with perfect foresight had defined the domestic
economic environment, constrained only by the
domestic energy endowment and by world-market prices
of enerqy resources abroad?" The answer to this
question would be substantially different from the
answer to the question posed by EPC, and, we think,
more interesting.
7.1 With universal perfect foresight, public
policies in the 1960's and 70.'s might well
have mitigated the disruptive economic conse-
quences of energy price shocks. A more fully
adjusted macro-economy with greater economic
growth and fewer recessions might have resulted.
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7.2 This statement is probably true, although if
the electric power system were deregulated and
priced at the margin, the electricity price would
probably been higher rather than lower.
7.3 A partial derivative of a function with respect
to a certain variable is necessarily taken at
certain values for other independent variables.
Given that we started from actual 1978 conditions,
and that the process we have performed is
essentially taking the partial derivative of
market shares with respect to price, no other
result could emerge.
In previous points the effects of expanding
the range of substitution was discussed (i.e.,
Point 4). In response to these points we
showed that with an expanded range of substitu-
tion there should not be a significant decrease
in opportunities for reducing costs of energy
services. Indeed, we suspect the range of
opportunities would increase.
Executive Summary:
8. LCES treats 1978 fuel prices as exogenous to the
least-cost strategy. As a result, the fuel prices
EPC uses in its simulations and computer runs, bias
results towards increased use of natural gas,
increased cogeneration of electricity, and sub-
stantially decreased use of purchased electricity.
8.1 Electricity prices are set at levels higher
than would prevail if optimal reconfigurations
of the utility capacity were allowed. This
affects EPC simulations by making cogeneration
more attractive to the industrial and buildings
sectors than it otherwise would be.
8.2 Indicated optimal industrial cogeneration of
electricity is dramatically higher than in any
other study surveyed, and most significantly
much higher than in other applications of ISTUM,
the simulation model employed in the EPC study.
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Response:
8. The run is not "biased" except insofar as the results
follow from the explicit assumptions. If this state-
ment is made relative to a free market, marginal
price case (exhibiting even higher prices), the
analysis-greatly overstates the role of electricity
and understates the market for productivity investment.
8.1 It is not clear that electric prices are set
too high. Marginal electric prices in 1978 were
for higher than the average prices used in the
analysis. To the extent that it could be dem-
onstrated that a reconfigured deregulated electric
system would have lower rather than higher prices,
the directional interpretation is correct.
8.2 The coceneration result is principally a function
of the spread between gas and electric prices
in the analysis.
Executive Summary:
9. Several key results of the LCES study were imposed on
the models, rather than being generated endogenously
within the models as the outcome of an explicit
optimization process. Hence prior judgment rather
than integrated analysis significantly affected LCES
results.
9.1 In the industrial sector, the second largest
source of energy-efficiency improvement was
- - III,_ i
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the development and market penetration of the
variable speed motor. As the recent history
of the Reliance Company indicates, the time
for the variable speed motor has not yet arrived.
9.2 In the transportation sector, the second largest
source of improvement derives from the increased
dieselization of the motor vehicle fleet. But
the figures regarding penetration of diesel
motored vehicles were imposed on the model
exogenously.
9.3 In the buildings sector, the fourth most important
source of efficiency improvement is cogeneration,
a result introduced into the study via a side
calculation.
Response:
9. This statement is unfair and misleading in the extreme.
As with all models, there are always a few features
or technologies one wishes to assess which are not
endogenous to the model at any particular state of
its development. In view of the purpose of our study-
i.e, to assess the market potential of key energy
technologies - a conscious decision was made to intro-
duce a few key technologies into the model which were
not formally represented. These were introduced to
the model via side calculations performed using exactly
the same calculation procedure the model would have
used. These changes were fully and explicitly docu-
mented. This analysis was thus fully consistent with
the calculations used for other-technologies, was
not in any sense "imposed," and was integral to the
optimization process. In fact, the technologies have
performed pretty much as one would expect in the
market place.
9.1 Motor controls have performed exceedingly well,
and are marketed by numerous manufacturers.
The Reliance situation was atypical and arose
from business rather than technical circumstances.
Other firms, such as Barry-Wright, are doing
very well.
9.2 Diesel automobiles are becoming increasingly
popular, as projected.
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9.3 Oil-fired cogeneration in buildings has not done
well because the world prices of oil used in
this system has gone from $14 per barrel assumed
in the study to $34 per barrel or more.
Executive Summary:
10. The models used by LCES in their analysis have been
found elsewhere to yield findings that are anomolous
or inconsistent with LCES results. This complicates
interpretation of LCES, and renders them less
credible.
10.1 The Energy Modeling Forum studied aggregate
energy demand-price elasticities using fourteen
different models. They found that elasticities
implicit in the ISTUM and BECOM models were
by far the most volatile and sensitive to
energy component price changes. For ISTUM,
the demand ellipse had the wrong slope. It
has been suggested that the EMF.4 price
experiments were unintentionally biased against
ISTUM; this conjecture needs to be evaluated
by the modelers.
10.2 EPC uses a modified version of both the ISTUM
and the BECOMomodels. The LCES reports contain
no discussion of the sensitivity of ISTUM
results to EPC model modifications.
10.3 Comparison of output from EPC runs of the
BECOM model with base-case output presented
in that model's documentation suggest very
different patterns of adjustment to higher
energy prices.
Response:
10. We find all of these differences easily explainable
in light of the case assumptions.
10.1 The volatility of elasticity stems simply
from the fact that both BECOM and ISTUM are
engineering-oriented optimization models
designed to study capital substitution rather
than econometric behaviour. Consequently,
their capital stock is more malleable; hence,
NO~l
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they should naturally have more volatility
in their elasticity. It is not an issue of
bias; it is simply that these models use a
fundamentally different analytic construct
than econometric models of fuel use because
they address a fundamentally different set of
issues not usually.raised in typical fuel
projection studies. This point is still not
fully appreciated by the review team.
10.2 Extensive sensitivity analyses, while always
desirable, were simply beyond the resources
available to us for the study.
10.3 This is because the run compared was from an
early development version of BECOM (Spring, 1977)
which used a much higher discount rate and did
not permit furnace fuel switching in existing
structures. The issue of base case comparisons
should be made relative to the 1978 base case pre-
sented in our documentation rather than earlier
model runs under different assumptions.
Executive Summary:
11. The use of ISTUM, BECOM and TECOM by LCES is poorly
documented. Appropriate documentation would delineate
each change in the base-case inputs of these models
made for the LCES model runs presented. The lack of
reasonable documentation aggravates the problem of
interpreting inconsistencies between LCES results and
the base-case output of ISTUM, BECOM and TEC.
Response:
11. Our applications were extensively documented. The
Technical Appendix included all input data, algorithm
descriptions, and output printouts in full. Each
change in the models was meticulously described there -
as evidenced by the ease with which the review team
identified and discussed these changes in point 9.
The concerns expressed about discrepancies between
this application of these models and others are readily
explained on the basis of different input assumptions
and straightforward changes in the models which are
fully described in the documentation. The review team
inexplicably uses as its point of reference "base case"
model runs presented in documentation of earlier versions
of these models rather than the 1978 base case developed
specifically for this study using current versions.
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Comments Concerning Treatment of Cogeneration
in the Least-Cost Studies
William R. King
Introduction
The MIT critique of the Energy Productivity Center
Least-Cost work contains a detailed review of cogeneration in
the industrial sector which we feel deserves a detailed
response. The concentration on cogeneration modeling was
prompted by the MIT observation that Least-Cost projections of
cogeneration penetration were far greater than estimates
developed by MIT and other sources. In our response to the
MIT critique, we first discuss the rationale for cogeneration
modeling in the industrial sector. This discussion is followed
by comments regarding MIT's critique of our capital costing for
coal boilers in coal topping cogeneration systems and its
critique of our penetration results.
Industrial Cogeneration Modeling
Three kinds of cogeneration are modeled in the industrial
sector. Topping cycles are modeled for steam-intensive
industries. In these cycles, a boiler is fueled to provide
steam at a higher heat content than is required in the process.
The steam is run through a turbine/generator system to produce
electricity. "Waste" steam goes to the plant process.
Diesel and gas turbine cogeneration systems are modeled
for other industries, and electricity is treated either as a
--- ---- t
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primary output or a byproduct. In cases where electricity is
a primary output, a "no-export" technology is used. In cases
where electricity is a by-product, an "export" technology is
used. In either case, the turbine is fueled by either diesel
or gas. Turbine exhaust gas runs a waste heat boiler to provide
process steam.
Contrary to statements made in the MIT review, the two
forms of cogeneration are consistently modeled. Both are com-
peted first in the steam sector. For the topping cycles, the
user is really making a boiler choice, so boiler capital cost
is the relevant cost to reflect in steam sector competition.
For turbine cycles, the user reflects the full system cost
(boiler and turbine/generator) in the steam sector with a capital
cost credit for electricity used in Machine Drive. Thus, the
steam sector capital cost for turbine systems is sensitive to
the value of the electricity credit; however, the accounting for
capital in the steam sector is consistent for both topping and
turbine cycles in that both systems show only the capital the
manager would attribute to steam production. In the Machine
Drive sector, the cost of the cogenerated electricity is used
for both topping and turbine cycles. The differences in costing
between topping and turbine systems arise because the modeler is
reflecting differences in the decision processes used by managers
to choose a system (i.e., in steam intensive industries, the
manager is primarily choosing a boiler, not a cogeneration
system).
iii-89-
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Industrial Cogeneration Capital Costing
MIT makes two observations regarding our capital costing.
First, they observe we used a capital recovery factor of 0.07.
This factor was derived assuming an industrial equipment life
of 25 years at a five percent real discount rate. The original
ISTUM runs done by Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc. (EEA)
used a capital recovery factor of 0.14 for cogeneration, com-
pared to a factor of 0.11 for most other technologies. They
based their factor on very similar assumptions (25 year life and
7.9 percent real discount rate). The difference between-the
factors employed at EEA and at the Energy Productivity Center
is due to the use of an after tax capital recovery factor
formula by EEA. The Energy Productivity Center study employed
a simple capital recovery factor excluding tax effects. This
factor was developed for each sector studied (industry, buildings,
transportation) and was applied consistently to all sectorial
technologies.
Second, MIT believes that coal boiler costs may be over-
stated, contributing to coal topping cogeneration's inability
to gain market share. We used capital cost data current to the
ISTUM model at the time of our runs. The model data base will
be updated as more accurate capital cost data becomes available
for a given technology.
Penetration of Industrial Cogeneration
The magnitude of the cogeneration penetration is a result
of the spread between gas and electric prices assumed in the
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analysis. Thus, since the gas price is low relative to the
electric price, it can be expected that gas cogeneration
technologies might produce less-expensive electricity. The
question of fuel pricing has been addressed in previous sections
of this chapter. If one believes the spread between gas and
electric prices should be narrower, then the cogeneration
penetration would naturally diminish. Testing this hypothesis
is a straightforward sensitivity analysis using this methodology.
Cogeneration capital costing would also affect penetration
relative to noncogenerating technologies. However, since MIT
agrees that the cogeneration costs used are in agreement with
those cited in other sources, with the exception of coal boiler
costs, only the mix of cogeneration technologies should be
affected with a change in capital charges (i.e., more gas
cogeneration instead of coal cogeneration). Furthermore, since
the same capital recovery factor was applied to all technologies
in the Energy Productivity Center, ISTUM analyses, the relative
levels of technology capital costs were preserved in ISTUM
competition. Therefore, the magnitude of the capital recovery
factor does not bias cogeneration competition.
-
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1. Introduction
The three energy technology models employed in the Mellon Institute's
Least-Cost Energy Strategy Study: Minimizing Costs Through Competition,
include the Industrial Sector Technology Use Model (ISTUM) developed by
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.; the Buildings Energy
Conservation Optimization Model (BECOM) developed by the Brookhaven
National Laboratory; and the Transportation Energy Conservation Model
(TEC) developed by Jack Faucett Associates. In this report, we present
background information for each of these models including the modeler's
response to a questionnaire asking for descriptive information, the
translation of the questionnaire information into an entry for the
EPRI/MIT Energy Model Analysis Notebook, and some additional information
and comments bearing on the use of these models in the Mellon Institute
study.
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2. Industrial Sector Technology Utilization Model (IST4)
Energy Model Analysis Notebook Entry
MODEL NAME:
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES:
ISSUES ADDRESSED:
DEVELOPED:
RESOLUTION:
ASSESSMENT: N
MODELER CONTACT: S
M
E
1
A
7
SPONSOR: E
MODEL DESCRIPTION:
Industrial Sector Technology Use Model ISTUM4
o Static Optimization
o Stochastic Techniques
o Descriptive Simulation
o Demand for Electricity and Non-Electric Energy
o Regulatory Behavior
o Other Industry Behavior
o Economic Impact of Energy Policies
o New Technology Assessment
o Conservation Assessment
o 1977-1978
o Geographic: U.S. as a w'hole
o Temporal: Medium term 1980-2000 in 5-year steps
ot Assessed
amir Salama
ichael Lerner
nergy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.
111 N. 19th St.
rlington, VA 22209
03-528-1900
RDA/HOPPS
The Industrial Sector Technology Use Model (ISTUM) focuses on the
market penetration potential of conventional and emerging energy
technologies, providing projections of market shares to the year 2000.
The ISTUM methodology has three basic components. The first component
represents the inputs required by the model. These include the basic
characteristics of the technologies considered by the model,
macroeconomic and fuel price forecasts, and a methodology for estimating
baseline energy requirements. The second component is the market
competition logic. This is a four-stage procedure designed to simulate
financial decision making. The third component is the output procedures
which permit the data to be aggregated for detailed analysis of
particular issues. Each component is described briefly below.
Over 200 technologies are presently considered in ISTUN. Included
among them are: conventional oil and natural gas boilers and furnaces;
coal, fluidized bed, and coal gasification (e.g., MBG, LBG) technologies,
energy conservation equipment, and other energy conversion devices.
The technology characterization is designed to serve three functions:
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o Specify which technologies are being permitted to compete for
market shares in the industrial sector.
o Specify application cost variability for each technology based
on experience with conventional technologies, and
o Specify the percentage of each market where the technology is
capable of satisfying the technical process requirements.
This model, therefore, limits competition to those technologies for which
sufficient information is available to specify performance, provides a
range of costs for each technology based on specific application cost
considerations, and limits the market for which each technology is
allowed to compete to that fraction in which technical feasibility is
assured.
Industrial energy demand in ISTUM is represented through the concept
of service demand. Service demand is the amount of useful work required
for a particular process. Each industrial process's energy requirements
are grouped into one of the service demand categories tracked in the
model.. Examples of these categories include steam, direct heat, machine
drive, and internal electricity generation. Service demand is
partitioned into a variety of sub-categories in order to isolate
homogeneous energy services. Disaggregation includes: 26 industries
split into two-, three-, and four-digit standard industrial
classification codes (paper, chemicals, aluminum, etc.), 23 energy
service sectors (steam, electrolytic, machine drive, etc.), hours of
operation per year, combustor size (e.g., 50 million Btu/hr boiler vs.
250 million Btu/hr boiler), and five time periods.
The fundamental assumption underlying ISTUM is that a decision to
invest in industrial equipment is based on choosing the hardware which
performs a given task at the lowest cost. However, the decision to
invest is subject to behavioral constraints which serve to restrict the
market penetration rate of emerging technologies, even though they may be
superior.
ISTUM considers the total cost of technology in its comparative
assessment, including capital costs, maintenance costs, fuel costs, and
non-fuel operating costs. Technology costs within a cell are represented
as a range rather than as point estimates and are annualized so as to
provide a basis of comparison. The distribution attempts to pick up the
effects of site specific variability, differences in equipment costs,
etc. Various tax credits, depreciation and discount rate assumptions can
be simulated in this step.
The determination of the initial market penetration potential is
based on the life-cycle costs calculated in the previous section. Cost
,. distributions representing each technology competing for a market cell
are compared. The market share of each technology is determined through
a sophisticated statistical algorithm which determines the probability
that the technology is the least-cost option being considered. The
results of this step provide the economic market penetration potential.
- 001w
A-4
The market competition analysis assumes that firms have access to all
existing information regarding prices and availability of the alternative
technologies and fuels. However, in reality there are several
"behavioral" factors which limit a new technology's market penetration.
These include:
o lags in the transfer of information,
o decision maker aversion to risk, and
o vendor and distribution network and "supply side" restrictions.
These factors are explicitly modeled in the behavioral analysis and the
results are used to adjust the market penetration rates of the respective
technologies. The outcome is to slow the penetration of new technologies
to a rate somewhat lower than what a strictly economic analysis would
indicate.
Capital turnover in a given year is calculated as the sum of
projected equipment retirement in the previous period and increased
energy demand due to growth in product output. This figure is calculated
for each cell and is multiplied by the market shares for each relevant
technology to project capital requirements and energy demand.
ISTUM provides projections of service and fuel demands at five-year
intervals through 2000. Energy demands are broken down by energy service
sector, technology, fuel type, industry and technical characteristics.
Estimates of aggregate capital costs, as well as several relative
measures of market share projections, are also available.
COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT:
o Machinery - IBM/AMDAHL
o Languages - APL*PLUS
o Approximate cost - $500 per solution
o Code is available on tape
o Model is non-proprietary
o Model has been transferred
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS:
A second version of ISTUM is being developed. It should be
operational in the fall of 1981 and available to the public in the
beginning of 1982.
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Partial description of
each significant appli-
cation of the model,
including dates of usage
Ref. No. from-
Bibliography
describing each
application
Model Scenarios
operated supplied
by: by:
*14 = mo-deler
S = sponsor
0 = other
Sponsor/
client
for each
application
Impacts of tax incen-
tive on Energy Con-
servation (Feb. 1980)
Impact of financial
incentives on Indus-
trial use of oil/gas
(October 1979)
Conservation Techno-
logy Assessment
(1/79-current)
Impact of prices
economic growth on
industrial energy
conservation (10/80)
Natural Gas Demand
(1/79,1/80)
Private
DOE
DOE Office
of Industrial
Programs
Private
AGA
MODEL ASSESSMENT:
The model has been described in the literature, but has not been
subjected to either in-house or external assessment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
I. Industrial Sector Technology Use Model (ISTUM): Industrial Energy
Use in the United States, 1974-2000; 4 volumes, DOE; October 1979;
DOE/FE/2344
i. Volume 1 - Primary Model Documentation
ii. Volume 2 - Results
iii. Volume 3 - Appendix on ser\ice and fuel demands
iv. Volume 4 - Technology Appendix
2. The Least Cost Energy Strategy; Energy Productivity Center, Carnegie
Mellon University Press, 19/9.
ISTUM Technology Evaluation for the EIA Annual Administration Report
to Congress and the National Energy Supply Scenario, DOE, June 19,
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ENrRGY MIODEL ANALYSIS PROGRAM
r .Enerly Labor'ltor
.I MasaCSC-hues tlsflulte of Tehnology
/ Camu'dcge. MAassacht iseritS 02139
OUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENERGY POLICY MODELERS
The M.I.T. Energy Model Analysis Program (EMAP). under sponsorship from the Electric Power Research Institute. is developing
a directory of energy rr.deis and assessments, to be publisned in the fall of 1980. The directory will be Oistributea w.Oely to
government d(-.Eam nts acacemic institutions, and private industry. arC will he an extremely useful reference tool for model
developers. asscssors ana u:ers We would very much like to .nclude your model in th:S directory, and therelore are requesting
that you complete the following form to provide the inlormation needed. We will then compile your responses into a standard-
ized format. wnhich wil te sent to you for review prior to puoihcation.
Please answer the questions below as completely as you can: we are particularly pleased to be able to present in this directory
the kind of mear.ingful and interesting information and perspective that only mocelers and model assessors themselves can
provide. We are int rested ,n anything you have to offer about your model, and encourage you to use extra sheets of paper where
necessary. If you are extremely sncrt of time. please answer the questions marKeC with an asterisk." Martha Mason and Kelly
Morgan of the EMAP will be happy to ans.er any questions and offer assistance; they may oe contacted at (617) 253-8318.
Thank you for your assistance - the directory will not be complete without an entry on your model!
GENERAL INFORMATION
*1. What is the name of the model? Industrial Sector Technology Use Model
*2. By what acronym, nickname, or other name(s) is it known? ISTU I
'3. Where, and under what auspices, was the model developed.
Version I developed by ELEA under funding by ERDA/HOPPS.
Version II developed by ELA under funding by DOE Conservation and Solar Division
of Industrial Program. V-I 1977 1978
04. Over what time period was the model developed? V-_T LI0/80 to 91"
moJyr moJyr.
*5. Who is the person filling out this questionnaire?
Narme: Harold Kalkstein
Address.EEA Inc., 1111 N. 19th St., Arlington, VA. 22209
Telephone 703-528-1900
Relationship tomodel Developer of ISTUI Version-Il
06. Who Is (or are) the key modeler contact(s)?
Name: Samir Salama Name* Michael Lerner
Address.EEA Inc., 1111 N. 19th St., Address. EEA Inc., 1111 N. 19th St., Arlington, VA
Arlington, VA 22209 Teleohone.7 03-5 2 8 -19Q0 22209
703-528-1900 Project Director
Relationship torr ocel Proiect -Lnager Relat:onshiptomodel Project Director
*7. Who is (or are) the key contact(s) in the organization(s) that sponsored the model development?
Name. Choma;s CrossConserv ton and SolarName Cyril Draffins Fossil Fnnry (Vers:in I)
U nependnc Av~c., W. 100 Independence Ave., N.W
Address. . Address.
Telephone 202-252-21S20 . Telephone
Relationship to mel. Project Officer Relationship tomodel. Project Officer
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
The following questions are designed to provide understanding of the fundamental technical characteristics of the model. The
mult!plo-choice options are provided for your convenience: however, we understand that mooels vary significantly. and these
Ichoices may not be suited to your model. Please add categories, phrases, or sentences, as applicable.
In Ouestion 18 ve will ask about different operating versions of the same basic model. If there has been more than one version.
please indicate here which one you are describing. If the versions are significantly different. you may find it necessary to fill out
a complete questionnaire for each unique model version.
*8. What keywords characterize the issues the model addresses?
[:Supply of lue!s & resources N Economic impacts of energy policies
&Demand for e.ectricity O Environmental impacts of energy policies
Demand for r.cn-e,ectric energy 0 Demograpnicisocial impacts of energy policies
Regulato:y Venavior @3 New technology assessment
GElectric uttv behavor M Conservation assessment
EOtnet industry ehavlor
COther (spech)
09: What anslytic techniques are used in the model? (it appropriate, check more than one, and Indlcate which subsection of
the model uses which technique.)
CLinear programming Descriptive simulation
CNontinears.nteger orogramming - Allocation & eQuilibtium
E.Othe. stat cm, .ation C Inputloutput
CDynamic c'rn,,: 31aon O Regression. econometric
:"Stochas::c te nniques 0 Expert oopinion. non-quantitative
COther I(spec))
_ _
___ __
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010. a) What geographic resolution does the model cover?
. Stp.soDcrtscr, ,~i , __) _
Snternationaet T; ~ t 10 F r
C Ot rct s -ecf~,w
b) If regional informatlon is aqgregated before reporting results, what is the level of aggregation?
011. a) What temporal resolution does the model cover?
C Short terrm(5 3 '3 C' '.sl
X- Mediurn letrrn - years) .. 190/20L
2 Long terrlmoe' 23 vyPars,
b) It there are discrete time steps. what is their typical length? , 51 psn rz s
12. Aside from their use as input, were data used during calibrationldevelopmnt of the model?
X yes -- no tsk3 to queS. 13)
If yes. hpw were the data usecd.
0 for coefthcen:narameter determniation
3C for structural form ce:ermrnation
C for assess;ng ,- arcu racit rcCel results
K otnerfspecty) Baseline Technologv and Energy Consumption Charncterizat pn
*13. In the space below (or on extra sheets) please provide a complete technical description of your model, discussing when
applicable:
* model sruc:ure and methodology * variables (endogenous & exogenous)
* significa.v e--a:or.s * input da:a
* parameters * output data
When discusstng ,rnu! cata, olease differentiate between those data that serve as input assumotions imbeded in the model and
those that are fre ,ent!y changed outing model runs
Please attach a flow chart or other diagram of the structure of the model. if possible.
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The Industrial Sector Technology Use Model (ISTUM) focuses on the market
penetration potential of conventional and emerging energy technologies,
providing projections of market shares out to the year 2000.
The ISTUM methodology has three basic components each of which is shown
in Figure 1. The first component represents the inputs required by the
model. These include the basic characteristics of the technologies
considered by the model, macroeconomic and fuel price forecasts, and a
methodology for estimating baseline energy requirements. The second
component is the market competition logic. This is a four stage pro-
cedure designed to simulate financial decision making. The third
component is the output procedures which permit the data to be aggregated
for detailed analysis of particular issues. Each component is described
briefly below.
Over 200 technologies are presently considered in ISTUM. Included among
them are: conventional oil and natural gas boilers and furnaces; coal,
fluidized bed, and coal gasification (e.g., MBG, LBG) technologies,
energy conservation equipment, and other energy conversion devices.
The technology characterization is designed to serve three functions:
o Specify which technologies are being permitted to compete for
market shares in the industrial sector.
o Specify application cost variability for each technology based
on experience with conventional technologies, and
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.
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o Specify the percentage of each market where the technology is
capable of satisfying the technical process requirements.
This model, therefore, limits competition to those technologies for
which sufficient information is available to specify performance, provides
a range of costs for each technology based on specific application cost
considerations, and limits the market for which each technology is
allowed to compete to that fraction in which technical feasibility is
assured.
Industrial Sector Energy Demand
Industrial energy demand in ISTUM is represented through the concept of
service demand. Service demand is the amount of useful work required
for a particular process. Each industrial process's energy requirements
are grouped into one of the service demand categories tracked in the model.
Examples of these categories include steam, direct heat, machine drive,
and internal electricity generation.
Service demand is partitioned into a variety of sub-categories in order
to isolate homogeneous energy services. Disaggregation includes: 26
industries split into two, three, and four digit standard industrial
classification codes (paper, chemicals, aluminum, etc.), 23 energy
service sector (steam, electrolytic, machine drive, etc.), hours of
operation per year, combustor size (e.g., 50 million Btu/hr boiler vs.
250 million Btu/hr boiler), and five time periods.
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.
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PRIMARY MODEL LOGIC
The fundamental assumption underlying ISTUM is that a decision to invest
in industrial equipment is based on choosing the hardware which performs
a given task at the lowest cost. However, the decision to invest is
subject to behavioral constraints which serve to restrict the market
penetration rate of emerging technologies, even though they may be
superior.
Corporate Financial Model
ISTUM considered the total cost of technology in its comparative assess-
ment, including capital costs, maintenance costs, fuel costs, and non-
fuel operating costs. Technology costs within a cell are represented as
a range rather than as point estimates and are annualized so as to
provide a basis of comparison. The distribution attempts to pick up the
effects of site specific variability, differences in equipment costs,
etc. Various tax credits, depreciation and discount rate assumptions
can be simulated in this step.
Market Competition Analysis
The determination of the initial market penetration potential is based
on the life-cycle costs calculated in the previous section. Cost dis-
tributions representing each technology competing for a market cell are
compared. The market share of each technology is determined through a
sophisticated statistical algorithm which determines the probability
that the technology is the least-cost option being considered. The
results of this step provide the economic market penetration potential.
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.
_ l,
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Behavioral Lags
The market competition analysis assumes that firms have access to all
existing information regarding prices and availability of the alter-
native technologies and fuels. However, in reality there are several
"behavioral" factors which limit a new technology's market penetration
These include:
o Lags in the transfer of information,
o Decision maker aversion to risk, and
o Vendor and distribution network and "supply side" restrictions.
These factors are explicitly modeled in the behavioral analysis and the
results are used to adjust the market penetration rates of the respective
technologies. The outcome is to slow the penetration of new technologies
to a rate somewhat lower than what a strictly economic analysis would
indicate.
Capital Turnover Model
Capital turnover in a given year is calculated as the sum of projected
equipment retirement in the previous period and increased energy demand
due to growth in product output. This figure is calculated for each
cell and is multiplied by the market shares for each relevant technology
to project capital requirements and energy demand.
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.
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Model Outputs
ISTUM provides projections of service and fuel demands at five year
intervals through 2000. Energy demands are broken down by energy service
sector, technology, fuel type, industry and technical characteristics.
Estimates of aggregate capital costs, as well as several relative measures
of market share projections are also available.
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.
_1~1 I _ hu
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'14. Ihle lollowirg questin- concrrn the conspuing environment required by the model.
ar (3n n0f r,:-f .i .. ,_ )\ f' l ,
b L ane,,')("r;cy,-... -T h . . .
C Ap'ro', .: ~- 'r . )u* c' 0 .1 or t, e _ . per sol.t,cn
d Is tI- n o I hIneI ,. c'.*:r nO.> .'. ,r s l wJr., .IC'L;S5
e .. It c ce as aiac e cn :ZC S. cars
I Are ar part'; of tne roe, o'o:onetary'
flo Yes specly)
*15. Bibliography (partia I)
We woulo Wlie to :ncl.de i o,,c raony fcr your model. Tnerefore in the following snace. or on an attached sheet. please hst all
references in -rtrh :ne n-cue nhas .eei 'Jescrited or cileo vncluaOn§ cocurnenlalon. journals. p.Jocanions. and reports cn model
applhcation Please nm. er each item o: easy reference fa:er in tnte ruestionnat:e
1. Industrial Sector Technology Use Model (ISTUM): Industrial Energy Use in the
United States, 1974-2000; 4 voluLes, DOE; October 1979; DOE/I"E/2344
i.
ii.
11iii.
iv.
Volume 1 - Primary Model Documentation
Volume 2 - Results
Volume 3 - Appendix on service and fuel demands
Volume 4 - Technology Appendix
2. The Least Cost Energy Strategy; Energy Prod,,-!ivity Center, Carnegie Mellon
University Press, 1979
3. ISTUM Technology Evaluation for the EIA Annual Administration
Report to Co!ngress and the National Energy Supply Scenario,
DOE, June 19, 1979
4. MIF-2; energy demand elasticities (cannot locate exact reference
16. Which documents listed in Ouestion 15 are references for the model's data sources?
Relerence numbers
-- - --
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MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS
In this section Ne are intrested in tracen how tihe model has t.Le n us~t Int the first cojlumn. olease descrlbe each application of
the mdodel. useS rra,,'t i,"Cude both ac;iJemi study and -.;-cifc rOolerm SOlvnq In tne following columns please indilcait
which relerence nurrtbe from OueS iirn 15 dserin.s' the aC.;iscation. who the soonsr w as for that aoplication, who actually
operated the n cidel. and who suggesled or supplied tIoe scurnaros rnmplemented in tri. application
Part i a Model Scenarios
*Descri:ton of eac' s .;nfcant Ref. N from Sponsor/ operated supplied
application of !re macel. Question 15 client by: by*
Includng da:es of usage describing for each M = modleer M = modeler
each applic- applic- S= sponsor S = sponsor
ation ation 0 other O other
Impacts of tax incentive - Private M H
on Energy Conservation
(Feb. 19S0)
Impact of financial - DOE H M
incentives on Industrial
use of oil/gas
(October 1979)
Conservation Technology - DOE M S
Assessment (1/79 - Office of
current) Industrial
Programs
Impact of prices economic - Private M M/S
growth on industrial
energy conservation
(10/80)
Natural Gas Demand - AGA M S
(1/79, 1/S0)
17. As the table above suggests. an important factor in model development and documentation Is whether or not the model
has ever been installed and operated by someone other than the modeler.
a) Can the model be transferred for use by someone other than the modeler?
X.Yes . No If no, why not'
b) Has the model ever been transferred for use by someone other than the modeler?
No X Yes It ves. olease indtca'e we'e the mccel was transferred and briely Cescribe the
transferoocess Transter of ersion I to DOl: computer for planned use
by Fossil Enery Di-s.ion was conpleted ai dl as su sfull
run.
c) Do you have any plans to transfer the model In the future?
X No -Yes If yes. to were
18. One factor sometimes complicating model assessment Is that one-time or on-going changes to a model's structure have
led to more than one version of that model. In this question we are Interested In finding out how many discrete versions of
the model have been developed, and which, if any, are currently operational.
a) Has the model undergone any major structural changes since Its original finished form?
-No tsKp to Cues 19) ._..Yes If yes. please oriely cescr *e a-v s:;nlicant differences between the versions and
the reasons molivatin; tre cnarges.
i )Which version(s) of the model are currently operational, and where are they maintained?
Version 1; .Maintained on STSC computer system-is operational.
Version 2: Maintained on EIA/DOE computerywill be operational in the fall.
1hi
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MODLL ASSESSM[NT
*19. Haes the model ever been ,ubjocled to an in house assousniont by the modtrlors?
.Not,.'0 otiO:'; 20C) (not rfornl. ly)
Yes a) If yes. which clmonlts listed below received empha is during the niodelor assessment?
L Mod, vtdty ' " Usabillity
C; Structure Documentation
C Content 0 Efficiency
0 Preociton C Model
C Data val-ddy applications
SVerification of the C Other (specify)
model's expression
in the computer
code
b) Please briefly describe the techniques utilized irs the modeler assessment.
*20. Has the model been made available for assessment by external parties?
G No (skip to OJeston 21)
f6 Yes. thCroUn cucitcation of model descrotions in the literature.
C Yes. throun a formal external assessment
£I Yes. thro~,gh other meansispecify)
If the nooet v.as assessed by an Individual. group or organization other than the modeler(s). please answer the questions below.
a) Who was the assessor for the model?
Organization Technokron
Name of contact
Title
Address -
Telephone ( )
Title of Report
b) Who sponsored the assessment?
Organization Fossil Energy Division, DOE
Name of conact C'ril[ Irat in
Title -
Address - _3' I MgA _'n F 8 .L Z O
Telephone (
c) What assessment approach(es) were employed by the assessors?
Ot Review of the f;terature. not inclujng the computer code
0 Evaluation of the detaiied dccurentation. incudind the code
C Audit of the mccel's performance, using test problems
0 Evaluation of the model using experiments cesigned by the assessors. but imolemented by the modelers
o In-depth assessment. in wiich the assessors themselves implemented experimental runs of the model
G Comparative evaluation of two or more models
0 Other (specify)
d) Which elements listed below received emphasis during the external assessment of the model?
El Model validity 0 Usability
:l Structure 0 Documentation
O Content 0 Elficiency
o Prediction 0 Model
O Data validity applications
o Verification of the 0 Other (specify)
model's expression
In the computer
code
e) Do you have any comments on the external evaluation of the model?
21. a) Please discuss the accessibility of the model for initial or further as .essment. If the model has not been assessed. do
you have any plans concerning future assessment? Do you feel it r hould be considered for an assessment?
Version II of the Model will be in the public domain, fully doctumented and
_Xlilblcto._mrc -Q%," by t "b liTDO 3L N2__._o exten,;Lye external rcview
.js p rvetmt, 0., ,1 otjV m T .Ll t) F-u J'- - 5S-Tdi-R'
expert , - part ot a vali d,1Ft.ask in tte projiect.
22. We would be interested In any other aspects of the model that you would like to discuss. How doesit compare with other
models in terms of structure or coverage? Were there any interesting ramifications resulting from use of the model?
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Additional Information and Comments on ISTUM
ISTUM computes energy demand and technological market shares from
technological costs and efficiencies, service sector demand, and fuel
prices.
Fuel prices are built into ISTUM, but can also be input by the user.
Fuel prices are entered as distributions as opposed to point estimates in
ISTUM. Thus they are characterized by their mean, variance, and minimum
values. This is done to capture regional differences in prices. The
ISTUM fuel prices were provided by Data Resources, Inc. from the DRI U.S.
Annual Energy Model. Fuel prices are input adjusted to the specific
technology with which the fuel is used. This is done by dividing the
fuel price by the conversion efficiency of the technology. This is done
so that all fuel prices reflect the cost of the energy produced that is
usable to industry in a constant manner.
In order to determine total energy demand, ISTUM must first determine
the demand for each of the 23 service sectors. To do this ISTUM divides
industrial demand into 26 Standard Industrical Classifications (SICs).
Each of these SICs has a certain demand for each service sector. These
demands are then aggregated to determine total service sector demand. To
project future service demand ISTUM assumes that service demand grows at
the same rate at which the industry does. These projections were also
made by DRI on their Quarterly Macroeconomic Model. Since there are
differences in ISTUM4's and DRI's industrial classifications, surrogates
for service sectors are used in some projections.
ISTUM divides industrial use of energy into 23 service sectors. Of
these, thirteen actually compete technologies to fill the demand. The
other ten are sectors such as feedstocks that are included in the model
I-----~ Yli i
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Table 1
ISTUM SUBDIVISIONS
List of Competing Service Sectors:
1. Steam
2. Direct Heat--Intermediate
3. Direct Heat--Dirty
4. Indirect Heat--Coal Based
5. Machine Drive
6. Electrolytic
12. Space Heat
13. Indirect Heat--Not Coal Based
14. Calcining
15. Glass Melting
16. Brick Firing
17. Iron Making
19. Steel Reheating
Listing of SIC Classifications:
S1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Food
Tobacco
Textiles
Apparel
Lumber, Wood
Furniture
Paper, Allied Products
Printing, Publishing
Chemicals
Petroleum Refining
Rubber, Miscellaneous Plastics
Leather
S, C, G, Concrete
List of Non-Competing Service
Sectors:
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
18.
20.
21.
22.
23.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Liquid Feedstock
Natural Gas Feedstock
LPG Feedstock
Metallurgical Coal Usage
Miscellaneous Energy and
Lubricants
Steel Making
Internal Generation
Captive Electricity
Captive Direct Heat
Coke Consumption
Steel
Aluminum
Other Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Machinery (Not electric)
Electric Machinery
Transportation Equipment
Measuring Equipment
Misc. Manufacturing
Crops
Livestock
Metal Mining
Non-Metal Mining
-- Ifi.
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to insure that total industrial energy usage is accounted.
A problem with this service sector approach is that the service
"' provided by an individual service sector is not totally homogeneous. One
solution to this problem is to increase the number of service sectors.
ISTUM service sectors calcining, glass melting, brick firing,
iron-making, steel-making, and steel reheating are separated from the
direct heating sectors because of such problems.
A similar type of problem was solved by using size and load factors
in the ISTUM service sectors. It is reasonable that technologies will be
more or less competitive depending upon their size or load factor. Size
refers to the MI4Btu's produced per hour and load factor to the number of
hours per year a technology is in use. Part of this size and load effect
is captured by the use of cost distributions. However, for more accurate
• predictions up to two size and two load factors for each service sector
are used. More precision might have been available by using more sizes
and load factors, but at a trade-off in model costs.
Technologies are the third important input in determining final
energy demand. Good descriptions of the engineering processes of the
technologies can be found in the ISTUM documentation.
Like fuel prices, technologies are represented by cost
distributions. The use of a distribution more accurately portrays costs
than single point estimates. Costs vary for a number of reasons.
Construction costs vary according to site specifications and labor
costs. Also the quality of the service (e.g., evenness of heat) needed
by different industries may vary costs. To calculate capital costs, the
costs are broken down into components, estimated, and then aggregated.
The components are:
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1) site preparation and power house
2) primary systems and controls
3) fuel handling
4) environmental controls and waste handling
5) utility and feedwater systems
6) indirect capital costs
7) installation costs.
When technology costs are finally input into ISTUM they are given in
$/MMBtu's and annualized. The capital charge rate not only takes capital
lifetime and rates of return into consideration, but also the effects of
tax laws and depreciation accounting procedures.
Originally ISTUM was to look at different costs depending upon
whether a new or old plant was implementing the technology. The
empirical data suggest that a great difference in costs does not exist,
so the distinction was not included in the model.
Technologies are given a maximum market penetration. This figures
may be 100% of the service sector. Maximum shares exist for many
reasons. A technology may not provide the correct quality of service
across the whole sector. Steam is an example. Solar technologies cannot
provide the higher-pressure steam needed by solme industries. Thus it has
a maximum market share. Environmental constraints may also limit a
technology's market share.
ISTL 4 only competes technologies to fill incremental service demand.
This is demand created by increases in service demand plus demand created
by retirement of capital. The retirement schedule is based upon
historical trends. In general, the older the capital, the higher its
retirement rate. ISTUM does not allow for early retirement of uneconomic
A-21
capital.
In competing technologies to fill the service demand, it is important
to remember that costs are represented by distributions. By taking
annualized capital and operating costs and adding them to fuel costs,
ISTUM produces a total cost distribution. Since distributions tend to
overlap, a combination of technologies will capture shares of the
market. The minimum total cost value is important here. Otherwise all
technologies would capture a non-zero market share.
The market shares thus obtained are then modified by the behavioral
lag component. This component reduces the introduction of new
technologies. The newer a technology, the greater the lag will be.
After accounting for this behavioral lag, the market shares are
recalculated. These shares are turned into actual capital investment by
multiplying by the incremental energy demand. Total fuel use is then
calculated from the technologies in use.
~~11"i".
. ... .. , ,,,,,, , 1= I 1mim
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3. Transportation Energy Conservation Model (TEC)
Energy Model Analysis Notebook Entry
MODEL NAME:
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES:
ISSUES ADDRESSED:
DEVELOPED:
RESOLUTION:
ASSESSMENT:
MODELER CONTACT:
SPONSOR:
Transportation Energy Conservation Model TEC
Linear Programming
Regression, econometric
Demand for Non-Electric Energy
Regulatory Behavior
Other Industry Behavior
New Technology Assessment
Conservation Assessment
o 1976-1978
Geographic: U.S. as a whole
Temporal: long term 1975-2025;
single year up to 2000;
five year steps to 2025
Partial - Automobile sector forecasting model -
independent assessment by University of Michigan
Highway Safety Research Institute
Mike Laurence
Jack Faucett Associates
5454 Wisconsin Ave.
Chevy Chase, MD 20015
301 -657-8223
Gary Kaitz
Stanford Law School
Palo Alto, CA 94305
Department of Energy - Applied Analysis
MODEL DESCRIPTION:
TEC is designed to compute energy usage in the transportation sector
between the years 1975 and 2025. The model is divided into nine
transporation modes - air, automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, rail,
marine, and pipeline. The modes are independent and can be run together
or in any combination of the nine. TEC is a demand for transporation
services model in which the manufacturers minimize the lifetime vehicle
costs to the consumer. The model can consider factors such as fuel
prices, vehicle miles demanded, cost of improved efficiency,
environmental and safety factors, tax effects, and the introduction of
new technologies.
The automobile mode is the most complex of the nine modes. The model
classifies autos into three weight classes and projects a demand for each
- IENEI GY MODEL ANALYSIS PROGRAM
S Enerfi, Labonrao'ry
. Mas<chu elts Ins:'ue of Technology
. Cambrnajg., .Lassachcse::s 02139
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENERGY POLICY MODELERS
The M.I.T. Energy Model Analysis Program (EMAP). under sponsorship from the Electric Power Research Institute. is developing
a directory of energy models and assessments. to be published in the fail of 1950. The directory will be distributed widely to
government departments. academic institutions, and private Industry. and w:il be an extremely useful reference tool for modtl
developers. assessors, and users. We would very much like to include your model in this directory, and therefore are re-uesting
that you complete the following form to provide the information needed. Vie will then compile your responses into a standard-
ized format, which will be sent to you for review prior to publication.
Please answer the questions below as completely as you can: we are particularly pleased to be able to present in this directory
the kind of meaningful and interesting informat:on and perspective that only modelers and model assessors themselves can
provide. We are interested in anything you have to of fer about your model. and encourage you to use extra sheets of paper where
necessary. If you are ex!rernmely short of time. please answer the questiors rmared t' an astenrsk.' t.artha Mason and Ke;ly
Morgan of the EMAP wili be happy to answer any questions and offer assistance: they may be contacted at (617) 253-8318.
Thank you for your assistance - the directory will not be complete without an entry on your modell
GENERAL INFORMATION
*1. What is the name of the model?
2. ransortation Energo y ConsratiJ~n Model
*2. By what ac/onym, nickname. or eoffel namets) Is it now
TEC
*3. Where, and under what auspices, was the model developed.
Developed by Jack Faucett, Associates under funding from ERDA
Conservation and Solar Applications, Office of Transportation Programs
*4. Over what time period was the model developed? --- 6-- to
mo yr. moyr.
*5. Who Is the person filling out this questionnaire?
Name, Michael F. I awrnce-
Address -- 4- ire i .. , C 2hevy' lh Mn 2001
Telephone. 301-657-8223
Relationship to model.
'6. Who is (or are) the key modeler contact(s)?
Name: Michael F. LawreLce Name...Gary Kait7
Address, AddressStanford Law School. Palo Alto,_CA
Telephone: Telephone: 94305
Relationship to model:c Relationship to model: pro rammer
*7. Who is (or are) the key contact(s) in the organization(s) that sponsored the model development?
Name: ._ em.y -raboyL Name
Address: DOE- Aplied Analysis.-, ashbi nrt-on,_ C . ?n467
Telephone: 2-0 . j63 --.& -S Telephone:
Relationship to model:.Pt e ct Z r iS..t._.... Relationship to model:
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
The following questions are designed to provide understanding of the fundamental technical characteristics of the model. The
multiple-choice options are provided for your convenience; however, we understand that models vary significantly, and these
choices may not be suited to your model. Please add categories, phrases, or sentences, as applicable.
In Question 18 we will ask about different operating versions of the same basic model. Itf there has been more than one version.
please Indicate here which one you are describing. If the versions are significantly different, you may find it necessary to till out
a complete questionnaire for each unique model version.
08. What keywords characterize the Issues the model addresses?
OSupply of fuels & resources 0 Economic impacts of energy policies
M)Demand for electricity 0 Environmental impacts of energy policies
!p0emand for non-electric energy 0 Demographic/social impacts of energy pa;oices
aR-'gulatory behavior I New technology assessment
UlElectric utility behavior fr Conservation assessment
(jOther industry behavior
l Other(specify)
*9. What analytic techniques are used In the model? (If appropriate, check more than one, and Indicate which subsection of
the model uses which technique.)
(XLinear programming O Descrnipive simulAtion
ONonlinearinteger programming 0 Allocation & equilbrlum
OOther stalic optimi:allon U Input/output
CODynamic optmlzation IR Regression. econometric
OStochastic techniques U. Expcrt opinion, non-quantitative
Other (specify)
_ _
__ __ ____
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*-10. a) What geographic resolution does the model cover?
[1 Site-spectifc (spec1y)
"U. Regtonwide (pectly)
i ] Statewlde tspecly)
CX U S asa whole-
L; International (specify)
L; Oher (specify)
b) If regional information is aggregated before reporting results, what is the level of aggregation?
*11. a) What temporal resolution does the model cover?
U Short term (S years or less)
t. Medium lerm(6-20 years)
L k Long term(over 20vyears --- 97-502 5-_
b) If there are discrete time steps, what is their typical length? SA T ear TtPUO ZO O7
fivp year steps uptoZ 25
12. Aside from their use as input, were data used during calibrationldevelopment of the model?
..X yes no (skip to ques. 13)
If yes. how were the da!a used)
•Zj- for coeff,cient!parame:e; de:eainaion
C for structural form dee:mina:.on
Ck for assessing the accuracy.ol model results
[ other (specify)
*13. In the space below (or on extra sheets) please provide a complete technical description of your model, discussing when
applicable:
* model structure and methodology * variables (endogenous & exogenous)
* significant equations * input data
* parameters * output data
When discussing input data. please differentiate between those data that serve as input assumptions imbedded in the model and
those that are frequently cnanged during model runs.
Please attach a flow chart or other diagram of the structure of the model, if possible.
see attached
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MODEL DESCRIPTION
TEC is designed to compute energy usage in the trans-
portation sector between the years 1975 and 2025. The model
is divided into nine transportation modes - air, automobile,
truck, bus, motorcycle, rail, marine and pipeline. The modes
are independent and can be run together or in any combination
of the nine. TEC is a demand for transportaion services model
in which the manufacturers minimize the lifetime vehicle costs
to the consumer. The model can consider factors such as fuel
prices, vehicle miles demanded, costs of improved efficiency,
environmental and safety factors, tax effects, and the intro-
duction of new technologies.
The automobile mode is the most complex of the nine modes.
The model classifies autos into three weight classes and projects
a demand for each weight class. It then determines the demand
for new cars by calculating the scrapage rate of the existing
fleet and by finding the difference between fleet demand and
number of cars in the fleet minus scrappage. The model then
fills the new car demand with the cars that minimize the total
of the initial costs and the discounted operating costs over
the first owner's lifetime of the car. The car life for the
first owner is assumed to be approximately 52,000 miles.
Future costs are discounted at 10% for 80% of the car buyers.
The other 20% are assumed not to consider operating costs when
making their purchase. The costs of increased fuel efficiency
are built into the model and the fuel prices may be changed for
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all years of the run. The costs of the technologies to improve
fuel efficiency are considered seperately for three time blocks
within the model. The model also includes different safety and
emitions scenarios and can check the effect of MPG requirements
and penalties for non-compliance.
The truck and air modes are similar in design to the auto
mode. Trucks are divided into light, medium, heavy and heavy-
heavy weight classes. Airplanes are divided into six categories
for commercial flight and one general aviation class.
The other modes are simpler in design than the first three.
This is due largely to data constraints.
TEC offers output on fuel consumption and costs, vehicle
costs and vehicle market shares.
14. 1he followinu cquvs.lion coancern the conilmuling envronmmcn! reqluierd by Iie InoIVr.
a. Brindo ,,, ,y . I , o y A-2 2e
b. Lang age(-) om, oyed . I Fi,' . .. ..
.C. Approvin.te coAp "r solutiOn co t _.. or li rne pe .llilutes . .. r so utor
d. IS the model hn; .idl with other rnc=cels or software package
_X_ .4lo __Yes(specify)
e. Is the code available on ta. _yyes5 cards ..yes ?
I. Ar& any parts of the rmodel proprietary?
_ _.No -- Yes(specify)
*15. Bibliography
We would like to include a bibtiog-aphy for your model lherefore. in The fo:owtng soace. or on an attached sheet. please list a:.
references in which the model has been described or cited: Including oocunmen:a:,on. journa!s publications. and reoorts On moC'
applications Please number each item for easy reference later in tne q'Jestionnare
1. Jack Faucett Associates, TEC: Transportation Energy Conservation Model,
Washington, D.C. JFA, 1978
2. Jack Faucett Associates, TEC: Transportation Enerqy Conservation Model-Uer's Guide
Washington, D.C., JFA, 1978
3. The Energy Productivity Center, Least-Cost Energy Strategy-Technical Appendix ,
Carnegie-Mellon University Press
4. Shackson, Richard H. and Leach, IH. James, Maintaining Automotive MobilityL
Using Fuel Economy and Synthetic Fuels to Compete with OPEC Oil, Interim Ieport,
Carinegie-Mellon University Press, 1980
5. Jack Faucett Associates, Automobile Sector Forecasting Model Documentation,
Washington, D.C. OFA, 1978
16. Which documents listed In Question 15 are references for the model's data sources?
Reference numbers:
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MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS
Ir this section we are interested in tracing how the model has been used In the first column. please describe each application of
the model. uses might include both academic study and specific problem-solving. In the following columns please nadscate
which reference number from Question 15 describes the application, who the sponsor was for that application, who actually
operated the model, and who suggested or supplied the scenarios implemented in the application.
*Description of each signifcant
application of the model.
including dales of usage
Least-Cost Energy Strategy
Study
Ref. # from
Question 15
describing
each applic.
ation
Model Senario
Scenarios
supplied
by:
M = modeler
S = sponsor
O = o:ner
S
3,4
Sponsor/
client*
for each
applic-
ation
Mellon
Institute
EPC
I I 1
17. As the table above suggests, an important factor In model development and documentation is whether or not the model
has ever been installed and operated by someone other than the modeler.
a) Can the model be transferred for use by someone other than the modeler?
x Yes No If no. why not?
b) Has the model ever been transferred for use by someone other than the modeler?
No _.XYes II yes. please indicate where the model was transferred and briefly descrnte. the
transfer process. mOl was tr.Sa~ne9ie.-etton-Uni-ver- f t
c) Do you have any plans to transfer the model in the future?
.X No Yes II yes. towhere?
18. One factor sometimes complicating model assessment is that one-time or on-going changes to.a model's structure have
led to more than one version of that model. In this question we are Interested in finding out how many discrete versions of
the model have been developed, and which, if any, are currently operational.
a) Has the model undergone any major structural changes since Its original finished form?
.. No (skip to ues. 19) Yes It yes, please briefly describe any signl'cant differences between the versions and
the reasons motivating the changes.
b )Which version(s) of the model are currently operational, and where are they marlntained?
-- I -- -
Model
operated
by:
M= modeler
S= sponsor
O = other
MODL 3  ESSMENT
'19. Has the model ever been subjected to an in-house assessment by the modelers?
No (skip to Oue; 20)
_JLYes a) If yes, which elements listed below received emphasis during the modeler assessment?
LX Model validity L. Usability
,; Struclure [3 Documentation
JO Content Efficiency
k' Prediction C Model
Data va!:iaty applications
. Verification of the 0 Other (specify)
model's expression
in the computer
code
b) Please briefly describe the techniques utilized in the modeler assessment.
*20. Has the model been made available for assessment by external parties?
0 No (skip to Ouestion 21)
0 Yes. through pubhcat:oa of model descriptons in the literature.
y" Yes. through a formal ex:-'nal assessment assessment done of Automobile sector
0 Yes, through ot.er means(specify)
If the model was assessed by an individual, group or organization other than the modeler(s), please answer the questions below:
a) Who was the assessor for the model?
Organization Uniersty of _ichiganrdighwa h S f.ety Research Institute
Name of contac LBarba ra-URicardso n
Title
Address .fDniar&'rity _K c.igajl -HSrRT
2~_201Baxter Poadr
Telephone(131}) 753-1 7&-itle ol Repordl__tP _pulished fa!.__Q78
b) Who sponsored the assessment?
Organization otL0 ._V.ehi lanufactu s
Name of conlactDl Vk Sh ckS ton
Title
Address
Telephone( )
c) What assessment approach(es) were employed by the assessors?
0 Review of the literature, not including the computer code
ri Evaluation of the detailed documentation, including the code
10 Audit of the model's performance. using test problems
o Evaluation of the model using experiments designed by the assessors. but implemented by the modelers
J0 In-depth assessment. In which the assessors themselves implemented experimental runs of the model0 Comparative evaluation of two or more models
o Other (specify)
d) Which elements listed below received emphasis during the external assessment of the model?
RI Model validity 0 Usability
xJ Structure 0 Documentation
XJ Content 0 Efficiency
91 Prediction 0 Model
kl Data validity applications
gi Verification of the 0 Other (specify)
models expression
In the computer
code
e) Do you have any comments on the external evaluation of the model?
21. a) Please discuss the accessibility of the model for initial or further assessment. If the model has not been assessed, do
you have any plans concerning future assessment? Do you feel it should be considered for an assessment?
22. We would be Interested in any other aspects of the model that you would like to discuss. How does It compare with other
models in terms of structure or coverage? Were there any interesting ramifications resulting from use of the model?
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weight class. It then determines the demand for new cars by calculating
the scrappage rate of the existing fleet and by finding the difference
between fleet demand and number of cars in the existing fleet minus
scrapage. The model then fills the new car demand with cars that
*" minimize the total of the initial costs and the discounted operating
costs over the first owner's lifetime of the car. The car is assumed to
last 52,000 miles. Future costs are discounted at 10% for 80% of the car
buyers. The other 20% are assumed not to consider operating costs when
making their purchase. The costs of increased fuel efficiency are built
into the model and the fuel prices may be changed for all years of the
run. The costs of. the technologies to improve fuel efficiency are
considered separately for three time blocks within the model. The model
also includes different safety and emissions scenarios and can check the
effect of MPG requirements and penalties for non-compliance.
The truck and air modes are similar in design to the auto mode.
Trucks are divided into light, medium, heavy and heavy-heavy weight
classes. Airplanes are divided into six categories for commercial flight
and one general aviation class.
The other modes are simpler in design than the first three. This is
due largely to data constraints.
TEC offers output on fuel consumption and costs, vehicle costs and
vehicle market share.
COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT:
o Machinery: IBM 370
o Language: FORTRAN
o Approximate time per solution: 2 1/2 minutes
o Model is non-proprietary
o Model can and has been transferred
o Model is available on tapes and cards
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS:
The TEC model was developed around the Jack Faucett Associates'
Automobile Sector Forecasting Model. The Automobile Sector Forecasting
model is now a fully integrated part of the TEC model; however, like all
the sectors of TEC, it may be run separately.
The only current application of the TEC model is its use in the
Mellon Institute's Least-Cost Energy Study.
------ -6 l,,
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Description of each
significant application
of the model, including
dates of usage:
Ref. No. from
Bibliography
describing each
application
Sponsor/
client Model Scenarios.
for each operated supplied
application by: by:
*M = modeler
S = sponsor
0 = other
Least-Cost Energy
Strategy Study
3,4 Mellon
Institute
EPC
MODEL ASSESSMENT:
Assessor:
Sponsor:
Barbara Richardson
University of Michigan Highway Safety Research Inst.
2901 Baxter Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109
313-763-1276
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
An in-house assessment of the TEC model was performed. The validity
of the model's structure and content were checked. Tests were also run
to check the model's predictions. The in-house assessment also verified
the computer code.
An in-depth external assessment of the Automobile Forecasting Sector
of the TEC model was performed by the University of Michigan Highway
Safety Research Institute. This work included recalculation of the data
inputs and the parameters of equations used in the model. Test data were
run to check the accuracy of the model's forecasts. This assessment also
examined the model's computer code.
No other assessments are planned at this time.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
1. Jack Faucett Associates, TEC: Transportation Energy Conservation
Model, Washington, D.C., JFA, 19/8.
2. Jack Faucett Associates, TEC: Transportation Energy Conservation -
User's Guide, Washington, D.C., JFA, 19/8.
3. The Energy Productivity Center, Least-Cost Energy Strategy -
Technical Appendix, Carnegie-MelFon---Fiversity Press.
m~
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4. Shackson, Richard Hi. and Leach, H. James, Maintaining Automotive
Mobility: Using Fuel Economy and Synthetic Fuels to Compete with OPEC
Oil, Interi Ti Report, Carnegle-Mellon University lress, 1980.
5. Jack Faucett Associates, Automobile Sector Forecasting Model
Documentation, Washington, D.C., JFA, 19/8.
--
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Additional Information and Comments on TEC
The TEC model used in the Least-Cost Strategy Study is on the
Carnegie-Mellon University computer. Thus it is possible that changes
were made to the model which may make it different than the description
below. Recently, an evaluation of the Automobile Sector Forecast Model
(the automobile sector of TEC) was performed by the University of
Michigan Highway Safety Research Institute. This report should be
available in the fall. The report did suggest changes that must be made
in the model to insure reliability of the results. When this report
becomes available, it should provide valuable insights into the rest of
the TEC model and the Least-Cost Study. The Least-Cost Study only
appears to use the aircraft, automobile, and truck sectors of TEC. Thus
they will be the only ones discussed here.
The aircraft sector is divided into two parts: air carrier and
general aviation. The Least-Cost Study does not appear to consider
general aviation in its analysis. The air carrier sector is further
divided into two components, domestic and international travel. This is
because the two types of travel have somewhat different characteristics.
However, the methodology involved in calculating fuel use is the same.
TEC divides aircraft into six categories according to number of
engines and body type (i.e., narrow or wide). Current aircraft are
placed into these groups. Fuel efficiency gains are made by replacing
existing planes with more efficient planes. The more efficient planes
are phased in according to a schedule based on various studies. TEC
contains two alternative schedules which may be used. One is based upon
the assumption that research being done by NASA will become available.
This schedule is considerably more optimistic about fuel efficiency
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increases than the other schedule that does not assume the NASA research
will be available.
The aircraft sector first projects total passenger-miles for a given
year. These estimates are based upon an FAA study. However,
passenger-miles can be input by the model user. Passenger-miles are then
converted to seat-miles by dividing by load factor. TEC assumes a
constant load factor of .55. This figure can also be changed by the user.
Seat-miles are then allocated into each of the different aircraft
groups. The percentages to each category are held constant by the
model. Within each category seat-miles are then allocated to specific
aircraft. To do this a retirement schedule based upon assumed aircraft
lifetime is applied to the fleet to determine size of existing fleet.
Seat-miles are first distributed among the existing fleet. Remaining
seat-miles are then allocated to new planes. It is assumed that the most
fuel-efficient planes available will be purchased. From this information
fuel consumption can then be determined.
The automobile sector begins by projecting a demand for automobiles
in a given year. This is done as a function of household income.
Different household income levels are assumed to have different demand
levels. The parameters were developed from historical data. Total
automobile fleet demand is figured by aggregating the number of
automobiles demanded by each income level. The demand for new cars is
then determined by subtracting current fleet size from the total
automobile demand plus scrappage. The scrappage schedule is based upon
historical trends. The effect of new car prices and the unemployment
rate on scrappage is also added for automobiles nine years or older.
The new car demand is filled by cars that minimize the total
.11
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discounted costs to the first owner, or about 52,000 miles. The data on
costs of increasing fuel efficiency were taken from a Hittman Associates,
Inc. study. The study looks at different technologies and estimates
their cost and fuel savings. Future costs are discounted at 10% for 80%
of car buyers. The other 20% are assumed not to consider future costs in
their purchase decision.
TEC divides the automobile market into three groups depending upon
weight. Market shares of each of the three weight classes are based upon
historical data and are a function of the relative prices of cars of
different weight classes and the market share of the weight class in the
previous time period.
TEC also computes vehicle miles traveled per year per household.
This is a function of disposable income, number of automobiles owned, and
the real price of fuel. From the information on weight class, fuel
economy of cars, and vehicle miles traveled, TEC calculates fuel
consumption. In this calculation an adjustment is made to simulate the
fact that as a vehicle gets older it is used less often.
The light truck sector is modeled in a similar way except no
competition exists among fuel-saving technologies. Yearly fuel economics
are simply put into the model.
The trucking sector is also similar to the automobile sector. The
trucks are divided into three types: medium, heavy, and heavy-heavy.
The trucks are also divided into seven categories according to their use
(e.g., construction, agriculture). Demand for truck use in each of these
categories is predicted. This demand is a function of growth in GNP.
New truck demand is figured from demand, existing fleet, and scrappage.
Vehicle miles traveled are then calculated and fuel efficiency can be
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calculated. The fuel efficiencies of different model years are taken
from earlier research by Jack Faucett Associates. From information about
vehicle miles traveled, fuel efficiencies and the age mixture of the
truck, fleet fuel consumption is calculated.
- -~-~---61 11iili
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4. Buildings Energy Conservation Optimization Model (BECOM)
Energy Model Analysis Notebook Entry
MODEL NAME:
ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE:
ISSUES ADDRESSED:
DEVELOPED:
RESOLUTION:
ASSESSMENT:
MODELER CONTACT:
SPONSOR:
Brookhaven Buildings Energy Conservation
Optimization Model BECOM
o Linear Programming
Demands for Energy
Regulatory Behavior
Economic Impacts of Energy Policies
New Technology Assessment
Conservation Assessment
Federal Energy Policy
o 1/77-1/78
o Geographic: 4 U.S. census regions; U.S.
o Temporal: 6-20 years
Not Assessed
Peter T. Kleeman and Chip Balzer
Building 475
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Upton, NY 11973
617-426-5844
Department of Energy
MODEL DESCRIPTION:
The Brookhaven Buildings Energy Conservation Optimization Model
(BECOM) is designed to provide a tool for projecting, analyzing, and
evaluating the energy implications of conventional and proposed
energy-related technologies in buildings. Starting with detailed cost
and performance data for individual building technologies, the model
assembles alternative combinations of these technologies within a linear
programming framework. BECOM explicitly models 25 energy conversion
technologies and 8 structural technologies that can be used by 9 building
types in each of 4 regions. BECOM is designed as an extension of the
Brookhaven Energy System Optimization Model (BESOM).
Structure. BECOM is formulated as a modified transportation/
transshipment problem. The aggregated demand points of BESOM for
residential/commercial space heat, air conditioning, water heating, and
appliances are the sources for the transshipment problem. The
destinations are the different building markets. Shipments from source
to destination are made through intermediate transfer points: conversion
devices and thermal shells. Associated with each node (technology or
transfer point) is an efficiency coefficient and a cost. The objective
is to minimize cost.
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Equations-
I) BESOM
1) Supply equations - limit amount of a given resource available
2) Demand equations - specify energy requirements of a given
sector
3) Electrical supply and peaking constraints - limit capacities
of plants and account for peak demands
4) Environmental constraints - limit emissions into environment
5) Market penetration equations - limit technology penetration of
markets
II) BECOM Constraints
1) Demand constraints for each type of demand and building type
2) Minimum constraints on residual stock
3) Seasonal load balance
4) Fuel mix in new construction
5) Seasonal operation constraints on heat pumps
6) Solar back up constraints
7) Solar AC constraints
8) Solar water heating
Data Inputs
1) Building stocks including inventory data for 1975, removals in
1976-2000, and new construction during 1976-2000
2) Theoretical building loads specified for space heating, air
conditioning, hot water, lighting plus power, and auxiliaries
in commercial buildings
3) Shell efficiencies
4) Conversion device efficiencies
5) Technology costs
Inputs come from Arthur D. Little data base for buildings.
Outputs. Output for each region is displayed on three levels. The
first shows energy demand by building type. The second surtls the energy
flows separately in residential and commercial buildings. The third
presents net energy demand by fuel and end use for each region.
In addition, the results of each run are presented in terns of
physical units which use each technology combination. The investment in
energy-related devices and structures during the period from 1976 to the
case year is summarized.
BESOM
Demand Point
0 Conversion Thermal Building -0 BECOMDevice Shell Type Demand Point
BECOM
Supply Point
=mh'.
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Model Operation. The model is set up using a general-purpose
proble7T-scription system (PDS/4AGEtN) which is interfaced to the CDC
APEX III linear programming system. Runs for each region are independent
of each other. BESO and BECOM are run simultaneously as a
cost-minimization problem.
Data
Inputs ---- PDS/MAGEN APEX 
APEX III tn PDS/MAGEN REPORTS
Readble tion
Inputs
COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT:
o CDC 7600
o Languages employed are PDS/MAGEN, and APEX
o Linked with BESOM (Brookhaven Energy System Optimization Model)
o Code available on tapes and cards
o Non-proprietary
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONIS:
o Model is transferable but has not been transferred
o Replacement model is currently under development under the name KB-l
at Brookhaven Nationil Lab
o Developed from 1/77 to 1/78 under contract to DOE, Division of
Buildings and Community Systems
Description of each
significant application
of the model, including
dates of usage:
Ref. No. from
Bibliography
describing each
application
Sponsor/
client
for each
application
Model Scenarios
operated supplied
by: by:
*M = modeTler
S = sponsor
0 = other
Assessing market potential
of gas powered air-cond.
technologies under various
fuel & technology price
assumptions 9/80-pres.
Work i s
currently in
progress
American M
Gas
Ass'n
Arlington,
.
-- -- ~~~mi
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Assessment of alternative 4 New York M S
building energy policy State
options for New York State Energy
Energy Office 1979, 1980 Office
Investigation of elasticity 6,7 Energy M S
of demand for energy 1978, Modeling
1980 Forum
Identifying energy conservation2,3 Mellon M S
strategies in residential and Institute
commercial buildings 1979
MODEL ASSESSMENT:
The modeler conducted an in-house assessment. Although this model
has been used, it has not been submitted to formal third-party assessment.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
1. The Brookhaven Buildings Energy Conservation Optimization Model.
Steven C. Carhart, Shirish S. Mulherkar, and Yasuko Sanborn. BNL
50828, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1978.
2. The Least-Cost Energy Strategy. The Energy Productivity Center,
Mellon Institute. Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1979.
3. The Least-Cost Energy Strategy: Technical Appendix. The Energy
Productivity Center, Mellon Institute. Carnegie-Mellon University
Press, 1979.
4. Analysis of New York State Energy Office Conservation Programs in
Buildings. Peter T. Kleeman and Doreen Schneider. BNL 28523,
Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1980.
5. A Simulation Model for Assessing Building Energy Conservation
Policies. Peter T. Kleeman in Modeling and Simulation, Volume II,
Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Pittsburgh Conference,
Pittsburgh, PA, May 1-2, pp. 1133-39, Instrument Society of
America, Research Triangle Park, N.C., 1980.
6. Aggregate Elasticity of Energy Demand. Energy Modeling Forum, EMF
report 4, vol. 1, August 198Q.
7. Aggregate Elasticity of Energy Demand. Energy Modeling Forum, EMF
report 4, vol. 2, in preparation.
. ,
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ENERGY MODEL ANALYSIS PROGRAM
I n,: -cy Lo:,l'ory
l-.;achlr.ftls In!,lu : fe Ichnolo)y
cf3m~:-nrde. FMassachselts 02139
OUESTIONNAIRE FOR ENERGY POL'ICY MODELERS
The'M.l.T. Energy Model Anilysis Program (EMAP). under spon'.orship from the Electric Power Research Institute, is developing
a directory of enrgy rroadels and assessrmen!s. to be pubtised In the la!l of t'30 The directory will be distributed w:dety to
government d-pr:rnen's, academiz cst,:ut:on, and pr:vate 1n'dlus!ry. and wll be an extremely useful relerence tool for model
developers, assessors. and users. We %,.ould very much like to include your model in this directory, and therefore are requesting
that you comp'ete the 13o!!:*.,rg form to provide the informnation needed. VWe ,.ill then compile your responses into a standard-
lied format. which sil be sent to you for review prior to pub.cation.
Please answer the questions below as completely as you can, we are r,3rticularly pleased to be able to present in this directory
the kind of meanir.gful and interesting incrmation and perspecti e that only modelers and model assessors themselves can
brovide. We are interested in any hing you have to offer about your model,and encourage you to use extra sheets of paper where
necessary. If you are extremely short o tnime, please answer the questions marked with an asterisk." Martha Mason ind Kelly
Morgan of the EMAP will be happy to answer any questions and offer assistance, they may be contacted at (617) 253-8318.
Thank you for your assistance - the directory will not be complete without an entry on your model!
GENERAL INFORMATION
*1. What is the name of the model? Brookhaven Buildings Energy Conservation Optimization
Model
"2. By what acronym, nickname, or other name(s) is It.known? BECOM
'3. Where, and under what auspices, was the model developed. Developed at Brookhaven National
Laboratory under contract to the U.S. Department of Energy, Division of Buildings
and Community Systems.
*4. Over what time period was the model developed? mo 1/77
mo /yr.
to 1/78
moJyr.
*5. Who Is the person filling out this questionnaire?
Name: Dr. Peter T. Kleeman
Address- Building 475 , Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY 11973
Telephone 1(56) 3L5-2116
Retationsh;pto madet Have used and modified model for expanding its capabilities.
*6. Who is (or are) the key modeler contact(s)?
Name: _ _Dr .ter T. Kleeman Name: Chip Balzer
Address: Bldg. 475, Upton, NY 11973
Telephone. (516) 345-2116
Relationship to model: as above
Address: Bldg 4 5Upton, tY 11973
Telephone: (516) 345-2256
Relationshipto model: Data base and model maintenance
*7. Who is (or are) the key contact(s) in the organization(s) that sponsored the model development?
Name: Mr. Peter Back Name Mr. Steven Lee
Address. U.S. DOEC ashington, D.C. 20585 Address: U.S. DOE, Washiinston. D.C. 20585
Telephone: .1202 252-9426 Telephone: (202) 252-9426
Relationshtp to model.Jprr am sponsor Relationship to model: Program sponsor
MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
The following questions are designed to provide understanding of the fundamental technical characteristics of the model. The
multiple-choice options are provided for your convenience; however, we understand that models vary significantly, and these
choices may not be suited to your model. Please add categories, phrases, or sentences, as applicable.
In Question 18 we ill ask about different operating versions of the same basic model. If there has been more than one version,
please indicate here which one you are describing. If the versions are significantly different, you may find it necessary to fill out
a complete questionnaire for each unique model version.
*8. What keywords characterize the Issues the model addresses?
O p)ply of fuels & resources & Econoic impacts of energy policies
WDemand lor e!eclrcity O Environmental impacts of energy policies
pemand for non-clectric energy P/Demographic/social impacts of energy policies
P. egulatory behavior L New technoloy assessment
DElectric utility behavior ;Conservation assessment "
DOther industry behavior
2biher(s,eicty) Federal energy policy assessment
I'. What analylltc l,chniques are used in th, model? (if rpproprlate, check more then ons, and Indicate which subsection of
the modal uses which technique)
b'Lnear picgrarn.nnin - Descriptive simulation
]Nonlnealangr programming O Allocaton & equilibrium
-Other slatic ophlmzatlon 0 Input/output
D 0yna.m c Cepltmiaton 0 Regress,on. economotric
.Stochastic techn-ques 0 Export opinion, non-quant:atlive
Olther (specify)
_ ~C- ----
_____ __ ______~ --
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'10. a) What geographic resolution does the model cover?
1 te-sprhc,f¢ (Dsecily)
,wOget.: (-,-flPCIfy) _ _ fr__. U . _ .S._US_ _ ...T_C. ...
1, Statc.wadr+(,ls p, ct)ly)
US asawd,;,o'e as unioL. __iLour reg itons(. Inerna on.ld(pectdy)
(U Other ('.b,acufy) _
b) It regional information is aggregated before reporting results, what is the level of aggregation?
*11. a) What temporal resolution does the model cover?
_. ,hrl term (5 y,'as or less)
t( /editrn term ('-20 years)
O Long t!rm(over 20years)
b) It there are discrete lime steps, what is their typical length?
12. Aside from their use as inpu, were data used during calibrationfdevelopment of the model?
yes - no (skip to ques. 13)
II yes, how were the data used?
C tor coethlcientlparametet determination
o fot structural form determirat:on
[0 for assessing the accuracy of model results
0 other(specty)
*13. In the space below (or on extra sheets) please provide a cdmplete technical description of your model, discussing when
applicable:
* model s!ructure and methodology * variables (endogenous & exogenous)"
* signithcant equations * input data
* oarameters * butpul data
When discussing input data, please differentiate between those data that serve as input assumptions imbedded in the model and
those that are frequentiy chang.d during model runs.
Please attach a flow chart or other d;agram of the structure of the model, if possible.
see attached report (reference 1 in bibliography)
--- ~- ----- --- -- --- ~~... YIYIIIII
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114. The following questions cnncern the computing eiivironmont required by thu model.
a trani o!r chi:try ... Crntr rol )a a. Crp._CDC_7600
b. Larigua, . ) -r, eoyeddPr;; /MAGLl '.EX.-
C ,pp ,o,rr.ate CO.t pI)rr so!uthnn Co; _ .$5 _ Or tle.: _ per solution
d. Is the rrro.I I vrned wth oth.r mod.lts or soll;ware paCk:;ls'9
fo _XX Yes(r.pcly) Qrookiaven_ nerg y__Syn-_pt.mtimiza yel_ IqESO'L
e Is the code alvaable on tape .yX __ cards y.__
f. Are any Sarts of the model proprietary)
..X._No Yes(specly)
15. Bibliography
We would I ,e to snclud-, a bib:ihgraphy for your model Therefore. In the folow.ng space, or on an attachd sheet. please tst all
references ni which the model has been described or cited. inciuding documentation. journals, publications, and reports on model
applicatiors Please number each item for easy reference later in the questionnaore
1. The Brookhaven Buildings Energy Conservation Optimization Model. Steven C. Carhart,
Shirish S. Mulherkar, and Yasuko Sanborn. BNL 50828, Brookhaven National Laboratory,
1978.-
2. The Least-Cost Energy Strategy. The Energy Productivity Center, Mellon Institute.
Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1979.
3. The Least-Cost Energy Strategy: Technical Appendix. The Energy Productivity Center,
Mellon Institute. Carnegie-Mellon University Press, 1979.
4. Analysis of New York State E~rl'-gy Office Conservation Programs in Buildings. Peter T.
Kleeman and Doreen Schneider. Nf, 28523, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1980.
5. A Simulation Model for Assessing Building Energy Conservation Policies. Peter T. Kleeman.
in lodeling and Simulation, Volume 11, Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Pittsburgh
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, May 1-2, pp. 1133-39, Instrument Society of America,
Research Triangle Park, N.C., 1980.
6. Aggregate Elasticity
August 1980.
7. Aggregate Elasticity
in preparation.
of Energy Demand.
of Energy Demand.
Energy Modeling Forum, EMF report 4, vol. 1,
Energy Modeling Forum, EMF report 4, vol. 2,
16. Which documents listed in Question 15 are references for the model's data sources?
Flelerencenumbers 1, 3.
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MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS
In this .ectlior we are interested in tracinr how th, riol-kt h~s been u.ed In the hr.t r.olornr. ple:ra,: duscrihe aclh anpplcatin of
the lOd:!l, ustes might incluce both academic stdy ;aid .p,-cthc proublan r.olvarorj in the following colurns, pl.atre al,'Cicltte
which reflerence numrib-r from Oue;tion 15 describ s the appl'ration, wtr the sponsor wvs lfor ttht application, who actually
operatd the model, and who suggested or su.pleed the scenrarios Implemented an the ar'pcdaton
Model Scenarios
*Descripton of each sign;ificant Ref. # from Sponsor' operated supplied
apphicatior of the model. Ovestion 15 client by: by:
including dates of usage: describing for each M= modeler M= modeler
each applic. applic- S= sponsor S = sponsor
ation ation O- other O other
Assessing market potential work is American Cas M S
of gas powered air-cod. currently in Association,
technologies under various progress Arlington,VA
fuel and technology price
assumptions 9/80 - pres.
Assessment of alternative 4 New York M S
building energy policy State Energ
options for New York State Office
Energy Office
1979,1980
Investigation of elasticit 6, 7 Energy M S
of demand for energy Modeling
1978,1979 Forum
Identifying energy 2, 3 Mellon S S
conservation strategies Institute
in residential and
commercial buildings
1979
17. As the table above suggests, an important factor in model development and documenta:ion is whether or not the model
has ever been installed and operated by someone other than the modeler.
a) Can the model be transferred for use by someone other than the modeler?
XxXYes No If no, why not?
b) Has the model ever been transferred for use by someone other than the modeler?
XX No Yes If yes. please indicate where the model was transferred and briefly describe the
transfer process. _Sansoar..usedJ.L istjllatiat.._hutw~o d ~nden
C) Do you have any plans to transfer the model in the future?
_.XX No . Yes if yes. towhere?
18. One factor sometimes complicating model assessment Is that one-time or on-going changes.to a model's structure have
led to more than one version of that modal. In this question we are Interestedin finding out how many discrete versions of
the model have been developed, end which, if any, are current!y operational.
a) Has the model undergone any major structural changes since Its original finished forml
.No(skip to Oues 19) .. X..Yes If yes, please briefly describe any sannthcant clrferences between the versions and
the reasons mc::va,!r gbe c, r5--s
b )Worunder. tve ..namre of.c.t lLelto iuwhere r thtl .a o atory
b )Which version(s) of the model are currently operetional, and where are they maintained?
----------. I Y
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t.IODEL ASSESSMENT
*19. Ha> 11 fmodel over bCHert -ljRLlchd to an ill house assessment by the modolers?
4No('. p to Oir-s 20)
-- Yes a) If yes, which elements listed below received emphasis during the modeler assessment?
0 Model vahai:y [U Usability
[ Structure Ll Documcntation
.1 Conten! 1 Elliciency
0 Prediction 0 Model
C Data valtdly app!ications
0 Veriication of the CJ Other (specify)
model's expres=ion
in the computer
code
b) Please briefly describe the techniques utilized in the modeler assessment.
*20. 1la- the model been made available for assessment by external parties?
( No (skip to Ojeshon 21)
U) Yes. through pt.bcaton of model descriptions in the lihterature
0 Yes. through a formal eterrial assessment
- Yes. Vttrough otor means (specify)
II the model was assessed by an itdividual, group or organization other than the modeler(s), please answer the questions below:
a) Who was the assessor for the model?
Organization
Name of contact-.
Title
Address
Telephone( )
Title of Report
b) Who sponsored the assessment?
Organization
Name of contact-
Title _
Address
Telephone( )
c) What assessment approach(es) were employed by the assessoes?
O Review of the litera;ure, not including the computer code
0 Evaluation of the detailed documentation, including the code
o Audt of the model's performance. using test problems
O Evaluation of the model u .rg experiments designed by the assessors, but implemented by the modelers
] INrdepth assessment, in v,hich the assessors themselves implemented experimental runs of the model
C Comparative evaluat-on of two or more models
SOtlher (specify)
d) Which elements listed below received emphasis during the external assessment of the model?
O Model vatidity 0 Usability
0 Structure 0 Documentation
o Content 0 Efficiency
o Prediction E Model
O Data validity applications
0 Verification of the 0 Other (specify)
model's expression
in the computer
code
e) Do you have any comments on the external evaluation of the model?
.21. a) Please discuss the accessibility of the model for initial or further assessment. If the model has not been assessed, do
you have any plans concerning future assessment? Do you feel it should be considered for an assessment?
ThjTsoodel is not_ agood candidate for assesssment since a mo.el is currently_ ein
developed tLhai t.w111 -in. e-f fcct.replace-this. .model _uirh _one. of...sup eri r_quzali.t)t
-Th is-modrln---i ,- c-urrent ly-knovn-a- KR-1- nnd- mnny--be- imp emented -end-doeumei ted------
imrcrr-uicMhn -rthe-n exrsvever a t onhs.
22. We would be interested in any other aspects of the model that you would like to discuss. How does it compare with other
models in terms of structure or coverage? Were there any interesting ramifications resulting from use of tihe model?
This model indicated in several applications that aggressive policies on the
part of the federal govt. could encourage large energy savings in both residential
and conunercial sectors. The bulk of these savings would occur through building
envelope improvement rather than conversion device retrofit or replacement
when real fuel prices paid by consumers increases.
mlhIIM,
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The Mellon Institute Least Cost Energy Strategy (LCES) is an at-
tempt to examine how the effects of higher world energy prices
can be partially mitigated through the introduction of more efficient
technologies. The approach taken in the LCES is to consider competition
between alternative new technologies to determine their adoption patterns.
Very detailed breakdowns according to technology type, and energy service
demand by industry, transportation, and housing sectors are provided.
The scenario explicitly considered by the LCES is what technologies
and energy inputs would have been adopted in 1978. Actual energy service
quantities in 1978 are determined and then, not allowing for changes in
these quantities, the cost savings associated with adoption of least cost
technologies to meet these these energy service quantities are determined
using existing, large scale computer algorithms for each of the industrial,
transportation, and housing sectors. The industrial sector analysis makes
large use of the Industrial Sector Technology Utilization Model which is
not part of the LCES report but was partially available to us for exami-
nation. The building sector analysis relies heavily on the Building
Energy Conservative Optimization Model and the transportation sector
relies on the Transportation Energy Conservation Model. Documentation
of neither of these models was available to us for evaluation. Below,
our evaluations of the LCES are presented based on the LCES reports and
other limited material available to us but not included as documentation
to the Mellon Institute reports.
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MARKET ADOPTION IN THE LCES
The methodology employed in the LCES is to consider energy'efficiency
improvements in three sectors of the economy: industrial sector, build-
ings sector, and the transportation sector. While improved efficiency in
each of these sectors had been substantial up through .1978, as pointed out
by the authors of LCES, the approach taken by them is to consider more
completely further efficiency improvements and the potential cost-savings
associated with their adoption. The question they wish to provide in-
sights on is "How would the nation have provided energy services in 1978
if its capital stock had been reconfigured to be optimal for the actual
1978 energy prices?" In essence, their answer to the question involves
comparison of costs of providing energy services among alternative techno-
logies in various sectors of the economy. This section examines the me-
thodologies used in this attempt and evaluates them in the hope of pro-
viding a more appropriate approach.
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A. Industrial Sector Analysis
The first step in analysis of the industrial sector is to determine
the quantity of energy services demanded to produce given output levels
based on actual 1978 levels of economic activity. Given these quantities
as inputs, the Industrial Sector Technology Utilization Model (ISTUM) is
used to calculate the lowest cost combination of fuel and efficiency
improvement technologies to meet these quantities demanded. The average
cost of fuel prices in 1978 were used in this cost determination approach.
No changes potentially induced by lower cost alternatives, on economic
output levels or the distribution of economic activity are permitted.
Turnover of the capital stock in which technologies are embedded includes
equipment used in generation or conversion of energy but not other items.
The exercise considers 23 energy service sectors (e.g., machine
drive, space heat,etc.) in 26 industrial catagories. Within each service
sector technologies were adopted on the basis of the ISTUM lowest service
cost algorithum. The least cost estimates are based on an assumed con-
stant (1978 actual) quantities of service demanded and energy prices
through the year 2000, but allow for full turnover of energy using durable
goods taking into account replacement through the year 2000. The authors
suggest that limitations in the approach such as process changes due to
changing costs of energy services are not serious because the analysis
is only for one year, 1978. Numerous technologies are considered for
each of the 23 service sectors with competition between technologies
conducted separately for each service sector.
-- --- --- ---- EllL
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Market Share Projections
Market share projections in the LCES are determined by use of ISTUM.
The discussion presented here is based in large part on documents referred
to in the LCES pertaining to ISTUM but not developed by the LCES. The
basic approach is to characterize the cost of a technology in terms of
capital costs and costs associated with the utilization of the durable good
in generation or conversion of energy services. With different costs
associated with alternative technologies and utilization rates the ob-
jective is to determine the least cost technology that would be adopted.
The cost of each technology is determined by adding up (using a discounted
cash flow technique) capital costs, fuel costs, and operating and main-
tenance costs. That technology with the lowest total cost is then the
appropriate technology to be adopted.
The procedure to determine the total cost associated with each
technology is to assume distributions of fuel costs, capital costs, and-
operating costs. For a particular type of plant this includes site pre-
paration, start-up costs, and other capital costs as well as refined
breakdowns for operating and maintenance costs. Appropriately, ISTUM
realizes that these costs may vary by plant for a variety of reasons
(included are site-specific valuations and firm-related variation).
Hypothetical ranges associated with cost variation due to these factors
are then used to deter-mine distributions of costs associated with all
factors that figure into total cost determination. These distributions are
then added together (assuming independence) to arrive at total cost dis-
tributions for each technology. Each technology is assumed to have a
I ---- _~_Mik
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maximum market share in each service sector with some technologies excluded
(zero market share). The exact procedure for this determination, however,
is not explicitly addressed in the available documents. In addition to
these considerations, often some technologies are limited in application
because of restrictions in size either because of technical factors or
through regulation. The cost associated with a particular technology may
also depend on the extent of utilization. Thus load factor categories
are used within each service sector in analysis of competition among
alternative technologies.
Competition between alternative technologies is examined in five-
year intervals (1980-2000) with only those technologies available in a
given year able to compete. Thus, for example, a technology that is
expected to be developed in 1985 will have no effect on the technologies
available in 1980 and adopted in 1980. The nominal market share is
"...that fraction of the market segment in which that technology will be
able to supply energy to the final process more cheaply than any other
competitor."
Since the nominal market share determines the fraction of the
market in which any technology is theoretically preferable to any alter-
natives, based on the cost of the alternatives, it is most probably the
market ceiling for the particular technology. It is realized that the
acceptance of a given product or process in a market place is not
dependent on cost considerations alone. Factors such as consumer risk
aversion, lags in transfer of information concerning the technology,
role of governments, etc., all affect the rate at which a product/process
is adopted.
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In the original industrial sector technology utilization model (ISTUM)
these factors are termed behavioral lag factors. ISTUM defines behavioral
lag as the amount of time in years required for actual market shares to
equal the nominal market shares (the market ceiling). It is supposed to
be a time lag function controlling the rate at which the actual market
shares approach the market ceiling. ISTUM concentrates only on costs and
does not consider the effect of net benefits of a particular technology
on its adoption. To get around this point, the ISTUM methodology uses
the ratio of the nominal market share (NMS) to maximum market fraction
(MMF) as a measure of the perceived profitability of a technology (PTP)
and in turn the expected length of the behavioral lag. The assumption is
that the higher this ratio, the higher the perceived profitability of a
technology and hence the shorter the behavioral lag time.
The behavioral lag time (BLT) is modeled as the product of the
initial technology behavioral- lag time, ITBLT, and the behavioral lag
multiplier. The ITBLT is defined as the maximum number of years one
could imagine that risk aversion and information transfer constraints
which delay the commercial acceptance of a product/process could be over-
come. ISTUM sets the upper limit of this number to be 15 years.
A risk aversion multiplier (or lag time slope) is defined as the
slope of a downward sloping straight line which depends on the nominal
market share relative to the maximum market fraction. This slope is
set equal to 5.0. After calculating the behavioral lag time for each
technology, the actual market share (AMS) is computed according to the
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following procedure:
0, where t - YTA < 0
AMS = NMS(t) x (t - YTA(t)), where 0 < t - YTA(t) < BLT(t)
NMS(t), where t - YTA(t) > BLT(t)
where YTA = Year technology is available
BLT = Behavioral time lag
t = Time in calendar years
The assumption is that once time t exceeds the year technology is
available, (YTA), by the technology behavioral lag time, actual market
share will be equal to the nominal market share. Since this model does
not take into consideration the probable appearance on the market of
more superior technologies, it is not clear whether the nominal market
share or the market ceiling will ever be approached by most of the
technologies.
Results
In the industrial sector, technological improvements in energy ef-
ficiency accounted for 22% of the industry energy service market in 1978
in the absence of least cost strategy. However, the results also show
that if least cost strategy had been applied in 1978, technological
improvements in the energy efficiency would have accounted for 33% of
the energy service market. Oil utilization in industry contributed to
18% of the energy service market in 1978 and in the hypothetical situation,
oil would have accounted for only 11% of the energy utilization in indus-
try. Another important difference in energy utilization in industry was
__ __ /1
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in the area of natural gas usage. The results show that while natural
gas accounted for 22% of the energy service market in 1978, if least cost
strategy had been employed natural gas would have accounted for 37% of
the energy service market in 1978. Purchased electricity would have
captured 11% of the market for energy services in industry in the presence
of least cost strategy in 1978 but the actual share of the market captured
by purchased electricity in 1978 was 26%. Industrial coal utilization
would have dropped from 10% in the actual 1978 situation to 7% in the
hypothetical case.
On the whole, energy cost per capita which was $257 would have de-
creased to $232 if least cost strategy had been employed in 1978. This
is a 10% drop in the actual 1978 situation.
Evaluation
Table 1 presents the major comments of our evaluation of the LCS
modeling effort.
First, the modeling effort provides a detailed breakdown of
energy service demand sectors and industrial catagories. This disaggre-
gation effort is an important step forward in analysis of market adoption
of new innovations. They have provided a model that brings to light some
of the effects of competition between new technologies on the extent of
adoption which are essential ingredients in understanding adjustment
to the changing world energy situation.
Second, the demands for energy sources in each sector are assumed
fixed at their 1978 levels, not responsive to price or expected growth
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TABLE I
COMIMENTS ON THE LCES INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ANALYSES
1. The detailed breakdown of energy service demand sectors and industry
categories is a necessary step forward in the modeling of market
adoption of new technologies.
2. Effects of energy service cost reductions due to adoption of new
technologies on costs of outputs and input quantities demanded
need to be considered to determine total market adoption patterns.
3. The LCES results are relevant for comparison of cost savings asso-
ciated with adoption of new technologies only in the sense that they
compare actual costs to what costs could have been if adoption
of new technologies took place in a non-dynamic setting without un-
certainty. A more realistic approach is needed that takes into
account market adoption decisions in a world where future changes
in prices and economic conditions are uncertain.
4. Costs of adjustment are not explicitly modeled in the LCES market
adoption methodology. Factors that alter the rate of adoption of
new technologies should be viewed in the same manners as other costs
and explicitly included in the LCES analysis.
___ _ ~~ ~_ ~ ~ "L,,/
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TABLE 1 (con'tl
COMMENTS ON THE LCES INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ANALYSES
5. The level of existing durable good stock structure, embodying older
technologies should be explicitly considered in the determination
of adoption of new technologies. Replacement of existing technologies
will depend on the age and efficiency structure of capital
goods in which technologies are embedded and thus will alter the
rate of adoption of a new technology depending on this structure.
6. Effects of expectations of introduction of newer technologies in the
future on current adoption patterns of new technologies in the current
period need to be explicitly treated in the LCES analysis. The age
structure of existing capital stock, the life terms of alternative
new technologies and the extent of expected future cost reductions
will play important roles in determination of market adoption pat-
terns of existing new.technologies.
7. The approach taken in the LCES through use of ISTUM is to consider
dispersion of elements of costs associated with purchase and utili-
zation of new technologies. The economic reasons for this disper-
sion need to be explicitly incorporated into the cost structure
analysis instead of relying on mechanistic procedures to determine
cost dispersion and the maximum market penetration of new techno-
logies. Variation in labor costs and other input costs as well as
output market conditions need to be included in a more complete
analysis.
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TABLE 1 (con't)
CO4MENTS ON THE LCES INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ANALYSES
8. A least cost of production strategy could include substantial re-
location of industry to areas where fuel costs are lower and cli-
matic conditions are such to lower demand for energy servies in
heating and cooling capacities. However, the benefits to the pop-
ulation may be more substantially decreased because of higher costs
of transportation and/or costs associated with population relocation.
Instead of relying on cost of production decreases as the LCES, a
more appropriate approach would be to consider reduced costs of
population consumption of all goods and services.
9. The cost savings associated with adoption of a technology that pro-
vides two distinct services is the sum of the savings in each cate-
gory. The appropriate comparison between alternative technologies,
some of which provide multiple services, should take into account
such joint cost savings. The current cost comparison algorithms, to
the best of our knowledge do not take into account these properties.
10. The year of availability of new technologies, just like costs of
existing technologies, should be allowed to depend on economic factors.
-- --------- I Y
B-12
or decline in demand. Further, reduced costs of production in one
sector of the economy due to adoption of new technological innovations
do not affect production costs in other sectors. For example, reduced
steel prices would not reduce the cost of automobiles. People often
consume not the output of metal fabrication industries but rather services
from goods they directly purchase. A direct measurement of the benefits
to society of adopting new technologies is the ability of people to
purchase goods and services they directly consume and not the changes in
costs associated with intermediate goods used in production.
Third, although the LCES results are only meant to relate to what
happened in 1978 relative to what could have happened if the LCES were
followed, it is not clear that given the information available in 1978
and earlier, the LCES results may not have been appropriate, even with
perfect foresight with respect to new technologies. For example, great
uncertainty with respect to future energy prices may optimally lead to
less investment in new technologies that would have large benefits asso-
ciated with their adoption only if fuel prices did not decline.
Fourth, costs of adjustment are not explicitly treated in this
modeling effort. If all relevant capital was to turn over immediately
in 1978, the cost of producing all the durable goods that embody the new
technology may increase in cost. Thus the cost distribution associated
with supply of one type of technology will not be independent of the
quantity of other technologies supplied. More explicit treatment of the
aggregate implications of the model results and their appropriateness is
needed.
10 Iffi iiM ,
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Fifth, the role of the existing capital stock and cost of utilization
relative to that associated with the new technologies needs to be more
completely developed. The efficiency of the existing capital stock may
depend significantly on its age structure and thus the technology imbedded
in it. It appears there is an asymmetry between competition between existing
(old) technologies and that between new technological innovations.
Our understanding of the model is that all old capital is replaced by
improved existing technologies as of 1978 and this old capital has no
value. An economic treatment of this subject would not lead to this
result and that it is not likely to be a least cost strategy. In order
to carry a more sound economic analysis along these lines it would be
necessary to compare costs of utilizing existing durable goods that
embody old technologies with both costs of new durable goods containing
new technologies and their costs of utilization.
Sixth, the expected introduction of a new technology in the future'
does not affect what technologies are adopted in the current period.
Even abstracting from the existence of current old technologies that are
in place, the choice between two equal-cost technologies available in the
current period,but with different lifetimes, will not be adopted at the
same rate if it is expected that in two years a new, dominant technology
will become available. In addition, in some cases it may be least costly
not to replace an old technology with a new, more efficient technology,
if it is expected that an even more efficient, less costly technology
will be developed in the near future. These trade-offs need to be more
explicitly dealt with in the Mellon Institute study.
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Seventh, the approach taken in the LCES through the use of ISTUM is
to consider dispersion of elements of costs associated with the purchase
and utilization of new technologies. The economic reasons for this dis-
persion need to be explicitly incorporated into the cost structure analysis
instead of reliance on mechanistic procedures. For example, variation in
labor costs and other input costs will alter the variation in cost in a
systematic manner that should be included in the cost structure analysis.
Eighth, a least cost strategy could involve the relocation of all
industry to regions where energy costs are minimized and/or where cli-
matic conditions are such as to require very little heating services. This
may lead to very low costs of production but an overwhelming decrease in
the benefits that stem from the consumption of the goods purchased. In
other words, the resulting increase in costs of transporting goods and
services where people live would outweigh the savings achieved by pro-
duction relocation. Moreover, such considerations suggest that the effects
of energy cost changes in production and distribution' (the transportation
sector) cannot be developed independently. Optimal adjustment to higher
energy prices thus involves comparison of both benefits and costs asso-
ciated 'with the adoption of new technologies in a spatial context.
Ninth, the cost savings associated with adoption of a technology
that produces two distinct services is the sum of the cost savings in
each category. The appropriate comparison, for adoption purposes, between
technologies that have such characteristics should take into account these
joint cost savings amounts. The current cost comparison algorithms, to
the best of our knowledge, does not take into account this property.
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Tenth, the year of availability of new technologies. depends on dif-
ferences between regions, prices, labor ayailabilities, site-specific
factors as well as qualitative service demand differences such as pro-
duct/process reliability. The model should include the effects of inter-
actions between these factors on the availabilities of new and improved
technologies and make new technology development a result of economic
determinants.
-- YYI
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B. Building Sector
The LCES for the building sector focuses on the lowest cost combina-
tion of energy technologies that would satisfy the actual 1978 quantities
of a variety of service demands. Nine building types were considered
under the residential and commercial building categories; the residential
category had four building types--single-family detached, low density,
multi-family, and mobile homes. The commercial buildings category is
made up of the following: office, retail, school, hospital, and miscel-
laneous. Service demands in a building category are broken down into
four types: 1) space heating, 2) air conditioning, 3) thermal demands
(water heating, cooling, drying), and 4) lighting/appliances.
An example of a space heating demand for a single-family house is the
energy required to maintain a reference house, defined explicitly in
terms of its thermal characteristics, at a reference temperature for
one year. Fuel demand is then derived from service demand by adjusting
for fuel conversion efficiences.
Service demands were derived for new and existing buildings for each
of the four end uses--space heating, air conditioning, thermal, lighting/
appliances--in each of the nine building types in the four specified
regions of the U.S. The LCES uses the Building Energy Conservation
Optimization Model (BECOM) which derives the least cost mix of capital
and fuel required to meet all service demands. However, no documentation
of this model was available.
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Model Formulation
The model is formulated as a trans-shlipment problem with energy as
the commodity to be shipped from the supply nodes (fuel sources) to the
demand nodes (building service demands). All the possible ways of satis-
fying the service demand for each building type in each region are
specified. Each procedure is likely to incur a different cost. The
components of the costs are 1) fuel cost, 2) capital cost amortized
over the lifetime of the equipment, and 3) the capital cost of the
structural improvements, also amortized. The costs are represented as
costs per unit of service adjusted for efficiency.
Given the efficiencies of the equipments and the structural tech-
nologies and the associated costs, the preferred mode for the provision
of a service demand is one that provides the energy service at the lowest
cost. A discount rate of 5% is used in the LCES. The model is basically
a cost minimization linear programming algorithm which seeks to achieve
the least cost of provision of a specific level of service demand in a
given building type in all four regions of the U.S.
Results
According to the LCES modeling effort, building energy service markets
would have shown a 23% reduction in the cost of energy services per capita
if the least cost strategy had been employed in 1978. Technological im-
provements in energy efficiency accounted for only 2% of the energy service
market in the building sector in the actual 1978 situation. But in the
least cost case , a hypothetical 1978 case, improvements in energy effi-
ciency would have contributed 35% of the market for energy services.
~~----- .~-- ---- --------- IUii
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The shares of oil, natural gas, and purchased electricity in the
buildings' energy service would have declined if least cost strategy had
been followed in 1978. Oil would have accounted for 12% of the building
sector energy service market in the hypothetical case compared to 16% in
the actual 1978 situation. The share of natural gas in the energy
services market would have decreased from 56% in the actual 1978 situa-
tion to 37% in the hypothetical situation.
Intensive retrofitting of residential and commercial structures
would have been mostly responsible for the differenc between the two
cases, contributing to over 8% of the aggregate energy service market.
It was also found that under the 1978 hypothetical case, the introduction
of more energy-efficient appliances would have occurred.
Evaluation
Table 2 gives our major comments on the LCES modeling in the building
sector.
First, regional representative technologies are described in much
detail for all building types. Most of the refined breakdowns deal with
alternative technologies and associated costs. This is a necessary first
step in analysis of adoption of alternative technologies in the housing
sector.
Second, documentation of the procedures used in the LCES is not
complete so that comment on the underlying determinants of market pene-
tration cannot be clearly presented.
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Third, homogeneous conditions are assumed within each broad regional
category although very substantial variations in climatic conditions,
structural characteristics, and energy prices exist. A need is to
consider more completely this intra-regional variation in the above
factors.
Fourth, the 1970's were characterized by substantial regional and
intra-regional change in location of population. To the extent that
differential energy costs played a role in these patterns, market
penetration results in the buildings sector may not affect the least
cost strategy.
Fifth, similar to the modeling for the industrial sector, no con-
sideration is given to the role of existing technology age structure, or
age structure of the housing uinit itself. Issues associated with adoption
of new technologies in existing buildings need to be examined more com-
pletely before the LCES results can be useful in describing potential
cost savings.
Sixth, sensitivity analysis with respect to assumptions made would
be useful in establishing the stability of the results and indicating
which assumptions need to be more fully addressed.
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TABLE 2
COMMENTS ON THE LCES BUILDING SECTOR ANALYSI.S
1. Very refined breakdowns of alternative technologies are presented
and provide a necessary first step in market adoption analysis.
2. Documentation of analytical procedures used limits comment on the
methodology.
3. More refined intra-regional breakdowns would enhance the usefulness
of the modeling effort.
4. Substantial movement of population between and within regions in the
period analyzed needs to be included in the analysis of housing demand
and associated energy use.
5. The role of age structure of existing housing stock and technologies
needs to be more fully incorporated into the new technology adoption
process.
6. Sensitivity analysis to the assumptions made would be useful in
indicating which assumptions need to be more fully explored.
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C. Transportation Sector
The approach taken in the LCES for the transportation sector was to
make use of the Transportation Energy Conservation Model (TEC), for
which documentation was not available.
Model
Specification of service quantity demanded (passenger miles of service
to consumers) was determined through historical correlation with disposable
income and other variables,. although the nature of this relation is not
presented. Principle modes of transportation are examined with aging
and retirement of vehicle types, although the procedures used are not
documented. However,no switching between modes is allowed. Moreover,
it "assumed that development of technologies planned for introduction
within the next ten years would have been advanced to make them available
in 1978."
For each mode, transportation source demand is held constant. The
LCES then makes use of TEC to determine the least cost mix of technolo-
gies. Apparently, a variety of alternative technologies were considered
in each mode.
Results
The results showed that in the transportation sector significant
technological improvements in energy efficiency in automobiles would have
contributed to 29% of the energy service market shares in the hypothetical
least cost case in 1978 compared to the 3% shares captured by improved
energy efficiency in the actual 1978 case. Oil consumption would have
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accounted for 69% of the energy service market in the hypothetical case
compared to 94% in the actual 1978 case. Most of the improvements in
efficiency in the hypothetical situation in the transportation sector
were expected to result from improved fuel econemy, increased use of diesel
engines in light and heavy-weight trucks, reductions in vehicle weight
through material substitution, and substitution of advanced wide-body
for narrow-body airplanes. Under the hypothetical 1978 least cost
situation, deregulation of the airline and trucking industries was expected
to have led to further improvements in efficiency.
The study also found that even though efficiency improvements
and fuel substitutions occurring in the hypothetical situation
would have required $364 billion (1978 prices), it would have cost a lot
less than the $401 billion invested in power plants and the oil import
bills actually required in past years.
Evaluation
Table 3 summarizes our evaluation of the LCES transportation sector
analysis.
First, unlike the analysis for the industrial add buildings sectors,
it appears that the analysis for the transportation sector does take into
account the influence of existing durable goods and retirement rates in
determining adoption of new technologies. This is an important element
in the analysis and should be addressed and documented more completely.
Second, mode switching, especially within urban areas, is likely to
have a major impact on demand for transportation services of each mode
even though demand for transportation services may not change in all modes.
I IY1 - __ .. IId hYYI
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TABLE 3
COMMIENTS ON THE LCES TRANSPORTATION SECTOR ANALYSIS
1. The role of age structure and retirement rate associated with existing
durable goods is included in afalysis of new innovation market penetra-
tion, but needs to be more completely documented.
2. Mode switching as a result of changing costs needs to be included in
the analysis as it has been found in a variety of studies of nrban
travel demand to be an important element in transportation analysis.
3. Effects of transportation cost changes on location of population and
production need to be addressed.
4. More complete documentation of effects of environmental and govern-
ment regulatory activity on the transportation sector should be in-
cluded.
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Mode switching due to cost changes has been well-established in studies
of urban areas and needs to be included in the LCES modeling effort.
Further, the historical correlations used to determine mode demand should
include such interactions.
Third, transportation costs have played an important historical role
in determination of location of population and jobs. Regional growth and
change as a result of transport cost changes is not included in the
modeling effort but is likely to be a long-term result.of such transpor-
tation cost changes, thus altering regional demand for transportation
services. A need is to more fully develop these issues in a least cost
energy modeling effort.
Fourth, environmental factors and government regulatory changes
have been included in the model and are likely to be of substantial
importance. However, to evaluate precisely the effects of these con-
ditions on penetration of new technologies a more complete documentation
is necessary.
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SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AN IIPROVED METHODOLOGY
The Mellon Institute study is an attempt to examine how effects of
higher world energy prices can in part be lessened by adoption of more
efficient technologies that compete with each other on a cost basis. The
economic basis for these adjustments is recognized by the LCES but rigorous
economic analysis of the adjustment process is seriously lacking in the
LCES modeling effort.
The mechanistic approach taken by the LCES needs to be altered so
that the underlying economic principles affecting market adoption of new
technologies is explicitly included in the process of adjustment to chang-
ing world energy process. Serious analysis of this adjustment and the pro-
cess of new technology adoption must address the manner in which existing
and new technologies embedded in durable goods compete both at any point
in time and over time.- Such analysis needs to he based on a framework
that considers relationships among the level of adoption of alter-
native technologies and the rate at which these change. -In essence, mar-
ket adoption of innovations is a dynamic process that must he examined in
that context, including uncertainty with respect to future conditions.
Market adoption patterns of a single new technology will depend on how
costs and benefits of adoption of that technology over time are related to
costs and benefits of adopting alternatives. over time and the replacement
process now and in the future. The mechanistic algorithms used in the
LCES are not sufficient to accurately reflect the complicated dynamics of
change involved. In addition, analysis of market adoption of new techno-
logies must be viewed in a setting of a dynamic economy with changes in
industrial composition and location of production and population in addi-
tion to changes in world energy prices.
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This paper is a review of the assessment of cogeneration in the
Mellon Institute Energy Productivity Center's report "The Least Cost
Energy Strategy" (the LCES Study). LCES results show far greater
penetrations of cogeneration than are found in other literature on the
subject. Some of these differences can be explained by merely examining
the input assumptions of the relative costs of investing in the various
cogenerating technologies and of the relative costs of fuels. However,
the biases that result from these assumptions can only be clearly
understood through a detailed examination of the methodology.
Cogeneration is conventionally defined as the joint production of
heat and electricity. The joint production can be thought of as reducing
the costs of producing each of the outputs through the "writing-off" of
part of capital and operating costs to each of the outputs. The costs of
producing electricity will then be the residual of the net cost of
producing steam, or the cost of producing steam can be the residual of
the net cost of producing electricity.
The plan for this paper is, first, to compare the LCES results with
those found in other reports. The input assumptions that lead to the
divergence of the LCES results from the other reports are reviewed
briefly. The methodology of the LCES report is then reviewed in some
detail. That description, drawing heavily on documentation provided by
the creators of the model utilized for tile LCES report, is followed by a
discussion of the estimation of the capital costs of cogeneration. The
emphasis in that discussion is on the problems of trying to predict the
total of individual investment decisions using aggregate energy demand
data. The purpose of that discussion is not so much to criticize the
model, which in many respects is satisfactory, but to outline the
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limitations of the aggregate approach that it utilizes.
The simple economics of cogeneration are reviewed in the appendix C.1 to
this paper. Particular weight is placed on the complexities of
estimating the capital costs of cogeneration systems and of the
estimation of an optimum investment in these systems. Those not familiar
with cogeneration or not familiar with the impact of such considerations
as utilization factors and its effects on the estimation of capital costs
may find it helpful to review the appendix before proceeding. Other
papers that discuss the economics of cogeneration include Cox and
Helliwell (1980), Helliwell and Cox (1979), Helliwell and Margolick
(1980), Pickel (1978), and Joskow and Jones (1981). The appendix and the
text draw heavily from these papers.
Two technologies will be discussed in this paper, both of which
provide process heat in the form of steam. 1 They are: steam-topping
cogeneration and gas-turbine, combined-cycle cogeneration. Diesel-motor
cogeneration is occasionally referred to.
The Least-Cost Results
Table 1 compares the LCES results with those found in other reports
and with the actual situation in 1975, as reported by Pickel (1978). The
most striking feature of this table is the large amounts of cogeneration
found in the LCES results, far greater than those found in the other
studies. In fact, the LCES penetrations are so great that estimates
previously considered outliers now appear to be fairly reasonable.
l"Process" will describe an input to all non-electricity production; f
or instance, process steam for the production of paper.
111W11
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TABLE 1
Estimates of Congeneration Penetration
Total U.S. cogenerated electricity as a
percentage of total electricity productiop,1975 (Pickel, 1978)
Massachusetts estimate of profitable cogeneration
in state as a percentage of 1977 electricity
consumption. Base Case. (Massachusetts, 1978)
Resource Planning Assoc.1
Dow (1975)1
Thermo-Electron (1976)1
ISTUM1
Least-Cost(a) 2
Least-Cost(b)3
1 As percentages of 1985 demand projected by DRI.
(1978) using 65 percent utilization rate.
4%
19%
5.5-16.4%
18.2%
7.7%
5.9%
51 .6%
37.7%
Adapted from Joyce
2 Industrial cogeneration as a percentage of 1978 industrial demand.
Estimated from gas consumption figures. Table III.3.3of LCES technical
appendix. Total gas use for electrolytic and machine drive demand = 2.95
Quads. At 60% efficiency this gives 1.75 Quads of electricity.
Percentage cogeneration is then (1.75/(2.21 +.1.18) where 1.18 is
industrial demand for purchased electricity.
3 Total cogeneration as a percentage of total 1978 demand. Estimated as
in (a) plus oil consumption for diesel cogeneration in buildings times
40% efficiency. Oil use in diesel cogeneration in buildings (from Table
111.4.1) 2.29 Quads. At 40% efficiency, this gives .916 Quads of
electricity. Total electric purchasesdf LCES study is 4.4 Quads. (1 .75
+ .916)/(1.75 + .916 + 4.4) = .377.
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This is not the only unusual result. The LCES report shows all
industrial cogeneration coming from gas turbine systems. This result is
not found in any other study and is not even found in the original report
on ISTUM, the computer model upon which tile LCES industrial results were
based and which is described below. Table 2 has been drawn up to
indicate this divergence. It presents two estimates of the fuels
consumed in the production of steam and cogenerated electricity by
predicted levels of investment in different technologies. The fuel
consumption figures are in percentages. Each percentage is the
proportion of the total fuel consumed to meet either steam or electricity
demand. The first of these results is from the original report on
ISTUM. The second set of results is the LCES result. The fuel cost
input assumptions are also listed for both studies.
While gas turbines provide very little steam in the ISTUM study, this
technology provides almost half the steam in the LCES study and meets
about half the demand for electricity. Similarly, while coal provides
large amounts of steam in the ISTUM study and some electricity, it
provides none of either in the LCES study.
The major reasons for these results were found to be:
i) The low price of natural gas assumed in the LCES study, a price
consistent with the average price in 1978, but not representing its true
value as a substitute for oil, nor its likely level in the gradually
deregulated future. Natural gas is the presumed fuel for gas turbines in
the LCES study, while ISTUM assumed the turbines to be fired by oil.
Thus, the cost of fuel for the gas turbine is $2.50/MMBtu for ISTUM and
$1.55/MMBTU in the LCES study.
ii) Capital costs were generally found to be understated in the LCES
I iIII
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Table 2
Steam penetrations %
1
Electricity Penetrations _%
I STUI
Coal (New)
Gas Turbine
Diesel
Natural Gas Boilers (New)
26.9
.06
.02
16.35
Coal Topping
Gas Turbine
Diesel
Electricity Purchases
LCES
Coal (New)
Gas Turbine
Diesel
Natural Gas
(WHB)*
Boilers (New)
0.0
45.62
0.0
42.84
Coal Topping
Gas Turbine (ORB)2
Gas Turbines
Diesel
Electricity purchases
Price Input Assumptions
in $/MMBtu
ISTUM
(1980 prices in 1978$)
LCES(1978 prices in 1978$)
Coal
Oil
Gas
Electricity
1.20
2.50
2.30
7.10
1.10
2.49
1.55
8.12
This does not include electrolytic demand for electricity!
2 organic Rankine cycle.
2.69
9.2
11.00
69.42
0.0
4.3
64.62
0.0
31.05
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study, with the exception of coal boilers, which were assumed to be about
twice as expensive as their current cost.
The primary consequence of this particular set of assumptions is that
investment in gas-turbine technologies are made to appear cheaper than
investment in steam-topping systems or to purchasing electricity.
However, gas turbines produce about four times as much electricity per
pound of steam than topping technologies. Thus, the apparent biases in
the cost assumptions lead to the choosing of a technology that produces
far more cogenerated electricity than found in other studies.
To see the manner in which these input assumptions affect the choice
of technology and the amount of cogeneration it is necessary to review
the methodology employed in the LCES paper.
Review of Least-Cost Strategy Procedure
The model upon which the Least-Cost Energy Strategy report depends is
an adaptation of ISTUM, which itself was developed for DOE and is
documented in Department of Energy (1979). Figure 1 is a flow diagram
that illustrates some of the steps in this process. The model takes as
inputs fuel prices, technology capital costs, and energy demand data. It
evaluates a set of technologies to find the combination of them that
meets fixed energy service demand at lowest cost. The penetrations of
some technologies are limited by technical constraints. "Energy demand"
is separated into 26 industries, each with up to 23 energy service
demands. Two of these service demands are relevant to cogeneration;
machine drive demand and steam demand. These services are the only two
that will be considered in this review.
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MAXIMUM TECHNICAL
MARKET SHARE
ENERGY DEMAND
26 Industries
23 Services
MARKET COMPETITION
ANALYSIS
NOMINAL MARKET
technologies
to meet demand
Figure 1
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Technical Constraints Estimation
Cogeneration systems can only produce a certain number of kWh per
pound of process steam demand. For instance, a steam-topping system with
a boiler pressure of 1250 p.s.i., a heat content per pound of steam of
1375 Btu, and a process requiring steam at 150 psi, can produce about 55
kWh of electricity per thousand pounds of steam generated to meet process
heat requirements. The steam-topping maximum market share is estimated
as:
STt C,t PT Pg (-h 3 ) (1)ST,t M (1)Tt
where ST, t  is the maximum share of machine drive energy demand
that coal-topping can meet,
MC,t is the total amount of new coal-fired boiler capacity
installed in year t, in Btus,
MT,t is the total demand for electricity, in Btus.
PT' Pg are turbine and generator efficiencies (pT . pg = .7), and
&h3  is the change in Btus per pound of steam as it expands
through the turbine, as a percentage of Btu/lb, as steam
exhausts the turbine.
This can be converted to an equation to estimate the amount of
cogeneration potential available in kilowatts by replacing MTt with
3412, the number of Btus per kilowatt hour.
Market Competition Analysis
ISTUI takes the costs of providing an energy service from the range
of possible technologies and picks the lowest cost system to meet that
demand. However, instead of using point estimates of the cost of each
. . .II ll YI lI ,,
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technology's services (which would result in a single technology
capturing the whole market or up to the maximum allowed by its technical
constraint) the model utilizes a range of per-Btu costs for each of the
technologies.
The costs of meeting steam- and machine-drive service demands through
cogeneration are estimated in two inconsistent ways. To understand this
problem it is helpful to review the capital costs involved in
cogeneration systems.
The major investments that are incremental to providing steam and are
due solely to the decision to cogenerate electricity from a steam topping
system include :
i) the cost of the turbo-generator,
ii) the cost of the additional boiler capacity necessary to produce
the greater output of steam necessary to make up for the heat
converted to electricity,
iii) the additional boiler cost resulting from a boiler of a
pressure higher than that necessary to provide process steam alone,
if the investor is considering increasing cogeneration capacity in
this manner, and
iv) the cost of any condensing capacity.
While the isolation of the incremental cost of producing electricity
from a coal topping cycle is straightforward, the same cannot be said of
the other two technologies. In fact, both diesel and gas-turbine
cogeneration could be considered primarily electricity-generating
technologies, with steam being a by-product. However, the ISTUM
methodology requires that these technologies compete in well-defined
service sectors, either steam services or electricity services. All
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three technologies must first.compete to meet industrial steam demand.
The capital costs of meeting steam demand with a coal system is merely
the cost of a conventional coal boiler. However, the cost of providing
steam from the gas turbine and diesel technologies is deemed to be the
total cost of the systems, minus the benefits to the firm of producing
electricity for its own use and for sale to the local utility. The
average cost of providing process steam fom a gas turbine could then be
represented as
AC = (K + FS + FT - BE)/Btu (2)
where ACS is the average cost of a Btu of steam,
K is the total annual capital and operating cost,
FS is the cost of fuel consumed to raise steam to meet process
heat requirements,
FT  is the additional fuel required to produce electricity from
any steam topping system,
BE is the annual benefit due to reduced electricity purchases
and due to sales of surplus electricity, and
Btu is the annual process heat production.
Thus the greater the price of electricity the lower is the cost of steam
used in production. Also, the lower the cost of the fuel burned to
produce both steam and electricity, the greater will be the net benefits
of producing electricity and hence, the lower will be the cost of
producing steam.
Coal boilers with no cogeneration capacity then compete with
gas-turbines and diesel cogenerators to meet steam demand on the basis of
their average costs of steam. Once the amount of steam generated from
gas turbines and diesels is estimated, the amount of electricity produced
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can be computed. This electricity production is then subtracted from
that required by the machine drive sector. The remaining machine drive
demand is met by steam topping and purchased electricity, whichever is
cheaper.
Thus, three cogeneration technologies are evaluated in two
contradictory ways. The ISTUM modelers no doubt felt that, since there
was no way to isolate a steam-producing segment of the gas-turbine system
or the diesel system, they had to think of the steam generating
investment as being incremental to the electricity generating system.
However, it is incorrect to assume that the incremental cost of producing
electricity is embodied in one technology. Consider the case of a plant
manager evaluating the purchase of a new steam generating system and
faced with the choice of the three technologies. The cheapest way to
produce steam alone will probably be the coal system since the other two
systems produce the steam merely as a byproduct. Suppose the manager
then considers the possibility of cogenerating electricity. The
incremental cost of cogenerating by steam-toppping is, as we saw, the
additional boiler cost plus the cost of turbo-generator. The incremental
cost of producing electricity from a gas-turbine or a diesel system would
be the total cost of those systems, minus the total cost of the coal
boiler large enough to provide steam requirements alone. In this manner
all technologies could compete on the same basis in order to meet
electricity demand.
Conversely, the method applied by ISTUMt for gas turbines and diesels
(equation 2) could be applied to the coal-topping system as well. The
credit to be applied to the cost of process steam production would be the
value of electricity produced.
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Once the net steam costs had been evaluated for all possible topping
designs this technology could compete with gas turbine or diesel
cogeneration systems on the same basis. This sort of approach has been
suggested by the developers of the ISTUM model. (See Olson and
Kalkstein, 1980.)
Even if these methodologies had been applied consistently to all
technologies, however, it is unlikely that they would result in an
optimum investment strategy. The only way to do that would be to
calculate the net present value of the whole range of possible technology
options, including conservation possibilities. More specifically, that
means subtracting the capital, fueloperating and maintenance costs for
the entire investment (i.e. not broken into their component parts) from
the present value of electricity savings. The project which supplies
steam requirements with the smallest negative value should be the one
undertaken. However, in a system that chooses technologies by minimizing
costs instead of maximizing benefits, such a procedure, though correct,
cannot be undertaken.
In summary, the amount of machine drive demand satisfied by each
technology is based upon each technology's penetration into the steam
market. The cost of steam from coal is merely the cost of a coal
boiler. The cost of steam from a gas turbine is the total cost of that
system, minus the benefits of electricity production. With the very low
prices for natural gas and the realistic prices for electricity found in
the LCES study the gas turbines take a very large share of the steam
sector market. The amount of electricity generation that this
gas-turbine steam penetration implies is so large that there is little
left for any other technology to capture.
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To see how the results of Tables 1 and 2 come out of the LCES study
it is useful to look at the assumed capital and fuel costs for each
technology. The first part of Table 3 displays the LCES cost assumptions
(in dollars per MMBtu) for the technologies. It clearly demonstrates the
economic advantage that gas turbines enjoy under the LCES scenario. The
costs shown are after electricity benefits have been subtracted. The
electricity savings are somehow allocated over both the capital and fuel
costs of the gas-turbine system. In some cases the fuel costs are
reduced to a negative number. The credits earned from electricity
generation are $6.76/MMBtu for electricity (about 2.3V/kWh) and the cost
of the fuels are $1.55/MMBtu for natural gas and $2.49/MMBtu for
diesel. (The fact that the minimum costs under the "fuel" and "total"
headings are higher than their mean costs may indicate that the cost
distribution of the ISTUM system have been replaced by using the mean as
a point estimate.)
As Table 2 indicates, the natural gas price assumptions are clearly
very low, resulting in the low net fuel prices for gas turbines on column
3 of Table 3. The 1978 prices are much lower than those that one could
reasonably expect after natural gas deregulation. The LCES study implies
that investors will be very myopic in their decisions to invest in
cogeneration,even though the life of this equipment is very long.
What if potential cogeneration investors had not had as myopic a view
of the price of natural gas and expected to face the marginal cost of
natural gas by 1985? In the second and third sections of Table 3 are
represented some of the LCES cost assumptions adjusted to take into
account different possible prices for natural gas. In the second section
we add an additional $O0.75/MMBtu to the cost of gas to bring it up to the
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Table 3
Technology Costs
Steam Service
$/MMB t u
LCES Cost Assumptions
From Table II 2.5
Technology
Steam
Gas Turbine
New Coal
Machine Drive
Coal topping
Purchased
Electricity
Steam
Gas turbine
Steam
Gas tur!bine
New Coal
Machine Drive
Coal topping
Capital + O&M
Mean Min
3.2 2.1
3.4 2.7
7.9 4.2
0.27 0.15
Fuel
Mean Min
-.4 1.2
1.25 .97
1.8 1.4
7.6 1.5
Total
Mean Min
2.8 3.3
4.7 3.6
9.7 5.6
7.87 2.8
ISTUM Price Assumptions
3.2 3.6
Deregulated Case Cost Assumptions
3.2
3.4
7.9
2.26
3.06
3.6
5.46
6.46
10.7
Corrected Coal Costs with Deregulated Fuel
Steam
New Coal
Machine Drive
Coal Topping
1.82 -
2.761
3.06
3.6
4.88
6.36
1 From page 11-98, Vol. 1 of ISTUM reported, corrected for different
interest rates and for inflation.
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ISTUM case. In that scenario the difference between the cost of steam
from a gas turbine and the cost of steam from a coal boiler is reduced
from $1.9/MMBtu to $1.1/MMBtu.
For a "deregulation" scenario all prices are set on the basis of the
cost of oil in 1980 when residual oil was priced at an average of
$4.27/MMBtu. Coal is assumed to have a long-run price of one half of the
price of residual oil. (It was actually about one third the price of oil
in 1980, but the one half proportion is closer to the historic
situation.) Natural gas is priced at 85 percent of oil. Under this set
of assumptions the cost of new coal steam is $1.00/MMBtu above that of
gas-turbine steam.
With these fuel cost adjustments the coal technology still costs more
than the gas turbine technology but the reduction in the differences
between the mean prices could well have resulted in some coal being used
to generate both steam and electricity. However, a further adjustment
must be made to the LCES cost assumptions. The assumptions of investment
costs for coal systems are too high. The discrepancy between the LCES
assumptions and currently listed prices is discussed below, under
"Capital Cost Issues." Corrected coal cost estimates are listed in the
last section of Table 3. The additional adjustment to capital costs
results in the cost of coal being below that of the gas turbine in
providing steam.
The annual holding cost of capital utilized in the LCES study is also
too low. The LCES formulation for estimating the annual cost of capital
includes no consideration of taxes and assumes a discount rate of 5
percent. Even if the discount rate were acceptable, the inclusion of
taxes would almost double the cost of holding capital. Since gas
---~ YYYYII.YY
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turbines have a higher capital cost than coal boilers, this correction
would make gas-turbines even less attractive for the production of steam.
With fuel and capital costs adjusted to be more realistic, the LCES
results would have shown far greater production of steam from coal
boilers. The biased input assumptions combined with the ISTUM
methodology result in the gas turbine technology capturing most of the
steam market. With less gas-turbine steam production, far more of-the
machine drive demand would have remained to be competed for by
coal-topping cogeneration and by purchases. Furthermore, coal-topping
would not have captured as high a percentage of electricity demand. With
the cost assumptions of the last row of Table 3 coal would have captured
a substantial portion of this market. The appendix and the capital cost
section contain discussions of the reliability of these cost estimates.
Electricity Prices and Utility Operations
The electricity prices used are about the same as the average U.S.
industrial price in 1978. A valid objection to the use of these prices
lies in considering the relative costs of capital to the utility and the
potential cogenerator. Utilities clearly expect a higher rate of return
than the 5 percent real rate enjoyed by the LCES investors and pay some
taxes that are not accounted for in the LCES study. A more reasonable
(i.e. higher) cost of capital faced by cogenerators would reduce the
amount of cogeneration in the LCES study. On the other hand, the average
industrial rate charged for electricity is based on the historic book
value of the utilities' capital stock. A socially optimal level of
cogeneration can only be found if the price of electricity is based on
the costs of new capital to utilities. In most cases this would result
_ IM._
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in a higher price of electricity and, therefore, increased cogeneration.
Any study that purports to estimate the socially optimum mix of energy
technologies should do so on the basis of the marginal costs of all
energy, including the marginal cost of electricity.
Furthermore, the estimate of the marginal cost of electricity should
take into account the large amounts of cogeneration that are being
projected. There are two primary concerns of having large amounts of
generation connected to the utility grid but not under the control of the
utility; the reliability of the dispersed systems and the effect on these
systems on operating costs.
Figure 2 outlines a simplified flow structure for modeling these
effects. A utility's hour-by-hour demand for electricity is collapsed
into a cumulative distribution of demand (referred to as a Load Duration
Curve) which is then fed into a production costing model. The minimum
cost of meeting the demand for electricity is estimated taking full
account of the reliability of each unit owned by the utility. The
overall reliability of the system is also measured. The operating costs
are passed on to a rate-setting model which utilizes infomnnation on the
investment history of the utility to estimate regulated rates and also
calculates rates based upon the long-run marginal costs of the
utility.2 Both sets of rates should be used to compute the level of
cogeneration; one in response to current regulatory practice, the other
in response to socially optimal prices.
The amount of investment in cogeneration should provide a time
profile of the production of cogenerated electricity which can be
2 Both sets of rates include prices of electricity both for sale and
for purchase by the utility.
Figure 2
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subtracted from the original load duration curve. The new load-duration
curve is then run through the production costing and reliability model
and the rate-setting model. Depending upon the effects of cogeneration
on net load, the operating costs of meeting the new demand will be less
than, equal to, or greater than during the first iteration. A revised
set of rates is then estimated to pass on to the cogeneration investment
model, revised levels of cogeneration investment are calculated, and a
new load duration curve is fed back into the system.
No work has been done to examine the effects of large amounts of
cogeneration on the operating and capital costs of a utility. Work
reported in Cox (1981), Tabors, et al. (1981) and Finger (1981) on the
effect of large amounts of photovoltaic producers connected to the
utility grid indicate that, for this technology, the operating costs of
the utility are reduced. As more and more electricity is fed into the
grid the utility shuts down some of its most inefficient plants. With
increased penetration of these dispersed generating systems cheaper and
cheaper electricity is displaced. Thus additional dispersed units
provide lower benefits.
The strong correlation between peak demand and maximum photovoltaic
output (which may also exist between peak demand and maximum
cogeneration), allows the utility to reduce its capital requirements and
maintain its reliability requirements. On the other hand, Lee and
Yamayee (1980) predict increases in spinning reserve requirements with
levels of photovoltaic penetration greater than 6 percent of a utility's
peak demand.
Either increasing or decreasing costs to the utility through large
penetrations of decentralized generation will result in a reduced value
IYIYII
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for cogeneration. Reduced total utility costs due to production savings
will be passed on as lower rates to customers reducing cogeneration
benefits. Increased costs (e.g., for spinning reserve) due to
cogeneration alone will be assessed against cogenerators and will also
result in lowered profitability.
On page 36 of the summary LCES report, gas turbine cogeneration is
shown to save 1.6 percent of the 1978 U.S. energy consumption. This
result can be approximately replicated from the information provided in
the LCES technical report 3 . It is important to note, however, that the
LCES authors are implying a substitution away from oil, coal, nuclear,
hydro and some natural gas-fired utility generators. The savings are
thus not necessarily in oil and natural gas.
Problems with the the relative prices of electricity and natural gas
account for a large part of the surprising results of the LCES study.
However, the estimation of relative capital costs also has an impact on
both the choice to cogenerate and the choice of technology with which to
cogenerate.
Capital Cost Issues
The investment costs quoted in the ISTUM reports seem to be fairly
consistent with costs published elsewhere. A standard design for a 108
MW gas-turbine combined cycle system, according to Pickel (1978), costs
$455/kW. ISTUM uses a mean price of $444/kW (Vol 1, p. 11-99). Cox and
34.18 Quads of steam generated times .4562 of this steam coming
from gas turbines times .82 Quads of electricity per Quad of steam
produced by gas turbines divided by 79 Quads of energy consumed in the
U.S. gives .0198. To save 1.6 percent indicates that for every Quad
burned to produce electricity by cogeneration a utility would have to
burn 2.2 Quads.
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Helliwell (1978) report an average capital cost of electricity production
of l.0/kWh (1978 Cdn. $) for cogeneration from wood-fired topping system
in British Columbia whereas the ISTUM document reports a capital cost of
.78/kWh (1978 US $) for coal-fired cogeneration. The LCES study seems
to have retained the same investment costs as those found in ISTUM for
the gas turbine systems. For instance, the ISTUMt report states a total
cost for gas turbines as $11.16/MMBtu, which, after subtracting fuel
costs gives $5.41/MMBtu. After correcting for changes in the fixed
charge rate used in the LCES study, the ISTUM result transforms to
$3.79/MMBtu. The equivalent capital cost quoted in the LCES study is
about $4.5/MMBtu. (This interpolates between two capacity factors
presented in the LCES study.)
There is one glaring inconsistency between the capital cost estimates
of the LCES study and the ISTU14 study; the capital costs of
coal-topping. An estimate of the mean cost of capital for this
technology in the ISTUM study (p. II-98 of Vol. I of Department of Energy
(1979)) is one half that found in LCES study. An overestimation of coal
capital costs was also found in the steam demand sector. Pickel (1978)
reports (on p. 217) that the cost of a typical field-erected coal boiler
is .0315 $/Btu/hr. For a 300 thousand pound boiler this coverts to about
$10.4 million (1975 $), which would be about $12.94 million in 1978
current year dollars. Assuming a load factor of .457, this gives an
annual cost of $879,160. The operating and maintenance costs for this
system with the same load factor would be $792,000. This becomes
$990,000 in 1978 dollars. Dividing capital, operating and maintenance
4 This conversion is made using the Handy-Whitman index of electric
utility costs. See Whitman, Requardt and Assoc. (1980).
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costs by the expected annual heat production gives $1.416/MMBtu. The
LCES study uses a value of $2.996/MMBtu for the same sized boiler,
utilized at the same 46 percent rate. Thus we find that coal consumption
is understated partly because the LCES workers utilize a cost that is
twice as high as that found in other reports.
There are, in addition, two issues in the estimation of capital costs
that neither ISTUM nor the LCES study take into account. These issues
are better addressed by studies that examine individual plants instead of
whole industries. Pickel (forthcoming) shows that past predictions of
cogeneration based on aggregate studies have overestimated the levels of
cogeneration. This is partly due to important details being excluded,
details that must be dealt with by surveying plants separately. Pickel
(forthcoming) and Helliwell and Cox (1978) show the advantages of this
approach.
The first of these capital cost considerations has to do with
economic retirement of older plants. ISTUM assumes that the rate of
retirement in the past will continue into the future. This is hardly a
reasonable assumption for energy generating and consuming equipment. As
an example, consider a plant with several boilers, and with annual
production expected to remain constant. Each time there is an increase
in energy prices a plant manager examines the stock of boilers, with a
view of replacing that equipment. If the present value of savings due to
the installation of a new, more efficient boiler is greater than the cost
of installing that boiler, then a new boiler should be purchased. Thus
the rate of replacement is a function of the rate of change of the
relative costs of energy and capital. If energy prices increase on a
sustained basis more rapidly than they have in the past, then replacement
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rates will be greater. As the ISTUI4 documentation states, these factors
are not taken into account (Vol. 1, p. IV-103). The data upon which the
retirement rates are based are ten five year periods from 1926-1975.
Thus, the data on retirement rates are based on a period of decreasing
real costs of energy, except for the last 5-year observation.5
Premature retirements will impose additional costs on a firm. The
writing-off of large amounts of undepreciated capital, while having no
economic consequences, will have an impact on the fins ability to raise
the capital necessary to make the economically efficient investment.
But the zero economic cost of discarding undepreciated capital is not
entirely a correct assumption to hold for cogeneration ihvestments.
Imagine a potential investor in cogeneration who has a boiler which
currently has 10 years of economic service remaining. An estimate of the
net benefits of adding cogeneration equipment to the current boiler
indicates that the project would result in losses. A possible
alternative is to scrap the boiler for one designed to provide more
electricity per pound of steam or to invest in a gas-turbine system. In
this case, the cost of cogenerating electricity must include the value of
the discarded boiler in order to cogenerate electricity. Thus, the
prospect of producing electricity may result in early retirement of
capital, but the costs of such a retirement would tend to push the
retirement date back towards the date that it would have been retired had
there been no increase in electricity prices. These scrapping costs are
not taken into account in the ISTUM4 cost distributions. They probably
5 However, instantaneous and unexpected changes in the price of
energy, spaced with intervals of real price declines will have no effect
on survivorship rates. There will be rapid adjustments in the capital
stock with retirements proceeding at their previous rate.
ammggiglglmilgglhlI 1 Il ,1.1 l1ll i, i  WhI II II 1111 il l l umull l l l Ul m ll lM n llN
C-24
cannot be measured in an aggregate model of this sort, again pointing to
the preference to individual plant modeling.
The ISTUI4 methodology measures capital costs as a function of the
projected capacity factors of the equipment used. However the average
costs of energy from a new system may not be the same as the marginal
cost of producing energy from the total energy producing plant (i.e.,
with both old and new capital). With indivisibilities of capital and
economies of scale matched against continuous increases in steam demand,
a firm will purchase equipment in such a way that some of its capital
will be redundant. Thus, some investments that may seem attractive on
the basis of the average cost of energy with a fixed capacity factor will
not be so when the marginal cost of energy production is used as the
investment criteria.
In addition to the problems of indivisibilities it is important to
consider the complexities of the cogeneration investment that are
outlined in the appendix. Firms faced with base load demand for steam
plus a highly oscillating demand above that base will not purchase a
cogeneration system to capture all of that peak, but may utilize an array
of technologies that will efficiently utilize the varying demand for
steam. The perspective of the individual investor is much different from
that implied by a model that optimizes upon a national steam demand. The
smaller systems that such considerations would lead to will also
significantly reduce efficiencies, particularly for gas turbines.
Conclusions
The results of the teast-Cost study indicate levels of cogeneration
far greater than those predicted elsewhere. The LCES study also
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indicates that all industrially cogenerated electricity should ideally
come from gas turbine systems. The penetration of cogeneration is much
greater than even that found in the report of early results from ISTUM,
the model upon which the Least-Cost report is based.
There are four major weaknesses of the LCES study. The first of
these is the unrealistically low price of natural gas which fuels the gas
turbine technology. Secondly, this low price results in gas turbines
capturing a large share of the demand for steam, an outcome of the ISTUM
methodology which was found to be inconsistent in the way it treated
different technologies. The large amounts of cogeneration that the LCES
study predicts arise from this bias towards gas turbines because this
technology produces about four times as much electricity per pound of
steam than topping systems.
Thirdly, the large penetrations of cogeneration have profound
implications on electric utilities' costs of production. These issues
are not addressed anywhere in the Least Cost study.
Finally, capital costs of technologies were often incorrect.
The cogeneration submodel suffers from the problem of trying to model
very complex individual investments in an aggregated manner.
Considerations raised in this paper and in the appendix indicate that
such an effort is likely to miss key considerations that must be taken
into account and that will vary from plant to plant.
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Appendix C.1
Brief Review of Cogeneration
Figure Al provides a diagramatic representation of the three
technologies discussed in this paper and which are described below. The
Least-Cost study also includes a fourth technology for on-site generation
of electricity, a gas-turbine combined with an organic rankine cycle.
This technology produces electricity only, and will not be discussed.
Steam-Topping Technologies
The standard method of producing steam for process requirements is to
combust fuel below a boiler in which steam is raised. In order to assure
a constant supply of steam, the boiler pressure is significantly greater
than that which is required at the process site. The steam can be passed
from the boiler through a pressure-reducing valve to the production site
where it is required at from 60 to 150 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.).
As heat is transferred to the production site the steam condenses and is
pumped back into the boiler.
Electricity can be jointly produced with steam by dropping the
steam pressure from boiler to process through a turbine attached to a
generator. The energy cost of producing this electricity is only the
energy loss in converting the stea into electricity in the turbine. At
a typical electric utility plant a considerable amount of energy is lost
to the environment in order to condense tilhe steam after it leaves the
last turbine. With a cogenerating system the heat loss in condensing is
actually recovered in the production site. What otherwise would have
been a heat loss can be thought of as being written off as a cost of
producing the plant's non-electric output.
Steam turbine STEAM TURBINE COGENERATION
r Electric power
cGeinrat-i I E,
Feedwater
Fuel Stack
Waste
heat
boiler
GAS TURBINE COGENERATION
Gas turbine
Process steam
Feed water
) Electric power
Stack
DIESEL COGENERATION
Air
Fuel
Diesel engine
Process steam
Feedwater
Electric power
Generator
Figure A-i Schematic of Cogeneration Technologies
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The amount of electricity that can be produced by cogenerating is
limited by the demand for steam and by the temperature and pressure drop
across the turbine. (See equation 1.) For a given steam flow,
therefore, the amount of electricity cogenerated at a particular site can
be increased by building a boiler of greater pressure and temperature.
Figure A2 shows a transform from steam demand to electricity
cogeneration potential. (Equation 1 is the exact formula for the
transform.) Figure A2a represents a hypothetical steam demand for a
plant over one year. This demand shows seasonal fluctuations but assumes
the hour-to-hour demand to be constant.
Figure A2b represents the same steam demand of the plant as a
cumulative distribution. It expresses the probability that any level of
steam demand, in thousands of pounds per hour, will be experienced by the
plant at any point in time. Figure A2c is the cumulative distribution of
possible cogenerated electricity production that arises from the steam
demand of Figure A2a, assuming the same set of boiler and process
pressures and also assuming the installed capability to harness all the
cogeneration potential. This capability includes, as we see later, the
existence of excess capacity in the boiler.
Thus, at an installed cogenerating capacity X* kW, the plant will be
able to fully utilize the turbo-generator 50 percent of the time and will
be able to produce, per year, a number of kilowatt hours equal to the
area under the curve below X*AB times 8760, the number of hours per year
(see Figure A2c).
The components of the capital costs of cogenerdting by steam-topping
vary with the exact configuration of the system. One possible design
would size the boiler(s) to be just large enough to provide the maximum
steam demand
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-0
0.
cr C"
cogeneration potential
kW 
6Z-3
SW
CD
r
C-30
steam necessary for all non-electricity production. Since some heat
energy is converted to electricity, this heat must be made up with
additional steam from the boiler over that required for non-electrical
production. If the boiler is just large enough to provide peak process
steam demand then no energy will be available for electricity production
during periods of peak process requirements.
Figure A3 shows the derivation of the cumulative distribution
function of cogeneration capability for such a system. In Figure A3a we
again show a seasonally fluctuating demand for process steam. The shaded
area indicates the amount of steam available for cogenerating
electricity, with the maximum steam available for cogeneration, H',
occuring during some summer hour. Figure A3b shows the cumulative
distribution function for process steam demand. Figure A3c is the
cumulative distribution for electricity that can be generated from the
steam available in the shaded area.
The depiction in Figure A3 implies that there is enough turbine
capacity to convert all excess steam to electricity by cogeneration. If
this is not the case then excess steam is used for cogeneration until the
maximum amount of electricity production is attained. At that point
total steam demand continues to go down at about tile same rate as process
steam demand.
This situation is depicted in Figure A4. The result of this
situation is a flat portion of the cumulative distribution function for
electricity generation. This sort of profile and distribution function
would result if the potential cogeneration investor wanted to improve the
utilization of the turbo-generator even though process steam demands
would allow higher amounts of cogenerated electricity.
I --;I-. --------- Ylliil
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If the plant designs that gave rise to Figures A3 or A4 were
employed, the additional capital cost of producing electricity would be
merely the cost of the turbo-generator alone since the boiler(s) would
have been necessary for process steam requirements. Tile total production
of electricity and, hence, average cost of capital per kilowatt-hour of
electricity would depend upon the number of hours that the boiler would
have spare capacity. The percentage utilization will also depend on
the size of the turbine generator. The larger the turbine, the fewer will
be the number of hours during which there will be enough spare boiler
capacity to use the turbo-generator to full capacity.
A profit-maximizing firm would probably find the design strategies
discussed above to be sub-optimal if they provide any profit at all.
Larger turbo-generators could be built and their utilization could be
increased by building a larger boiler and continuously feeding some steam
to the production site through the turbine. The degree of utilization
would depend upon the size of the boiler and of the turbine. These
systems relax the constraint of steam availability and are faced with
only the constraint of a sufficient heat sink at the production site for
cogeneration to take place.
Figure A5a shows, as a solid line, the process steam;i demand of Figure
A4a. The vertical distance between the solid line and the dashed line is
the additional steam necessary to make up the heat losses due to
cogeneration when all the cogeneration potential is utilized. The
vertical distance is greater during the winter due to the large potential
available at that time. Figure A5b translates the total steam production
into a cumulative distribution function for steam demand; Figure A5c
illustrates the transformation of steam demand to a cumulative
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distribution of cogeneration potential. The peak cogeneration potential
is greater than that depicted in Figure A4 because the steam producing
capability of the boiler has been removed as a constraint.
The utilization of both the turbo-generator and the boiler can be
improved by reducing the capacity of both. This is depicted in Figure A6.
For the situation in which only excess steam demand is used to
produce electricity the only capital cost of cogeneration.is just the
cost of the turbo-generator. With some steam always being made available
for cogeneration there is added a second component of the capital cost,
the cost of building a boiler of capacity greater than that required for
process requirements alone.
There is an additional incremental cost that can arise in
steam-topping cogeneration. As noted above, more electricity can be
produced per pound of steam by using a boiler of a higher pressure ari
temperature rating at some additional cost. Furthermore, the bofier ifllf
have to provide more steam to make up for the increased energy Toss fn
the additional electricity production. These supplementary costs can be
partially offset against the economies of scale captured v4th', the l arger
boiler and turbo-generator.
A final possibility is the inclusion of some condensing capability to
the electricity generation equipment. This will augment the production
heat sink when the production demand for steam is low. Figure A7 shows
steam demand profiles for such a system. The shaded area in Figure A7a
is the additional capacity that is available for condensing generation.
The area between the solid and dashed lines of Figure A7a is the steamr
utilized for cogeneration, that below the solid line steam for process
requirements. Figure A7c shows the electricity production profile for
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this system, with the shaded area being that due to condensing steam.
Generation of electricity through the use of a condenser would have a
higher fuel cost since no useful heat will be recovered outside the
turbine. However, this additional cost will be offset by the increased
utilization of the boiler and the turbo-generator. The investment with
the highest present value will depend upon the relative prices of capital
and energy. For a rigorous derivation of this trade-off, see Helliwell
and Margolick (1980).
Gas Turbine Combined Cycle
The gas turbine technology is depicted in Figure Alb. It utilizes
the expansion of gases released by combusting fuel to drive a turbine.
The gas exhausting from the turbine is then channelled through a
waste-heat boiler in which steam is raised. This steam can be delivered
to the process site through a topping turbine (not shown in the diagram)
or a pressure reducing valve. Again, flexibility in the ratio of
electricity to steam production can be maintained through the use of
condensors.
The possible steam demand profiles and cumulative distribution
profiles are portrayed in Figure A8a. Three profiles are shown. The
lower solid line is the demand for process steam. That steam is provided
from the exhaust gases which first produces the electricity. The dashed
line indicates the additional steam demand for electricity production by
steam topping cogeneration. The topping generation strategy implied by
this steam demand profile is one in which the topping turbine is utilized
at full capacity at all times. Additional capital costs to provide this
steam would be a larger combustor and a larger gas turbine. The higher
steam demand
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solid line is a possible profile to provide added steam to be put through
a condenser. Again, the advantage of being able to run steam through a
condensor would be increased utilization of both the gas turbo-generator
and the steam-topping turbo-generator.
The electricity generation load duration curve is found in Figure
8b. The lower solid line is, of course, the electricity production from
the gas turbine. The height between the lower solid line and the dotted
line represents the additional capacity generation that results from
adding a topping turbine. There are two components to this additional
power, the first being that which arises from the topping turbine. The
second component arises from the extra steam that will be required to
make up for heat lost in the topping turbine. That heat will have to be
raised in the fuel combustor, the gases from which will be passed through
a gas turbine larger than the one indicated by the lower solid line. A
large waste-heat recovery boiler would also be required.
A cogenerating strategy does not have to include full use of the
topping turbines. The gas turbine and waste-heat recovery boiler could
be sized just large enough to meet peak process steam requirements with
the topping turbine only large enough to generate electricity from excess
steam. (This is a strategy similar to that described for the situation
in Figure A4.)
The capital costs of these gas turbine cogeneration options are
slightly more complicated to assess forthe joint products than the simple
topping cycle. The smallest system possible results in an investment in
a gas turbine and a waste heat recovery boiler. An additional investment
can be made in a steam topping turbine up to a size large enough to
utilize excess process steam requirements. Topping capacity larger than
IIIMI ll hI I M
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that will require further investments in a larger gas turbine and a
larger waste heat recovery boiler. The thermal efficiency of the
gas-turbine-boiler system can be improved with a balancing condensor to
dampen any remaining fluctuations in the steam requirements.
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Appendix D
An Analysis of 'Least-Cost' Methodology
by
Michael Manove
Minimizing energy costs seems, on a superficial level, to be a
worthwhile objective of energy policy. It has more appeal than various
all-or-nothing alternatives such as a strategy of energy self-
sufficiency. The Carnegie-Mellon Energy Productivity Center (EPC)
describes the least-cost idea with great enthusiasm:
The nation has been on an unproductive course; it has looked at
energy as a diminishing domestic commodity instead of a service which
could be provided by many competing sources. We have been developing
a least-cost strategy which, we believe, could unleash new
competiitivforces, multiply consumer choices, force down the real
cost of energy services over the long run, cut the demand for energy
supplies, and make a substantial contribution to the nation's
economic health. [Emphasis added.]
Unfortunately, as a bit of thought will reveal, the least-cost-
energy strategy is generally not optimal; nor is it easily defined. In
this Appendix, I will examine least-cost methodology with regard to its-
limitations and its use within these limitations.
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1. Is the "Least-Cost Energy Strategy" the Best Strategy?
Least-cost energy strategies are generally not the best strategies,
for two different reasons. First, benefits are not explicitly considered
in the selection of least-cost energy strategies; only costs are
recognized. Second, it may not be reasonable to minimize energy costs
alone, for energy costs are often linked to other costs of production. I
will discuss the first of these problems here.
When a consumer goes to the store to buy an item, he often does not
pursue a least-cost strategy. Taken literally, the least-cost strategy
would require the consumer to buy the cheapest brand. But a consumer is
not interested in cost alone; rather, he is interested in net benefits,
the surplus of bentfits over cost. Therefore, consumers are willing to
buy expensive brands provided that the added cost is justified by the
increased quality of the product.
The concept of a least-cost strategy is meaningful only when some
details concerning the output (or benefits) produced by that strategy
have been specified in advance. "Least-cost for what?" we must ask. If
desired benefits can be specified in advance, then the search for the
least-cost strategy is a useful one. In most situations, however,
consumers are as free to determine the level of benefits as they are to
determine cost. In such cases, the benefits and costs of each
alternative strategy must be evaluated simultaneously.
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Consider, for example, a consumer who is shopping for an automobile.
The consumer is free to make his/her decision on the basis of fuel
efficiency, but is also free ;o decide on the size of the car and amount
of driving. The values that a rational consumer assigns to each of these
variables are interrelated and all will depend on the price of gasoline.
Normally, it would not be rational for a consumer to take the amount of
his driving and the size of his car as fixed and to consider the price of
gasoline only in choosing the appropriate level of fuel efficiency. Yet
the design of a least-cost study postulates exactly that: the quantity of
energy services to be produced and the productive capacity of the
equipment are both specified exogenously; only the efficiency of
energy-service production can be varied.
The least-cost strategy identified in this way can markedly deviate
from the optimal (net-benefit-maximizing) strategy. In order to obtain a
quantitative measure of the nature and degree of this deviation, I shall
employ several elementary analytical models of the production of energy
services. The models I use here were inspired by the more complex and
general models presented by McFadden [2.
1.1 General Setting
The general setting for all of the models presented here is the
same. Some energy service (space-heating, cooling, industrial steam,
transportation) is to be produced by some sort of equipment (furnace,
boiler, air conditioner, automobile) that uses some form of energy input
or fuel. Each strategy of energy-service production is described by
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three variables: the level of energy-service output, the productive
capacity of the equipment and the energy efficiency of the equipment.
These three variables imply values for two other important variables:
the capacity utilization rate and total use of energy inputs or fuel.
The models differ from one another in their designation of which of these
variables are fixed in advance, and which may be set by the consumer or
pol icymaker.
Our first model will represent the selection of the least-cost energy
strategy: the least-cost level of energy efficiency is chosen for a given
output of energy services and equipment capacity. The second model will
represent the selection of the maximum-net-benefits strategy when both
the level of energy services and the energy efficiency of the equipment
can be varied. The third model represents the selection of the
maximum-net-benefits strategy when energy services, equipment capacity
and equipment efficiency can all vary, but where the capacity utilization
rate is fixed. Finally, we shall construct a model of the selection of
the maximum-net-benefits strategy when energy service, equipment capacity
and equipment efficiency can all be varied independently of one another.
The properties of the strategy selected by our representation of the
least-cost model will be compared with those of strategies selected as
optimal by our three net-benefits maximizing models. In this way, we
shall reach some conclusions about the type and degree of distortion
inherent in the least-cost model output because of its restrictive
assumptions.
It is important for the reader to keep in mind that all models
contain simplifying assumptions and that their outputs necessarily
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deviate from reality. These simplifications cannot and ought not be
avoided if the model is to have significant explanatory and predictive
value. In fact, most policy model failures occur because of models that
are cluttered with complex, poorly represented and poorly understood
detailed depictions of the real world. Many models would be greatly
improved if they were cast at a simpler, more highly abstract level.
Thus, we are not objecting to the fact that a least-cost study contains
simplifying assumptions; rather, we are asking when the particular
simplifications made are the appropriate ones for the purposes to which
the study is to be applied.
1.2 Our Modelling Framework
The fundamental policy variables of our models are the level of
energy services, X, the capacity of the service-producing equipment, K,
and the equipment energy/service ratio (ESR), denoted by H. The variable
H is defined by the identity
(1) H = E/X
where E is the total quantity of energy used as an input to the
productive process. Thus the reciprocal of H is a measure of energy
efficiency.
The capacity utilization rate, U, is defined by the identity
(2) U = X/K
Wilk-' -'- ' - - ' -~-- -- - '-
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When cost is the same, consumers prefer lower utilization rates to higher
ones, because lower rates afford the consumer more flexibility in the
production of energy services.
In all of our models, equipment costs will be assumed proportional to
equipment capacity. This is because we are trying to depict the
production of energy services in the aggregate. Equipment capacity is
visualized as being determined by the number of units of equipment
available rather than by the size of each unit. The cost per unit of
equipment is denoted by the function C(H). We assume that lower ESR
values (greater efficiency) are more costly to achieve than higher ESR
values (lesser efficiency), and that there is increasing marginal cost of
increasing efficiency. Thus C'<O and C">O.
The price of energy inputs or fuel is denoted by P. In the models
below, we shall examine how the value of P effects the optimal value of
the other variables.
1.3 The Least-Cost Strategy of Producing Energy Services
Let the output of energy services, X, be fixed and, for simplicity,
assume that the equipment capacity, K, is fixed at K = 1. Then, total
cost of producing energy services is given by
(3) T = C(H) + PXH
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Note that HX is the quantity of fuel consumed in the production process,
so that PHX is the total cost of fuel consumed. The cost-minimizing
strategy is determined by the energy/service ratio, H, that minimizes T.
This first-order condition for the optimal value of H is given by
(4) -C'(H) = P
Suppose, now that C(H) is defined by
(5) C(H) = c + mH-"
for v > 1. The parameter co represents the base price of a unit of
capacity, and the parameter p represents the elasticity of additional
equipment cost with respect to energy efficiency.
Differentiating (5), we have
(6) C'(H) = -mvH - v- 1
Subtituting (6) into (4) yields
(7) log(mp/X) - (p+l)h = p
where h and p are the respective logarithms of H and P. By
differentiating (7) with respect to p and solving for h' we obtain
1(8) h' 1 + 4
Note that h' is the elasticity of the least-cost H with respect to
the price of fuel, P. Thus -h' is the elasticity of energy efficiency of
I MMM WAWMMIM
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the least-cost production strategy with respect to the price of fuel.
If, for example, v = 1, then a doubling of the price of fuel will cause
the energy efficiency of the least-cost strategy to increase by about 40
percent. We will show that this figure substantially exceeds the
analogous figures obtained from some of the maximum-net-benefits models.
1.4 The Production of Energy Services with Fixed Capacity
In this model, we shall assume K is exogenously specified at K = 1,
and allow both X and H to vary. As an example, think of a consumer that
must have a two-ton truck in order to haul large fixtures. The consumer
can select the efficiency of his truck and can determine the extent of
its use. The consumer derives benefits (revenue) from the services
provided by the truck, but must pay both capital costs and mileage costs.
Let B(X) denote the benefits to the consumer of the level of service
X. We assume decreasing marginal benefits, i.e. B'>O and B"<0. The net
benefits associated with any values of X and H is the difference between
the benefits of the energy service and its costs. This is given by the
function i(X,H) where
(9) w(X,H) = B(X) - C(H) - PHX
The maximum-net-benefits strategy is given by the solution of the
following problem:
max 7(X,H)
X,H
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The first-order conditions for the maximum-net-benefits strategy are
given by (4), repeated here,
(4) -C'(H) _ p
and by
(10) B'(X)
A second-order condition sufficient to guarantee that the solutions of
(4) and (10) describe a maximum-net-benefits strategy is given by
(11) -B"(X)C"(H) > P2
We now find the solutions of (4) and (10) for particular
specifications of benefits and cost functions. Let B(X) be defined by
(12) B(X) =- X( )/
for a > 0, a / 1. This benefits function was chosen because it implies a
demand function for X with a constant own-price elasticity of -a.
Let C(H) be given by (5), as before.
Differentiating (12), we have
(13) B'(X) = bX- 1 / a
Let x, h and p denote log X, log H and log P, respectively. Substituting
(6) and (13) into (4) and (10) and taking logarithms yields the
-
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logarithmic form of the first-order conditions for the
maximum-net-benefits strategy:
(14) log(b) -1x - h = p
and
(15) log(mv) - (p+l)h - x = p
Equation (15) is equivalent to (7), but in (15) X is not a constant. The
second-order condition (11) will hold if and only if
(16) 1 + - a > 0
Therefore, a maximum-net-benefits strategy will exist at positive values
of X and H if and only if (16) is true.
Equations (14) and (15) implicitly define x and h as functions of p.
Differentiating (14) and (15) with respect to p and solving for x' and
h', we have
(17) x' = - a
and
(18) h' =  1 - a
The logarithmic derivatives x' and h' are the elasticities of X and H
with respect to P, the price of energy inputs. Because the demand for
energy is given by E = XH the own-price elasticity of the demand for
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energy is given by e' = x'+h', so that
(19) e' = - + ai- a +
Condition (16) implies that both x' and e' will be negative. But, we can
see from (18) that h' will be positive if a > 1. Thus, as Khazzoom[1]
and McFadden [2] observe, it may be desirable for consumers to decrease
the efficiency of their equipment when the price of onergy rises' In our
model, this somewhat surprising behavior will occur w\henever consumer
demand for energy services is price-elastic. The intuitive reason for
this phenomenon is easy to understand. A consumer with an elastic demand
for energy services responds to an increase in energy price with a very
large decrease in the use of his equipment. Therefore, he no longer
needs to have equipment that is as energy efficient. Of course, his
total energy use will still decline.
By comparing (18) to (8), we can estimate the overstatement of
optimal equipment efficiency associated with least-cost analysis when
demand for services can vary. If the true price-elasticity of demand for
energy services is zero, then (18) becomes the same as (8) so that cost
minimization will identify the appropriate energy strategy. But if the
price-elasticity of the demand for energy services is non-zero, cost
minimization yields an exaggerated result. Recall that for v = 1 cost
minimization (8) yields h' = -.5, so that optimal efficiency increases
by about 40 percent when the price of energy inputs doubles. But if the
elasticity of demand for energy services is .5, then the
maximum-net-benefits strategy described by (18) calls for an efficiency
-^I'--IIIIYIYIY
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increase of only 29 percent. And if the elasticity of demand is unitary,
then the maximum-net-benefits strategy calls for no change in efficiency
of energy-service-producing equipment, only a reduction in the quantity
of services consumed. Because the demand for energy service is certainly
sensitive to the price of that service, we are confident that in cases
where equipment capacity is fixed, least-cost strategies will reflect a
significant bias toward increased efficiency of energy-using equipment.
1.5 The Production of Energy Services with Fixed Capacity Utilization
In the previous section, the stock of equipment was assumed to be
constant, and the production of energy services was varied by varying the
utilization rate of that constant stock. In this section we fix the
capacity-utilization rate, and allow the capacity of the equipment to
vary. When capacity utilization is fixed, the ratio of equipment
capacity to the output of energy services must be constant.
As before, we let B(X) represent the benefits of X inits of energy
services and C(H) represent the cost per unit of capacity of equipment
with an energy/service ratio of H. The net-benefits function is given by
(20) w(X,H) = B(X) - C(H)K - PHX
Using (2), we can rewrite (20) for the case of fixed capacity utilization
as follows:
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1(21) I(X,H) = B(X) - UC(H)X - PHX
where U is the constant capacity-utilization rate. The first-order
conditions for the maximization of (21) are given by
1(22) B'(X) = -C(H) - PHU
and
(23) C'(H)X = UPX
If X is positive, (23) reduces to
(24) C'(H) = UP
Let us now specify the function C(H) by equation (5), so that C'(H) is
given by (6). Substituting (6) into (24) and taking the logarithm of
each term in the resulting equation, we get
(25) log(mv/U) - (p+l)h = p
where h and p are the logarithms of H and P, respectively.
Differentiating (22) with respect to p and solving for h' yields
1(26) h' = - 1
- TP~
But (26) is identical to (8). This means that if the
--- ~ ^ IIIIIIIII l 6111111ii
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capacity-utilization rate is fixed, as we have assumed for this model,
the least-cost strategy is a good approximation for the
maximum-net-benefits strategy with regard to the energy-efficiency of
equipment. This is true even if the demand for energy services is price
elastic. Of course, because least-cost analysis contains no counterpart
of equation (22), it cannot tell us anything about the output of energy
services.
1.6 The Production of Energy Services with Variable Capacity Utilization
In this section, we allow both productive capacity (for producing
energy services) and capacity utilization to vary. In other words, the
level of the production of energy services and the capacity to produce
those services can vary independently. It is important to understand
that the presence of productive capacity creates benefits even when it is
not being used. This is because excess capacity allows increased
flexibility in the rate that services are created. Because of the need
for flexibility, people are often willing to pay for capacity in excess
of minimum production requirements. Therefore, in this section, we will
consider the benefits of energy services to be an increasing function
both of the level of services and the amount of capacity available to
produce those services. Benefits will be denoted by B(X,K). This will
make our model a bit more complicated than the previous models in which
benefits were functions only of the level of services, X.
In this model, net benefits are given by
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(27) ir(X,K,H) = B(X,K) - C(H)K - PHX
First-order conditions for maximizing w are given by
(28) B= PH
aXB
(29) aB = C(H)
ar
and
(30) -C'(H)K = PX
In order to present one e>ample of how X, K and H might depend on the
price of energy, P, we will specify the following form for B(X,K):
(31) B(X,K) = bX'YK Y,B > 0, Y,8 < 1
This particular functional fbrm (Cobb-Douglas) is a plausible, but by no
means general, benefits function. The value y+o is the elasticity of
benefits with respect the the level of energy services when the capacity-
utilization rate is held constant.
We specify the cost-of-efficiency function, C(H), by (5), as before.
Differentiating (31) and (5), substituting the results into (28), (29)
and (30) and taking logarithms yields
log(by) + (y-l)x + sk - h
log(bs/m) + yx + (s-1)k
log(m) - x + k - (i+l)h
= p
- log(C(H)) = 0
p
(32)
(33)
(34)
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Differentiating these equations with resect to p yields the equations:
(35) (y-1)x' + sk' - h' = 1
(36) yX' + (s-1)k' + PSh' = 0
(37) -x' + k' - (p+l)h' = 1
where S is the ratio of efficiency costs to total capacity costs given by
(38) S mH'
c + mH-
These equations can be solved for x', k' and h', the elasticities of X, K
and H with respect to P. The solutions are:
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(39) x' = -X 1 - (+s)
(40) k' = - S"- (Y+B)
and
(41) h' = 0
Equation (41) implies that for the Cobb-Douglas benefits function, the
optimal energy efficiency of productive equipment is independent of the
price of energy. How can this be so From (2) we know that u', the
elasticity of the utilization rate with respect to the price of energy,
is given by u' = x' - k', so that by (39) and (40), u' = -1. Thus, as
the price of energy increases, productive equipment is used less
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intensively. Although increased energy prices tends to increase optimal
efficiency, the accompanying reduction in utilization rate negates that
optimal-efficiency increase.
Suppose, for example, that y = -1/4 and s = 3/4. From (39) and
(40), we have x' = -1/2 and k' = 1/2. Therefore,.if fuel prices double,
the demand for energy services will fall by about 30 percent. The
capacity of the equipment, however, will increase by about 40 percent.
This increase comes about because consumers find equipment has become
less expensive as compared with the cost of energy services. Thus, for
example, after an increase in the price of gasoline, consumers may choose
to own more cars on the average, even if they decrease their total
mileage. Each car would be used significantly less, so that consumer
willingness to pay for increased fuel efficiency would be less than it
otherwise might be.
This model brings out a very important aspect of the production of
energy services. Increases in energy prices tend to decrease optimal
equipment utilization, and decreased utilization decreases optimal
efficiency. Thus, optimal efficiency is bound to be less than would be
indicated by least-cost analysis, in which productive capacity and the
rate of capacity utilization are both held fixed. The distortion
associated with least-cost analysis might be less (or more) dramatic than
the distortion that appears with the Cobb-Douglas benefits function, but
some distortion will be present. This type of distortion is independent
of the elasticity of demand for the energy service, and it will exist
even if that demand is perfectly inelastic.
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1.7 Conclusion
In Section 5, we suggested that least-cost analysis tends to be a
good approximation of maximum-net-benefits analysis whenever
capacity-utilization rates of service-producing equipment are fixed. But
while fixed capacity-utilization rates may be a realistic discription of
certain sectors of the economy, it is unreasonable to assume that
capacity utilization rates for the economy as a whole will remain
unchanged when energy prices are drastically increased.
We must conclude, therefore, that a least-cost energy strategy may
strongly overstate desired increases in efficiency. This can occur for
two different reasons. First, there are miny situations in which the
capacity of equipment must remain relatively fixed, despite changes in
the price of fuel. If, in such cases, the demand for energy services is
price sensitive, then increased fuel prices will cause capacity-
utilization rates to fall and least-cost analysis will overstate optimal
efficiency increases. This tendency was demonstrated in Section 1.3.
Second, when the level of productive capacity and the quantity of energy
services can vary independently, consumers (or producers) will tend to
substitute additional capacity (and flexibility) for the energy service
itself. This lowers utilization rates and optimal efficiency. This
tendency was demonstrated in Section 1.6.
It is a general principle of economics that the existence of
substitutes in production and consumption tends to reduce the impact of
external economic shocks. The methodology of least-cost analysis allows
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increased efficiency in the production of energy services to substitute
for energy-inputs or fuels, as energy prices rise. However, that
methodology excludes the possibility of substituting increased
flexibility in the production of energy services for some portion of
those services. Least-cost methodology also excludes the possibility of
substituting the consumption of non-energy services for the the
consumption of energy services. BIecause of these characteristics,
least-cost methodogy will tend to overstate both the importance of
increases in energy efficiency and the overall impact of high energy
prices on the economy as a whole. The general perspective created by
least-cost analysis may be seriously biased.
2. The Formulation of the Least-Cost Concept
Having already raised some questions about the desirability of the
least-cost approach, I would like to consider the meaning of the terms
"cost" and "least-cost," and discuss the different ways in which the
concept of least cost can be formulated. The task of adding up the costs
of providing energy services to the entire nation is extremely broad and
varied. In pursuit of this endeavor, even the most detached analyst will
be forced to make a long series of decisions entailing value judgments
and predictions. These decisions will constitute an implicit definition
of what the analyst means by the cost of a strategy and will ultimately
affect choice of which strategy is the least-cost strategy.
Here are some examples of decisions that must be made in computing
the cost of a national energy strategy: Should payments for
I I- - - M,
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already-existing capital goods be counted as costs? What value should be
placed on environmental quality? Should the actual price of natural gas
be used to evaluate the cost of gas? Or, should the analyst use some
estimate of the price of gas that would prevail in the absence of
regulation? What are appropriate minimum ambient temperatures.for
various categories of buildings? If a strategy includes governmental
regulations, should costs be computed on the assumption of complete
compliance with those regulations? If not, how should the costs of
cheating be evaluated? Will a particular strategy induce innovation and
market penetration of new, more efficient technologies? Should the
quantity of available oil be constrained to equal known reserves? Or
should the discovery of new deposits be assumed?
It should be obvious, I think, that there are no clear-cut right or
wrong answers to these questions. Many of the answers ought to turn on
the purpose of the cost calculations. But one point is clear: The
identification and description of the least-cost strategy will be of
little value unless the analyst diligently communicates his answers to
all of these questions and many others. In fact, any depiction of a
least-cost strategy without careful documentation of these decisions may
prove to be seriously misleading.
Each of the cost-defining decisions tends to answer one of the
following four general questions: Which resource expenditures are
counted as costs? At what prices are expended resources evaluated? What
variables are endogenous to the cost-minimization process? What
constraints are used in conjunction with the least-cost objective
function? One of the sections below is devoted to each of these general
_ _I~^_)__ _~ I
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questions.
2.1 Which Resource Expenditures Are Counted as Costs?
Answering this question requires a number of careful value
judgments. Below, I discuss some general points that arise in connection
with costing out all resources, and then I discuss costing-out specific
resources.
2.1.1 Money Expenditures vs. Resource Expenditures
It is important to consider as costs the real use or expenditure of
scarce economic resources rather than money payments. Sometimes the two
go together, but sometimes they do not. For example, federal, state and
local taxes are money costs that do not, in themselves, involve the
expenditure of scarce economic resources. Thus, taxes normally should
not be counted as an economic cost. However, when a specific energy
strategy requires the government to provide a certain service, the value
of that service should be counted as a cost.
The degradation of the environment is an example of a resource
expenditure usually not associated with a money payment. It is important
to count all such costs, even though it may be difficult to assign a
value to them.
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2.1.2 Point of View
This brings us to a closely related and equally general point: From
whose point of view are costs defined? From the point of view of
corporate stockholders, the corporate income tax is a cost, because it
gives the government, an 'outsider,' a claim on the real resources owned
by those stockholders. But from the point of view of the nation as a
whole, the corporate income tax is not a cost. It is simply a transfer
of resources from one group of citizens to another; both groups are
'insiders.' No resources are actually expended in that transfer.
We are frequently concerned about costs from the national point of
view. Thus, for example, all of the funds paid to foreign governments
for oil are considered to be costs. This makes sense because those funds
give foreigners (outsiders) a claim on our own real resources. It should
be understood, however, that it would be perfectly valid for an analyst
to be concerned with costs from the point of view, say, of all of
humanity. In that case, the profits paid to an OPEC member by virtue of
OPEC's monopoly power would be considered a simple transfer of resources
from one inside group to another, and not a true expenditure of
resources. Only the "competitive" value of oil would be counted as a
cost, for only that part of the money payment represents the value of the
oil in its best alternative use.
When the analyst determines the point of view, she is making a value
judgment that cannt be declared 'right' or 'wrong.' But those of us who
form the audience For the analysis are entitled to know whose point of
view was adopted.
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2.1.3 Capital Goods
Should the (levelized) cost of existing in-place capital goods be
included in the cost of an energy strategy? The answer to this question
depends on the purpose of the least-cost analysis.
Suppose, for a moment, that the analysis was motivated by the
following question: "How much would we have saved if we had had the
foresight to invest in efficient capital equipment rather than in the
inefficient equipment we now use?" This is a question of historical
interest. It is addressed to what we should have or might have done, not
to what we ought to do at the current time. The motivating question
implicitly requires that we view the world from the standpoint of the
time before current investment decisions were made. Thus, in trying to
answer this motivating question, we must put existing capital goods on
the same footing as alternative capital goods. Therefore, the cost of
both existing and alternative capital goods should be included in our
calculations.
Suppose, however, that we are attempting to solve the very practical
planning problem: "In what type of equipment should we now invest?" In
asking this question, we are looking forwards, not backwards. We must
view the installation of existing equipment as an irreversible event. If
existing equipment has no use other than to produce energy services, then
there are no economic costs (lost opportunities) entailed in using it for
that purpose. Therefore, in this case, capital charges for existing
equipment should be excluded from our calculations. Capital charges for
--- '-loIYIImIlI ilmiliii Al
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new equipment, however, should be fully included.
The analyst's Jecision to include or exclude capital charges on
existing equipment is a crucial one. It should be documented and
carefully justified.
2.1.4 Implementation of the Energy Strategy
We now turn our discussion to issues that relate to the social
organization of energy production. These social issues frequently entail
substantial resour:e expenditures.
Consider an energy-production strategy that requires a well-insulated
housing stock. For that strategy to be implemented, homeowners must be
informed that insulation is advantageous and induced to install it in
their homes. I.f the economic benefits of insulation do not accrue
directly to the homeowners, if the homeowners do not perceive those
benefits, or if the homeowners are irrational, then regulation and
enforcement may be necessary to implement an insulation program.
Providing homeowners with information on 'nsulation and its economic
effects may be costly. The regulatory process can also be extremely
costly. Vast resource expenditures may be required to enforce
regulations. Should these costs be included in the cost of the
associated energy strategy?
Or consider the following closely related question. Suppose that a
particular strategy calls for a large number of nuclear power plants.
These plants are highly unpopular among some segments of the population,
and their construction might make those people very unhappy indeed.
________________________________ 
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Should such "psychological" costs be included in the analyst's cost
calculations? Suppose that the construction of nuclear power plants
would likely induce widespread social unrest? Should the cost of such
unrest be tabulated and included in the cost of the associated strategy?
The appropriate answers to these questions depend on the identity of
the policymakers for whom the least-cost analysis is intended. If one
wants to convince nuclear opponents that nuclear power is desirable
because it is inexpensive, it does not make sense to include the
psychological state of those nuclear opponents as a cost of nuclear
power. But if the analysis is being conducted on behalf of'a politician
who is concerned with popular sentiments as well as with dollar and
cents, it may make perfect sense to convert sentiments to dollar-costs.
2.1.5 Diminution of Benefits
The least-cost methodology explicitly excludes consideration of the
benefits of energy service, a fact I have discussed at some length. In
principle, energy services are specified in advance, and all strategies
considered provide the same energy service. In fact, however, no two
energy strategies provide exactly the same energy services. For example,
improvements in the thermal shell of buildings may degrade ventilation to
some extent, causing benefits of space heating to be slightly
diminished. In order to make different energy strategies comparable,
such diminutions of benefits can and should be treated as costs of the
strategy with which they are associated. Any increases in benefits
I lMilIMMUM
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should be subtracted from strategy costs.
Very often, energy-efficient equipment is less convenient than
energy inefficient equipment. Efficient automobiles are often
characterized by cramped interiors, sluggish acceleration, high noise
levels and manual transmissions. Such inconveniences should be charged
off as added costs of efficiency if the analysis is to avoid a
pro-efficiency bias.
Of course, translation of inconveniences to costs requires numerous
value judgments. Often, these judgments can be facilitated by data
descriptive of consumer willingness to pay for added conveniences.
2.1.6 Conclusion
There are no simple answers to the question: "Which resource
expenditures should be counted as costs?" Many decisions in this area
require value judgments by the analyst. Many decisions depend on the
point of view of the analysis. It is essential, therefore, that these
decisions be well-documented and explained.
2.2 At What Prices Should Expended Resources Be Evaluated?
The evaluation of expended resources is a difficult process requiring
good judgment and forecasting ability. When a resource is bought and
sold in a competitive market, the actual price tends to reflect true
economic scarcity. Therefore, competitive prices are normally a good
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index of current resource value. Unfortunately, competitive prices are
often unavailable to the analyst. This may be because a resource is not
traded in a competitive market, or it may be because the analyst cannot
secure the relevant market data. Often, the analyst needs to know the
future value of a resource, and it may be difficult to forecast such
values even when current values are known. There is no single "right"
way to evaluate resources, but there are many wrong ways to do it. I
will discuss a number of them.
2.2.1 Resources Traded in Competitive Markets
When a resource is traded in a competitive market, the competitive
price forms a good starting point for resource evaluation. But even in
this simplest case, difficulties can arise. As an example, consider the
case of coal. Coal is one of the few basic energy sources whose supply
is competitive. But coal is not homogeneous; nor is the railroad system
that transports the coal. Since coal supplies differ by quality and by
location, there are a very large number of competitive prices available,
one for each type of coal and for each location in which it is traded.
Furthermore, although the national market for coal tends to be
competitive, some firms may exercise local monopoly power. More
importantly, the market for coal miners is unionized. Consequently, the
wage bill in the coal-mining sector may overstate the true economic costs
of that labor. This would be reflected in the market price for coal, so
that a downward price adjustment might be desirable.
There are other non-competitive factors in coal supply. Some states,
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and the federal government have imposed taxes and royalty charges on coal
production. These fees may affect a sufficiently large proportion of
coal to drive up its market price in some regions.
We can see then, that even competitive prices should be examined to
determine how well they reflect underlying economic scarcity. They may
deviate from scarcity values for a variety of reasons: non-competitive
elements in resource supply and transportation, externalities in resource
production, or because of buyers and sellers who are poorly informed
about market conditions or who have incorrect expectations about the
future. When substantial deviations exist, price adjustments in the
computation of costs may be desirable.
2.2.2 Regulated Markets
Prices in regulated markets rarely have the virtue of reflecting true
economic scarcity. Therefore, it is important to try to estimate the
economic cost of delivering marginal units of the resource involved.
This is an extremely difficult task. For ,atural resources, like gas,
both production and depletion costs must b! consider(!d. And depletion
costs, the value of the resource in its ne.t best alternative use
(possibly in the future), cannot be calculated with conventional
accounting procedures. Some economists have proposed complicated dynamic
optimization techniques to find them, but at this time the state of the
art has not been advanced far.
Both natural gas and electricity fall into the category of resources
whose production and sale are regulated, and there is reason to believe
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that their regulated prices underestimate their economic value. The
analyst must do his/her best to make appropriate price adjustments. The
difficulty of the problem is not a good reason to cost out these
resources at the regulated price.
2.2.3 Resources with Strategy-Dependent Prices
When the production of energy services consumes a large portion of
the available quantity of a resource, the price of that resource may well
depend on the energy strategy implemented. In such cases, estimating the
economic cost of the resource used up by a given strategy, requires
knowledge not only of the price that would prevail given the
implementation of that strategy, but of the entire supply curve for that
resource. This is because of the fact that the a competitive market
price reflects the economic cost of the marginal (last) unit of the
resource delivered; previous units are less costly. If a strategy uses
only a small portion of the supply of a resource, then the value of the
last unit is a good approximation for the value of all units used by that
strategy. Otherwise, each succeeding unit of the resource must be valued
differently. The conventional technique for evaluating the cost of such
a resource is to calculate the area under the supply curve, bound by the
quantity of the resource usage external to the strategy, on the one side,
and total resource usage, including that of the strategy, on the other
side.
A supply curve for a resource is illustrated in Figure I. Suppose
the non-energy sector of the economy uses quantity Qo of the resource,
D-30
while the energy-service sector specified by a given energy strategy uses
quantity Q of that resource. Then the shaded area corresponds to the
economic cost of the resource used up in the given strategy.
As an example, consider an energy strategy specifying extensive
retrofitting of heating systems. Suppose that the retrofitting work
would use a substantial portion of the available labor. time of plumbers
over a period of several years. To calculate the economic cost of the
plumbers' labor, one would determine the supply curve for plumbers, and
calculate the area designated in Figure 1. Notice that the last plumber
used costs quite a bit more than the first plumber used. Because more
and more plumbers are used, each succeeding plumber is withdrawn from
important alternative work.
Figure 1
Price
Supply
Curve
- Economic Cost
of Resource
Quantity of
QQ+Q ResourceQo 0
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2.2.4 Future Costs
Calculating the cost of an energy strategy projected into the future
requires some form of economic forecasting ability. Good forecasting
techniques can range from educated "guestimation" to sophisticated
econometric forecasting models. In order to obtain some sort of
confidence interval for cost estimates, it is important to conduct
sensitivity studies with respect to all forecasted parameters and data.
Usually, it is useful to present results for several variants of the key
parameters.
If important parameters are highly uncertain, the strategy that is
optimal for the most likely (or expected) outcome of the parameters
generally will not be the optimal strategy. This is because of the need
to "hedge one's bets" in an uncertain world. If key parameters are
unknown, it is often best.to postpone irreversible commitments.
Consider, as an example, the problem of developing a strategy for
long-term investments in electricity generating equipment. If it is
certain that in the future coal-fired boilers will be less expensive to
operate than gas-fired boilers, then coal-fired boilers should be
installed. If the opposite is certain, then gas-fired boilers should be
installed. But it does not follow that a combination of gas-fired and
coal-fired boilers is a good strategy when relative costs are uncertain.
It may be much better to hedge with stop-gap investments in small gas
turbines until more information emerges about future costs.
In short, the kinds of strategies appropriate to a highly uncertain
world are qualitatively different from those suited to a certain world,
_ ___ I~~ ~_ _ _
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whatever the description of that certain world may be. The best strategy
for the best guess about future prices may be a poor strategy indeed. To
find the least-cost strategy in the face of uncertainty, the analyst may
be best advised to use stochastic optimization techniques. Needless to
say, the application of such complicated techniques to large systems of
variables is highly problematical. In any event, an appreciation of the
implications of uncertainty is useful.
2.3 What Variables are Endogenous to the Cost-Minimization Process?
The analyst's answer to this question will determine the scope of the
policy model. The analyst must find a natural boundary for the problem.
All variables outside that boundary are to be specified as parameters in
advance of the analysis or omitted from consideration entirely; the
values of the variables within that boundary will be determined by the
analysis itself. In the design of a policy model for selecting a
minimum-cost energy strategy, there are a number of broad classes of
candidates for endogenous variables. These include important
macroeconomic variables, capital stock by technology type, energy
supplies by source, utilization rates of energy-using capital, innovation
of energy-related technologies, energy prices, and prices of non-energy
resources.
Selecting the endogenous variables for a policy model is an
analytical task requiring substantial creativity. Nevertheless, a few
general common-sense rules may be formulated. Variables that define the
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strategy being sought must be endogenous. With respect to the selection
of a least-cost energy strategy, the capital stock by technology type is
at the heart of any strategy description, and so must be endogenous.
Variables whose values are sensitive to the strategy chosen should also
be endogenous. If a group of variables is highly interdependent, then
either all should be endogenous or else enough of them should be
exogenously specified to determine the rest uniquely. For example, it
would not be logical to make the supply of coal endogenous and the supply
of natural gas exogenous.
If one variable causally determines the value of another, it would
not make sense to have the former endogenous and the latter exogenous.
More generally, causality may run from exogenous variable to endogenous,
from endogenous to endogenous, but not from endogenous to exogenous.
These rules are a rough guide to logical consistency in policy model
design. But the overall blueprint of the model, the decision about what
variables will be at its focus, should depend on the ultimate purpose of
the analysis. Almost every variable explicitly represented in a model
adds to its conceptual difficulty, its cost and its completion time. It
is important to keep this fact in mind during the crucial task of
choosing the level of aggregation for the model. Variables should be
omitted entirely unless they are to the point of the analysis. It
probably would not be a good idea to have a variable representing
academic salaries in a model of energy strategies. Academic salaries are
extraordinarily important, but, in the opinion of most authorities on the
subject, they are not closely related to the energy question. Every
variable included in the analysis should be relevant from a conceptual
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point of view.
I will now proceed to consider some specific classes of variables.
Then I will discuss the limitations of the least-cost methodolgy in this
connection.
2.3.1 Capital Stock by Technology Type
The capital stock of energy-service producing equipment is at the
heart of any energy-strategy model, and must be represented as a decision
variable. The difficult question in this connection is the appropriate
level of detail. In general, it is usually suggested that highly
aggregated representations are preferable until the structure of the
model is well understood and under control.
2.3.2 Capacity-Utilization Rates of Energy Consuming Equipment
As I have explained in a previous section, capacity utilization rate
variables are extremely important aspects of an energy strategy. Along
with fuel prices, they determine the appropriate rate of substitution
between capital costs and energy efficiency. With the cost of obtaining
efficiency given, the higher the energy price and the higher the
utilization rate, the more efficiency is justified.
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2.3.3 Efficiency of Energy-Consuming Equipment
The efficiency variable is at the foundation of any energy strategy.
It may be represented either as a continuous variable, where each level
of efficiency has an associated capital cost, or as a discrete variable,
associated with the technology type of the equipment and the cost of that
equipment.
2.3.4 Energy Supplies and Prices by Source
If the energy strategies under study are U.S. national strategies,
then energy prices and associated supply variables that depend on those
strategies should be endogenous. The domestic supplies and prices of
coal and natural gas are examples. If prices are modelled as exogenous
parameters, there is an implicit assumption that supply is perfectly
elastic at its parametrically given price. This is unrealistic for coal
and gas. If quantities are modelled as exogenous parameters, then there
is an implicit assumption that supply is perfectly inelastic or,
equivalently, that the amount of the resource that can be obtained is
independent of extraction or production costs.
2.3.5 Innovation
In the long run the amount of innovation that occurs in the area of
energy production and consumption will depend partly on the price of
energy inputs and services. Therefore least-cost energy analysis with
long time horizons should make energy innovation an endogenous variable.
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Of course, it is very difficult to make accurate predictions about the
quantity and effect of innovations. The analyst may choose to seek
expert opinion.
2.3.6 Limitations of the Least-Cost Methodology
As I have noted above, least-cost methodology requires that benefits
be exogenous and specified in advance. Therefore, there are several
categories of variables that cannot be endogenous to a least-cost model.
These include demands for energy services and macroeconomic variables.
The prices of energy services will be highly sensitive to the energy
strategy selected. Therefore, if the demand for a particular energy
service is price-elastic, then the quantity of that service demanded
should be, but cannot be, endogenous to the least-cost model. To specify
demand exogenously is to assume that either the price of energy services
will not depend on the energy strategy, or that service demand is price
inelastic. This is unrealistic for most energy services.
Energy is so fundamental to our economy that our overall economic
performance is likely to depend on the energy strategy selected.
Therefore, it would be desirable to endogenize a number of key
macroeconomic variables. But this is incompatible with the least cost
methodology.
The inability of the least-coast methodology to represent the causal
connection between energy strategy, on the one hand, and demand and
macroeconomic performance, on the other, is a serious limitation of that
methodology.
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2.4 What constraints are used in conjunction with the least-cost
objective function?
The least-cost methodology is a methodology of constrained
minimization. The very concept of least-cost has no meaning until
sufficient constraints are specified to define the feasible set of energy
strategies. The audience for a least-cost study will be unable to
interpret its results without clear knowledge of the model constraints.
2.4.1 Simulation of Base-Year Data
At some time during the process of model development, it is important
to have the model constrained sufficiently to simulate actual production
of energy services during the base year for which data is available.
Forcing a model to simulate known data has two benefits. First, the
model is partially validated. A model that cannot correctly simulate
something that has actually happened probably cannot simulate future
events of a similar nature. Second, the set of constraints needed to
simulate the base-year case provides a point of comparison with different
sets of constraints yielding different least-cost strategies. When we
see a strategy with a lower cost than that associated with existing
behavior, it is useful to be able to answer the question, "What
constraints were dropped?"
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2.4.2 The Economic and Technological Environment
Constraints must be used to describe various features of the economic
and technological environment including energy sources, energy conversion
technologies and industrial production technologies. Furthermore, upper
and lower bounds on stocks of certain capital goods must be present in
order to force model conformance with real-world base-year capital
stocks. It would not make much sense to allow the model to make drastic
changes in the stock of structures over a short period, for example.
Constraints must often be added to the model in order to force a measure
of realism on areas of the model that are loosely specified. In models
that do not endogenize innovation and technical change, it may be
desirable to have constraints on rates of technical change and market
penetration of new technologies.
3. Conclusions
The most serious limitation of the least-cost methodology is that it
focuses on costs and cannot take benefits into account. But both costs
and benefits depend on the national energy strategy selected. To specify
a level of benefits or energy services that prevailed during a period of
low energy prices biases the energy strategy that i; chosen towards
increased efficiency in energy consumption.
The least-cost methodology does have the advantige, however, of
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avoiding all of the problems attendant to benefits computation. This is
one argument that can be made in favor of its use. In the context of
selecting a national energy strategy, however, I do not find the argument
convincing. As I have pointed out above, the concept of cost has
critical subjective elements, as does the concept of aenefits. The
decisions of the analyst regarding the evaluation of expended resources
can have a critical impact on cost figures.
The subjective elements in least-cost analysis impose a number of
obligations on the analyst. The analyst must be consistent in approach.
Decisions must be appropriate for the purpose of the analysis. But most
important of all, the analyst must meticulously document an.1 subjective
input and assumptions. Lack of such documentation prevents other parties
interpretion of the results of the analysis in a meaningful way and can
cause those results to be confusing or misleading.
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